The bloody war that has ravaged Sudan for over 32 months is not simply the result of a conflict between two generals or between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF). It also reflects multiple struggles for influence between regional and international players.
Stretching from southern Egypt to the heart of Africa and bordered by the Red Sea, a zone of competition among the United States, Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf, as well as the Nile, Sudan straddles Arabs and Africans. Rich in diverse resources, and marked by ethnic, cultural, tribal and geographic variety, it is, in many ways, a microcosm of the continent.
Sudan’s crisis is far more than an internal war. It is part of the redrawing of influence across the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and Africa, with the country playing a central role in each of these arenas.
Today, Sudan stands at a pivotal moment in its history. The clash of international and regional agendas cast its present and future into a maelstrom of transformations, linking it directly to new maps of influence across the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and the Great Lakes region, amid a multipolar international struggle.
International and regional rivalries have had immense effects on Sudan, now part of the broader equation of reshaping the region. Sudan has in no way been insulated from the repercussions of the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, the crises in the Horn of Africa and the Nile Basin, the competition over the Red Sea, normalisation with Israel, the fight against Islamist movements and the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation, nor from issues of illegal migration, terrorism, human rights, and the collision of international and regional interests.
Due to the global and Arab preoccupation with the war in Gaza, the Sudanese crisis was relegated to a secondary status despite the atrocities, violations and horrific crimes it has seen. The Gaza war also had a polarising effect on Sudan, refocusing attention on the Red Sea as a vital corridor and elevating control over Sudan to a matter of strategic importance. The war in Ukraine and the broader Russia-West conflict have extended to other regions, including Africa, with Sudan emerging as a key arena of competition between Moscow and Washington.
The intense international and regional rivalry across the Arab world and Africa casts a dark shadow over Sudan. Numerous global powers — the United States, Russia, Europe, China, India, and others — are involved, alongside regional actors operating in these spheres, including Israel, Turkey, Iran, the Gulf states, and several African countries. Egypt, in particular, seeks to end the war, concerned about the potential collapse of the Sudanese state.
Some of the powers involved support the SAF, others support the RSF, while some powers hedge their bets on the eventual victor or the fragmentation of the country. Each actor employs a range of tools to advance their interests, be it diplomacy, political manoeuvring, arms supplies, funding, pressure, or sanctions. Europe and the United States aim to prevent the expansion of Russian and Chinese influence in Sudan, particularly in the light of Russia’s growing presence in the Sahel and China’s economic reach across much of Africa. Europe is also keen to stabilise Sudan to curb irregular migration, cross-border terrorism, smuggling and related threats.
Meanwhile, conflicts and tensions in the Horn of Africa — whether within Ethiopia, between Ethiopia and Eritrea, or amid Somalia’s ongoing terrorism crisis — demonstrate Sudan’s strategic importance and the value of its stability to international actors. Neighbouring countries, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, the Central African Republic, Libya, and South Sudan, have all experienced political unrest or armed conflicts in recent years.
A striking example of foreign intervention in Sudan’s war is the recent move by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which imposed sanctions on a transnational network comprising four individuals and four companies. The network recruited former Colombian soldiers and trained fighters, including children, to serve in the RSF.
Washington said that the involvement of these Colombian mercenaries enabled the RSF to seize control of Al-Fasher on 26 October, following an 18-month siege, and later carry out mass killings of civilians, widespread torture, and sexual violence.
Israel remains the “absent presence” in Sudan’s war, rarely mentioned explicitly, yet numerous indicators suggest its involvement. Israel is eager to normalise relations with Sudan, given the strategic, political, economic, and security gains at stake. The symbolic dimension of Sudanese-Israeli normalisation is also significant: Khartoum hosted the 1967 Arab League Summit, known as the “Three No’s” summit, which committed Arab states to neither recognising Israel nor negotiating or make peace with it. Israel’s strategy aims to fragment and weaken Arab states, a policy often referred to as “amputating the limbs.”
The involvement of Islamists in Sudan, including Islamist militias fighting alongside the SAF, remains a key factor shaping international and regional positions on the Sudanese crisis. These stances are expected to evolve following US President Donald Trump’s recent directive to begin the process of designating certain branches of the Muslim Brotherhood “foreign terrorist organisations” and globally recognised terrorists, specially in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan.
Trump’s move is likely to affect the position of Islamists in Sudan, whom the Quad now bars from participating in the next phase, despite Sudanese Islamists denying any affiliation with the global Muslim Brotherhood organisation and asserting their independence. The Islamists’ opponents in Sudan, however, are seeking to place them under international sanctions, viewing them as part of a transnational Muslim Brotherhood network that fuels terrorism and destabilisation campaigns against US interests and those of its allies in the Middle East.
The situation in Sudan, particularly in Darfur, remains a focal point for global human rights advocacy groups and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Recently, the ICC sentenced Ali Kushayb, a former Janjaweed leader associated with the ousted Omar Al-Bashir regime, to 20 years in prison for crimes committed since 2003, including murder, rape, and torture. The ruling against Kushayb was hailed as a symbolic victory for justice and for the victims and their families, sending a strong warning that past and present perpetrators will face accountability and that all criminals will be pursued and prosecuted.
Fierce battles have been raging between the SAF and its allies on one side, and the RSF and their allies on the other. The RSF gained control of the strategic city of Al-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, and subsequently advanced into the neighbouring Kordofan region, encompassing North, South, and West Kordofan.
The RSF now controls large swaths of Kordofan which, together with Darfur, accounts for nearly half of Sudan’s territory. The forces have also seized the strategic city of Al-Fashnusa, the capital of West Kordofan, and the important Heglig oil area, which produces roughly half of Sudan’s oil and serves as a conduit for South Sudan’s petroleum.
Buoyed by these advances, the RSF has launched further offensives, setting its sights on Al-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, and Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan.
However, the RSF’s progress and perceived victories have had dire consequences for millions of Sudanese in Darfur and Kordofan. Widespread violence, atrocities, massacres, and human rights violations have resulted in large numbers of deaths, injuries, and missing persons, alongside massive waves of displaced persons and refugees.
Those fleeing face severe hardships in accessing shelter, food, clean water, and medical care, while international aid organisations struggle to deliver assistance amid ongoing fighting and bombardment. An international relief convoy was recently targeted at the Adré border crossing with neighbouring Chad. This and similar incidents have drawn mounting condemnation of the RSF and are expected to trigger further sanctions against it.
Today, Sudan stands at a crossroads, with three possible scenarios on the horizon. The first scenario is the continuation of the status quo, with the conflict evolving into a prolonged war with a heavy human toll that would exhaust both sides and have catastrophic consequences for the country, its neighbours, the wider region, and international interests.
The second scenario is the fragmentation of Sudan, leading to the disintegration of its unity.
The third scenario envisions a negotiated settlement, driven by international pressure from the Quad, led by the United States, with participation from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and supported by numerous other international and regional powers.
The latter scenario requires coordinated international efforts, stringent measures to prevent the flow of weapons, mercenaries, and external interventions, and simultaneous pressure and incentives for Sudanese and regional actors to engage in the peace process.
Despite the magnitude of international and regional interventions, the overlapping interests, and the struggle for influence and resources in Sudan, the responsibility ultimately rests with the Sudanese party to the conflict who have a crucial role to play in ending the war, protecting the lives of Sudanese citizens, prioritising national interests, preserving Sudan’s unity and sovereignty, and contributing to a comprehensive and just resolution of the crisis, in the hope that this conflict becomes the last war in Sudan.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 25 December, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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