Political tension is rife in Lebanon following the government’s approval of the “objectives” paper submitted by US Envoy Tom Barrack last week. The document outlines a timetable and mechanism for disarming Hizbullah, which, prior to its recent confrontation with Israel, was the most influential political and military force in the country.
The government, led by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, has tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces with drafting a plan to achieve the objectives before the end of the year, a move categorically rejected by the Tehran-backed party.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun took office after being elected by the Lebanese Parliament following the assassination of former Hizbullah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah by Israel in 2024.
His nomination was rejected by Hizbullah and its senior political and military leadership. Salam, who comes from a movement opposed to the party, was also appointed prime minister after Aoun assumed the presidency.
Lebanon’s approval of the objectives caused Barrack to post his approval on X.
“Congratulations… for making the historic, bold, and correct decision this week to begin fully implementing the November 2024 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,” he said. The agreement ended the war between Hizbullah and Israel last autumn under US mediation and stipulated that arms would be limited to six official security and military agencies.
French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, whose country is regarded as the historical sponsor and founder of the Lebanese state, echoed Barrack’s statement on X. He congratulated the Beirut authorities on their “brave and historic decision” regarding Hizbullah’s weapons, expressing his belief that it would enable Lebanon to “pursue full sovereignty.”
Barrot welcomed the decision as being that of a strong state holding a monopoly on legitimate force, capable of protecting all sects, rebuilding a country ravaged by war and economic crisis, and safeguarding its territorial integrity within borders agreed upon with its neighbours.
Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Jassim Al-Budaiwi welcomed Lebanon’s decision to restrict the possession of weapons to the state, in line with the Taif Agreement that ended the country’s Civil War and relevant international resolutions, and in implementation of Aoun’s inaugural presidential address.
He stressed the need to implement UN Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, particularly Resolution 1701, and the Taif Agreement, in order to restore security and stability, safeguard the country’s territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders, and extend the government’s authority nationwide.
In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared that Iran supports Hizbullah’s stance after the group rejected the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm it.
“Any decision in this regard will ultimately be up to Hizbullah,” Araghchi said in a televised interview. “We support it from a distance, but we do not interfere in its decisions,” he added, noting that the group has “rebuilt” its capabilities following the losses it suffered in last year’s war with Israel.
Ali Akbar Velayati, adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also voiced opposition to the Lebanese government’s decision. In an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, he said that “Iran definitely opposes the disarmament of Hizbullah, because it has always supported the Lebanese people and the resistance and continues to do so.”
The Lebanese Foreign Ministry condemned what it described as “blatant and unacceptable” Iranian interference in its internal affairs in reference to Velayati’s remarks, stressing that Lebanon “will not allow any external party, friend or foe, to speak on behalf of its people or claim guardianship over its sovereign decisions.”
At the end of April, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry summoned Iranian Ambassador Mojtaba Amani to clarify his remarks on Hizbullah’s disarmament.
The summons followed a post by Amani on X in which he described the disarmament plan, without explicitly naming Hizbullah, as “a clear conspiracy against countries,” adding that “once those countries surrender to demands for disarmament, they become vulnerable to attack and occupation.”
After the summons, Amani referred to the matter as “an internal Lebanese affair,” according to Lebanese media reports.
For the first time since the 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the 1975-1990 Civil War and disarmed the militias that took part in it, the Lebanese government has moved to disarm Hizbullah, the sole faction allowed to retain its weapons at the time under the pretext of “resistance” against Israel.
The new decision strips Hizbullah of the political legitimacy that previous governments had enshrined in their ministerial statements through the so-called “army, people, and resistance” formula. At that time, Hizbullah was the most influential political and military force in Lebanon, enjoying backing from Damascus and Tehran.
The balance of power, however, has shifted with the formation of the current government. Hizbullah emerged weakened from last year’s war with Israel, while Tehran suffered a major setback following a 12-day war with Israel in June, and the regime of former president Bashar Al-Assad, an ally of Tehran, in Syria collapsed.
