This year proved to be one of the most turbulent that Iran has faced since the tumultuous decade that followed the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
It was a year in which the country found itself forced to rethink its strategic calculations, reorder its priorities, and repair the fractures left by the sudden collapse of allies and the relentless pressures of a shifting regional landscape.
Rather than the confident outward projection of influence that once defined its posture, Iran spent much of the year engaged in an inward reckoning, consolidating the home front and preparing its institutions for a future that was becoming more uncertain by the day.
In recent months, Iran has undergone significant internal realignment. Following the Israeli and American strikes last June, which claimed the lives of many high-ranking officials, a wave of appointments has reshaped the ranks of the security services, the army, and the Revolutionary Guard.
Concurrently, the authorities have moved to dismantle what they describe as espionage and sabotage networks, resulting in numerous arrests of individuals suspected of acting for foreign powers. Adding to this climate of consolidation, tens of thousands of Afghan refugees have been repatriated, driven by concerns that their precarious economic situation could make them vulnerable to recruitment against Iranian interests.
Moreover, domestic resilience and national unity are increasingly framed as core elements of national security. Cultural elites, media, and the state apparatus have begun reshaping the narrative of resistance, shifting its focus from a network of external alliances to an inward-looking struggle for “resilience, independence, and self-sufficiency.”
Economic hardship, sanctions, and external pressure are portrayed as trials meant to test the nation’s resolve. The emerging message is clear: if Iran cannot rely on proxies abroad, it must depend on its own people and on internal solidarity and the capacity to endure. In this reconceived narrative, civilian resilience, industrial self-reliance, and social cohesion become as strategically vital as missiles and drones.
Reformist politicians and academics in Iran told Al-Ahram Weekly that these measures reflect a broader strategic posture. Rather than anticipating a political opening with the West, Iran is bracing for what could be a new round of confrontation, perhaps with the United States, perhaps with Israel, perhaps with both, and one that might define not only the region’s balance of power, but Iran’s path for years to come.
This outlook, they note, stems from a perception of Israeli and American hostile intentions and the view that the European powers, in their subservience to Washington, lack an independent foreign policy towards the Middle East.
Yet Israel’s hostility, Washington’s unpredictability, and Europe’s lack of strategic independence are just some factors among many in an unstable regional equation. This means Iran cannot craft a decisive strategy. It is operating in a haze of uncertainty, forced to watch the landscape evolve while preparing for all options.
Iran started the year as a wounded state staring off the edge of a strategic cliff and a nation stripped of the external pillars that once shielded it from direct confrontation. The assassination of Hizbullah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and the decimation of the group’s senior command in September, along with the collapse of the Syrian regime in December, have not merely shaken Iran’s regional posture, but they have also cracked the foundation of its entire security doctrine.
With that axis disrupted, Iran is confronting the uncomfortable reality that the architecture it built to keep the US and Israel at arm’s length has been fundamentally shaken.
Today, Iran maintains no official military footprint in Syria; its Damascus embassy sits shuttered, and its direct access to Syrian political decision-making has vanished. An erstwhile sphere of influence has become a realm where Iran must now rely on intermediaries like Iraq and Russia merely to be heard in Syria.
The retreat of influence extends to Lebanon. Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Raji refused an invitation to visit Tehran in December, proposing instead a neutral third country in a telling diplomatic insult.
Iranian aircraft, including civilian flights carrying diplomats, now undergo inspections at Beirut Airport under suspicion of carrying money to Hizbullah. Even Iranian humanitarian aid destined for Southern Lebanon meets extreme difficulty, entering only sparingly if at all.
COMPLEX LANDSCAPE: The pace of this dramatic change has sparked fierce debate within Iran over how to navigate this newly complex landscape. True to form, when confronting pivotal challenges, the discourse has crystallised around two distinct poles.
One perspective, championed by the hardliners and the Revolutionary Guards, draws strength from past crises to affirm a staunch conviction: that America is immutable and untrustworthy. From this view, Iran’s security lies in holding fast to the revolutionary pillars that have long defined its path of self-reliance and the outright rejection of an American-designed Middle East, which, they argue, exists solely to crown Israel the victor.
The other perspective, long advocated by reformists and pragmatists, contends that Iran must now rethink its choices, particularly in the light of the resistance axis’ structural erosion. They urge a strategic recalibration, adapting tactically to the realities of the moment without surrendering the nation’s core enduring interests.
Yet, the crisis transcends political strategy and touches upon the very soul of the nation and its revolutionary identity. A potent domestic chorus is growing louder, one that champions an “Iran First” doctrine. Its proponents argue that Tehran has paid a staggering price in economic, human, military, and developmental terms for regional causes, sacrifices they believe have been squandered by the “unwise choices” of allies.
Their frustration is palpable. Many officials and analysts openly express their anger that Hamas initiated the 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel without broader consultation, just as they blame Al-Assad’s outreach to the Gulf and West, diluting axis coordination, for facilitating his own downfall.
This faction advocates a fundamental shift: to cast off the “revolutionary mantle” and don the “mantle of the state.” Their pragmatic creed prioritises tangible national interest above all, a view resonant with many of Iran’s youth and liberals.
Yet to the revolutionary generation and conservatives, this is anathema and a betrayal not just of political principle, but of the nation’s spiritual DNA. For them, supporting the oppressed and defying the oppressor is the essence of Iranian Shiism, a cultural and political imperative as much as a religious one.
To abandon this, they believe, is to renounce the core of the revolution and the faith that animates it.
The debate now consuming the political, military, and intellectual establishment reflects this anxiety in a struggle to redefine purpose, doctrine, and identity in a Middle East that has changed faster than anyone in Tehran expected and in ways that Iran can no longer control.
Yet a growing consensus acknowledges that the old reliance on a contiguous, proxy-dependent network for deterrence and influence has lost its viability. The fall of Al-Assad in Syria is seen across many strategic assessments as the severing of a critical artery.
Syria was not simply a friendly regime: it was the backbone of Iran’s logistical and strategic link to its wider network. Through Syria, Tehran supplied arms, money, training, and logistical support to Hizbullah in Lebanon and other allied groups. With that link broken and with Hizbullah itself deeply weakened by Israel’s campaign and the loss of its leadership, the practical architecture of Iran’s “resistance system” has been shattered.
As one prominent reformist politician put it to the Weekly, “the events of late 2024 will be forever fixed in our history as a Chernobyl moment.”
The consequences of these dramatic events are not only logistical or tactical but also existential for Tehran’s strategic identity. For decades, Iranian deterrence was not anchored solely in conventional military strength or ballistic capabilities but rested heavily on asymmetric geometry, proxy networks, and multi-front threat potential.
Now many within Iran conclude that this model is defunct. Iran’s ability to freely transport weapons and materiel across the 1,574 km route through Syria to Lebanon has been effectively neutralised, marking the end of its secure “land bridge.”
The overthrow of the Al-Assad regime and the structural weakening of Hizbullah have also affected the capabilities of Iraqi militias that coordinate with the axis of resistance and the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group in Yemen.
Together, they functioned more like a nervous system: pressure in one area triggered responses in another. Iran could rely on the fact that if Israel struck Iranian soil, it would not face Iran alone but an entire network of partners ready to bog it down in a grinding, unpredictable conflict.
Thus, the image of Iran now as an octopus without tentacles feels painfully apt – secure in its centre but unable to sense, reach, or stabilise its environment.
STRATEGIC LATENCY: In response, a strong current among military strategists and Revolutionary Guards-affiliated thinkers argues for a recalibration towards internal balancing and a greater emphasis on indigenous assets.
Missiles, drones, hardened facilities, electronic warfare, and mobile, dispersed military infrastructure – these are now discussed as being at the core of a revised deterrence posture. In this view, Tehran must accept that its capacity to project power outwards via proxies has been greatly constrained, meaning that deterrence must be re-centred on defending Iranian territory, disrupting enemy operations, and making any direct strike on Iran painful enough to deter.
The shift would mark a return, in part, to classical deterrence logic, albeit updated for asymmetric warfare, rather than over-reliance on proxy networks.
However, others propose a period of “strategic latency” with limited deniable operations, diplomacy where possible, and the slow rebuilding of deterrence along multiple vectors. They argue for a hybrid doctrine: invest in domestic deterrence, preserve covert asymmetric capacities, and conduct selective diplomacy, all the while avoiding full-scale hostility but keeping latent pressure alive.
This internal rethinking also spills into foreign-policy circles. Among policy analysts and some foreign ministry-linked voices, there is growing advocacy for diplomatic re-engagement with regional states previously viewed as adversaries, like the Gulf Arab states, or competitors like Egypt.
The logic goes that with Iran no longer able to project power through proxies and with its “axis” weakened, it becomes more palatable for regional actors to consider cooperation or at least coexistence if Tehran restrains its proxy activities.
Some argue that this could offer Tehran breathing space: a chance to stabilise, rebuild, and reposition. Observers point to the fact that many Gulf capitals are themselves fatigued by perpetual proxy conflict and wary of further instability; if Iran presents itself as a “less dangerous but pragmatic” actor focused on trade, diplomacy, and regional security, that might open windows.
The debate also extends to Iran’s nuclear posture. A faction within Iran’s security-intellectual elite argues that given the collapse of its extended deterrence network Tehran should lean more heavily on its nuclear hedging, even if only as latent deterrence without overt weaponisation.
They reason that the uncertainty associated with a potential nuclear breakout may restore strategic depth much faster than rebuilding proxy networks. Others counter that overt nuclear escalation would invite catastrophic consequences, including direct attacks, crippling sanctions, and isolation, before Iran has reestablished a credible defence posture.
The balance of views seems to favour maintaining the enrichment infrastructure as strategic leverage but avoiding overt weaponisation while rebuilding conventional and asymmetric capabilities.
The most profound peril facing Iran lies in Israel’s unrelenting drive to wage a war designed to dismantle its nuclear programme and potentially clear the way for regime collapse, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signalling to Washington that the problem is the regime itself and that pressure must continue until it falls.
Tehran understands that this threat will persist through 2026, as Netanyahu views the current moment, one in which Iran appears isolated, as uniquely advantageous for a decisive strike, a view echoed in Israeli intelligence assessments that warn that action must come soon before Iran regains strategic stability.
US President Donald Trump, meanwhile, seeks not a regional war but a lucrative deal that opens Iran’s natural resources to American capital, making US restraint on Israel a calculated effort to push Tehran towards negotiations on Washington’s terms.
Yet, Washington may overestimate its leverage, as Iran, though vulnerable, is also proud, deeply suspicious, and historically unwilling to negotiate under duress, with a political ethos built on resistance and survival.
When confronted with existential pressure, the regime tends to harden rather than yield, and it may reject any agreement perceived as coerced or humiliating, suggesting the US could be misreading the psychology that shapes Iran’s decision-making.
REALITY: Mohamed Marandi, a prominent Iranian academic and political analyst with ties to Iran’s decision-making circles, argues that Washington’s hopeful narrative of an Iran brought to heel bears little resemblance to the country’s internal reality.
He maintains that recent policy shifts have crystallised a national determination to deepen strategic bonds with China, Russia, the BRICS bloc, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and key regional partners including Egypt, the Gulf states, and the nations of Central Asia. This turn, he insists, reflects a fundamental distrust of Western intentions and is poised to strengthen Iran’s position in the medium and long term.
Marandi’s assessment is grounded in the evolving political and security landscape. In his view, Iran, despite operating from what some describe as a position of injury, is recalibrating its posture to build a more resilient, interest-driven network of regional and global relationships.
This shift is unfolding in a region transformed by two years of war in Gaza, where many governments now view Israel and not Iran as the chief source of instability, a sentiment voiced by figures like former Saudi intelligence chief Turki Al-Faisal. Israel’s strike on central Doha has also reinforced doubts about America’s ability or willingness to restrain its ally.
At the same time, Israel is expanding its footprint in southern Syria in Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda, while pursuing similar aims in Southern Lebanon and showing no sign of pulling back even if Hizbullah disarms. In Gaza, it treats newly captured areas as a new frontier, and in the West Bank de facto annexation grinds on, eliminating any realistic prospect of a Palestinian state.
Tehran argues that these moves amount to a systematic destabilisation of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, creating an arc of volatility that endangers the wider region.
From this vantage point, the Iranian leadership concludes that offering concessions to the United States or Israel on any front would result in significant strategic diminishment.
To compromise now, particularly as Israel continues its territorial consolidation, would undermine Tehran’s ambition to counter what it views as a detrimental American hegemony.
In the Iranian view, acquiescing to a regional order shaped by Washington and Tel Aviv would not constitute prudent diplomacy but a self-inflicted defeat.
Thus, 2026 looms like a gathering storm. Israel’s appetite for confrontation will not diminish, particularly if its leadership perceives time as a dwindling asset. America’s course will hinge on Trump’s mood. For its part, Iran will perform a delicate dance striving to avert war while meticulously preparing for it, a feat requiring exceptional discipline.
If 2025 was the year that Iran realised its old world had vanished, 2026 will be the year it learns whether it can survive the new one.
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