Last Tuesday, Israel launched a series of strikes targeting the Hamas leadership in the Qatari capital Doha as part of an operation dubbed “Summit of Fire.”
The targeted building was 25 to 35 km from the Al-Udeid Air Base located southwest of central Doha, which is the largest US military base in the Middle East and hosts around 10,000 personnel.
From this base, American Patriot batteries have protected Qatar against Iranian missile launches. However, they did not prevent this Israeli attack, despite tracking the Israeli aircraft responsible.
The base houses one of the world’s best early warning radar systems, the Raytheon FPS-132 UEW Radar, located within the Qatar Early Warning Radar Complex (QEWR) in the Al-Khor area of Northern Qatar. This radar has a range of up to 4,828 km (3,000 miles) and can monitor vast regions, including parts of China and Russia. This raises many questions.
A Qatari statement after the attack said that “the Israeli enemy used weapons today that were not detected by radars.” A US official told the news website Axios that “on Tuesday morning, the US military spotted Israeli jets flying east towards the Gulf. The US sought clarification, but by the time Israel provided it, missiles were already in the air.”
This suggests that the attack was not carried out under US sponsorship, but rather that the Israeli leadership insisted on imposing a fait accompli, as reflected in the American statements.
US President Donald Trump said that “the decision to attack Doha was made by Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu. It was not a decision made by me.”
According to an official statement from the White House, US Special Envoy Steve “Witkoff informed the Qataris before the attack. Trump feels very badly about the location of the Israeli attack. Trump believes this incident can serve as an opportunity for peace. Trump assured the Qataris that a similar attack will not happen again.”
However, these statements do not align with those made by Netanyahu in response to the strike in Qatar. He said that “I will pursue my enemies and overtake them. I will not turn back until I have annihilated them, as written in the Torah, and we will achieve this goal.”
Qatar’s Prime Minister Mohamed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani concluded the issue when he told the UN Security Council that “Israel, led by blusterous extremists, has gone beyond any borders, any limitations when it comes to behaviour. We are unable to predict what Israel will do. How can we host Israeli representatives when they have committed this attack?”
It seems that the Israelis imagined that the US would provide diplomatic cover for this incident and even allow them to push forward. Trump later stated that “I have directed Secretary of State Marco Rubio to finalise the [US] Defence Cooperation Agreement with Qatar.”
The developments have led some to question why the Gulf states agreed to host the American military bases, among them the Al-Udeid Base in Qatar. The obvious reason is protection against foreign intervention or invasion. At first, the concern was not specifically aimed at Iran, as is now claimed, as the history of these bases goes back much further.
In the early phase of the US bases in the Gulf, between the 1940s and 1970s, the US Navy established a small facility in Manama, Bahrain, to support its oil and shipping interests. In 1971, after Britain withdrew from “East of Suez,” the US set up Naval Support Activity Bahrain, which later became home to the US Fifth Fleet.
In the middle phase and during the post-Gulf War expansion in the 1990s, the US deployed large forces to Saudi Arabia (e.g. at the Prince Sultan Air Base). While initially temporary, this presence continued through the decade. US combat aircraft operated from there to enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq after the first Gulf War.
The US signed defence agreements with Qatar in 1992. In 1996, it began building the Al-Udeid Air Base, which by the 2000s had become the largest US base in the region and the forward headquarters of US Central Command (CENTCOM).
After the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991, the US and Kuwait signed a defence cooperation agreement, establishing camps such as Camp Arifjan and the Ali Al-Salem Air Base in Kuwait.
The last phase is from the early 2000s to the present. During this phase, the US gained access to the Al-Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi, which hosts US reconnaissance aircraft, drones, and fighter squadrons.
The US also has access to several Omani airfields (Thumrait, Masirah, and Al- Musannah). This dates back to a 1980 facilities agreement, but it grew after 2001 for US operations in Afghanistan.
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman remain the core hubs of US military activity in the Gulf today, with varying numbers of US troops and aircraft.
If these locations are plotted on a map, it will be seen that their primary goal is to secure the oil transport routes through the region, oil being the most valuable resource in the Gulf and a form of Arab leverage that the US and Israel struggled with during the 1973 War.
From these bases, the US provided military support and protection to the Gulf countries during Iraq’s aggression towards Kuwait in 1990. However, the situation has changed since then, and these bases have exposed these countries to Iranian threats of missile strikes, which occurred this year during the 12-day war between Israel and Iran.
The US intercepted the Iranian attacks, but its rules of engagement against the Israeli side are different and somewhat slower, making it easier for Israel to attack Qatar, as it did last week.
Many experts point to the urgent need to reassess the presence of US military bases and their defensive capabilities, in order to safeguard American troops, something that has recently occurred in Syria and Iraq.
There is also a growing emphasis on strengthening the US’ Gulf partners so that they can defend themselves rather than relying entirely on the United States.
It is also essential for the Gulf states to review their own strategies and military capabilities and to leverage their vast economic resources and well-educated human capital to build a genuine national defence force.
Nine years ago, Egypt proposed the idea of a joint Arab force modelled on NATO, something that reflects the Egyptian leadership’s wisdom and its understanding of the future dynamics of the Middle East.
If this proposal were implemented now, it would not be too late, especially since the current Israeli leadership continues its escalation without restraint or limitations from the United States.
It is increasingly difficult to predict what actions it might take against Iran, or even against neutral countries or those supporting the continuation of the peace process in the volatile Middle East.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 18 September, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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