Previous attempts to disarm Hizbullah have triggered political crises and security turmoil in Lebanon, most notably in 2008 when the government decided to dismantle the party’s wired communications network. On 7 May that year, Hizbullah forces invaded Beirut, sparking clashes with supporters of its political opponents that left more than 65 people dead.
Hizbullah’s arms have remained a central point of political division in Lebanon: one camp calls for full state sovereignty over all Lebanese territory and sole authority in matters of war and peace, while the other, led by Hizbullah, insists on retaining its weapons to confront Israel and “protect” Lebanon.
However, Hizbullah has long been accused of using its arms to dominate the country’s internal political scene.
Hizbullah’s initial reaction to the government’s decision was defiant. It refused to disarm, and in a statement late last week declared it would treat the decision “as if it did not exist,” describing it as a “grave sin.”
The group could respond by having its four ministers resign from the government, disrupting the work of Parliament. Hizbullah and its allies command a parliamentary bloc with considerable political influence, which they have previously used to block proceedings or reject major decisions.
Another option would be to mobilise street protests, drawing on its sizeable Shia support base. But here the political options begin to narrow, and all other courses of action are fraught with difficulty and high cost.
Most analysts agree that Hizbullah has not been completely defeated, but it is far from being up to its 2006 strength. Few can claim the group has emerged unscathed after losing much of its political and military leadership, including its figurehead of three decades, Hassan Nasrallah.
Its once-formidable arsenal has diminished and replenishing it has become far more difficult following the loss of its key ally, the Al-Assad regime in Syria that has now been replaced by an adversary with whom Hizbullah fought fierce battles during the years of the Syrian Civil War.
Party leaders understand that provoking a confrontation with Israel, thereby triggering a war to divert attention, is now almost impossible. But confronting the Lebanese Army would plunge the country into a full-scale tragedy.
In such a scenario, Hizbullah would face opposition from nearly all the Lebanese factions except its own supporters. Yet the army, which includes a significant number of Shia soldiers and officers, is unlikely to remain united in a prolonged confrontation.
A confrontation between the army and Hizbullah would risk reigniting civil war in a country that is deeply fractured along sectarian lines. Lebanese Christians are split between factions aligned with the West and the Gulf and those wary of Sunni Political Islam’s dominance in Syria.
This divide runs through the Maronites, the largest Christian community, as well as other Orthodox Christian groups.
The Sunnis fear losing their last significant position of power: the premiership. Since the end of the Civil War in the early 1990s, the prime minister’s office has become the main centre of Lebanese decision-making, particularly during the era of the late Rafik Al-Hariri, a Western- and Gulf-backed figure who spearheaded the country’s largest reconstruction projects.
Much of the Sunni middle class also fears the rise of Political Islam in Damascus, which they believe would be even more radical if a confrontation were to erupt.
The Druze community is likewise divided. One camp remains loyal to leader Walid Jumblatt, who has aligned himself with Syria’s new government under Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, who is credited with arresting suspects in the 1976 assassination of Jumblatt’s father, a killing widely attributed to then-Syrian president Hafez Al-Assad’s regime.
The other camp sympathises with the Syrian Druze in the south, who are resisting the Al-Sharaa government. Jumblatt has publicly criticised Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri, the spiritual leader of Syria’s Druze, for appealing to Israel for support.
Although the Shias are Lebanon’s most cohesive sect, they have little appetite for another confrontation, especially after the heavy losses sustained during the Syrian Civil War, when Hizbullah fought alongside the Al-Assad regime. They were equally reluctant during the 2024 conflict with Israel, which Hizbullah’s supporters portrayed as a victory, but which many viewed as a replay of the July 2006 war, without decisive gains.
If Syrian forces were to intervene on the side of the Lebanese government and army to enforce Hizbullah’s disarmament, Damascus would find itself confronting the minority Alawites in its coastal regions, Lebanon’s Shias, and the Syrian Druze in the south.
With there being no certainty that Lebanon’s Christians would support Syria’s new government, the crisis would become even more complex.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 14 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Short link: