The European signatories to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal known as the E3 and made up of the UK, France, and Germany have triggered what is called a “snapback mechanism” to re-impose international sanctions on Iran.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the official name of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, allows the parties to ask the UN Security Council to end the sanctions relief included in the deal.
The E3 set a deadline of 31 August for Iran to engage in negotiations with the US, which withdrew from the deal in 2018, and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Organisation (IAEA) to avoid triggering the snapback mechanism.
Two days after a non-productive meeting between Iranian officials and representatives of the E3 in Geneva on 26 August, the Europeans announced they were notifying the Security Council of the snapback triggering.
The JCPOA gives the Security Council ten days to initiate a resolution to continue providing sanctions relief to Iran after an E3 member notifies it of Iran’s “significant non-performance.”
All prior UN sanctions would return 30 days after the initial referral to the council if the resolution to extend relief does not pass or a Permanent Member vetoes it. The mechanism is currently set to expire on 18 October.
From Iranian official statements, it looks as if the ten-day window will not allow any resolution to stumble in the E3-Tehran talks. The European offer to extend the relief for six months provided Tehran allows concessions was nearly rejected by Iran. Meanwhile, Russia and China, the other signatories to the JCPOA, are submitting a Draft Resolution to the Security Council to extend the sanctions relief until next April.
However, no conditions specific to Iran are attached. It is not guaranteed that this resolution will pass, especially as two of the E3 states plus the US are Permanent Members of the Security Council with veto power.
Since Iran suspended cooperation with the IAEA following the Israeli and US attacks in June, there has been an escalation of the US and Western pressure on Tehran. As the Israeli and US strikes were not conclusive in eliminating Iran’s nuclear programme, it is understood that an Iran war 2.0 is in the making.
Babak Negahdari, head of Iran’s Parliamentary Research Centre, said the real impact of re-imposed UN sanctions “will be far less than existing US sanctions,” according to Iranian media reports. He added that activating the snapback mechanism under UN Security Resolution 2231 could be tolerated if “handled carefully.”
“The real pressure on Iran has come from US secondary sanctions, which affect every part of the economy and continued even during the nuclear deal,” Negahdari said.
The Iranian media also quoted Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad as saying that a return of the sanctions would create restrictions on Iran’s oil sales, but Tehran “has learned to bypass them and exports won’t be shut in.”
In response to the European move, Iranian MPs have introduced a three-part bill to withdraw Iran from the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The bill would require Iran to leave the NPT and its Additional Protocol, end all negotiations with the United States and the E3, and terminate cooperation with the IAEA.
The E3 move, along with IAEA reports on Iran’s nuclear activity and non-compliance with monitoring, seems to be part of a build-up to justify attacking Iran again, primarily by Israel and possibly with US involvement.
The next attack on Iran would be more expansive and probably last longer. Many analysts and commentators expect that it could be as early as next month and extend towards the end of the year.
In a blog for Global Security Review, a US website, Defence and Security Adviser Mohamed Al-Doh concluded that Israel’s strategic imperatives, Iran’s defensive mobilisation, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political calculus are all converging factors pointing towards the scenario of war.
Israel, along with the US, quickly welcomed the E3 decision. In his quest to keep Israel at war, Netanyahu is stepping up his attacks on Lebanon and Syria. These are not geared towards fighting Iranian influence, which has been severely diminished, but to achieve two goals: diverting attention from the massacre and destruction his army is inflicting on the Gaza Strip and silencing any internal opposition to his policy on the pretext that the “the country is at war.”
Israel has attacked Yemen twice over the past few days, intensifying its war on the country as it is now the only Iranian proxy still targeting Israel with missiles and drones. There is also a conviction in Israel that Iran is using the Yemeni Houthi militia to experiment with the use of new missiles, though Iran has denied supplying the Houthis with weapons.
The Yemenis also stress that they manufacture their own drones and missiles, probably with technical help from Lebanese Hizbullah advisers.
Last week, the Houthis fired a cluster bomb against Israel targeting Ben Gurion International Airport. The missile head fragmented mid-air following several interception attempts, but the Israeli Air Force official warned that it had posed a serious threat.
It was the first time that this type of missile has arrived from Yemen, as the Houthis had not fired such a weapon since 2023 when they began attacking Israel following the start of the war on Gaza.
The Israeli Ynet website reported that one of the hypotheses being examined in the Israeli military investigations is that the projectile contained cluster munitions similar to those used by Iran to fire at Israeli cities during the earlier war in June.
Cluster munitions pose a challenge to interceptors as they disperse smaller explosives over a wide area. Five Israeli interceptors from various systems engaged with the missile, including THAAD, Arrow, David Sling and Iron Dome, yet some of its bombs managed to hit the ground.
Meanwhile, Iran says it is preparing for any scenario, including another Israeli attack. Responding to the probability of war, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi did not rule out a future confrontation with Israel, telling the Saudi-owned daily Asharq Al-Awsat last week that “anything is possible, and Tehran is prepared for all circumstances.”
In recent weeks, the news media in Iran has been preoccupied with talk of “dismantling a Mossad cell” in the country in a reference to Israeli intelligence operatives. Part of the heavy losses that Iran suffered in the June war was due to its vulnerability to Israeli Mossad activities in the country.
Iranian military figures have been talking publicly about the country’s readiness for the “next war.” They claim that the military had re-built its defence and attack capabilities with new and more developed ballistic missiles that have now been stockpiled. Some reports also mention China stepping up its military assistance to Iran, though there has been no confirmation from Beijing or Tehran of such enhanced military assistance.
The Western media has also repeated reports in the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth of China “now actually rebuilding” Iran’s missile arsenal after the war between Iran, Israel, and the US earlier this year.
According to the Atlantic Council think tank in the US, China might not be shipping ready-made missiles to Iran, but that it would step up its technical help that dates back to the time the Iranian missile programme started after the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.
“In fact, some of the missiles transferred by Iran to Hizbullah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen were believed to be copies of Chinese C-704 and C-802 missiles. In exchange for this technical assistance, China received Iranian oil supplies at a discount price,” the article said.
Israel is also strengthening its missile-defence systems along with enhancing its air force. It recently signed a deal to acquire more mid-air refuelling aircraft that could help its fighters stay longer over Iran when war comes.
The US is also providing more military support to Israel beyond replenishing its ammunition stocks depleted by the war on Gaza. The recent reinforcement of its positions in Syria is giving Israel a leap forward in launching aerial attacks beyond Iraq into Iranian territory. That expansion is also widening the anti-missile defence area around Israel.
There is almost a consensus among analysts and commentators that an Iran war 2.0 is not a question of if, but when. Most likely it will be triggered by Israel starting a war, though on this occasion US involvement is not guaranteed.
What might cause the next war to be longer is Iran seeing it as an existential one and not only as a conflict aimed at destroying its nuclear and missile capabilities. As a result, Tehran’s response would likely be stronger than in the war in June, when the Iranians were still hoping for diplomatic advances with America and Europe.
Even if Iran’s firepower could not inflict significant damage inside Israel on that occasion, there is still the ultimate option of targeting US and Western interests in the region.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 4 September, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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