Israel officially recognised the self-declared Republic of Somaliland on 26 December, becoming the only United Nations member state to take that step, which was condemned by the majority of the international community and its organisations.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Sudan and more than 20 other Arab and Islamic countries denounced the recognition, alongside the African Union, the Arab League, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Several European countries, as well as China, Russia, and the United Nations, have also rejected the decision.The United Arab Emirates, Morocco and Ethiopia, however, have not issued statements either supporting or rejecting the Israeli move.
Few analysts feel the reasons cited by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, such as “promoting stability in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, and countering terrorism”, fully explain the decision. For Hamdi Abdel-Rahman, professor of political science at the Higher College of African Studies, “the decision itself is not surprising; its timing is the real surprise.” Israel has long maintained an “unofficial” presence in the Dahlak archipelago off Eritrea, yet the Gaza genocide and its aftermath have revealed its perceived need for a more secure foothold.
According to Abdel-Rahman, author of The Political Conflict in East Africa and its Implications for Egyptian National Security, Somaliland occupies a strategic position opposite Yemen, much of which is controlled by the Houthis, who at the time were engaged in armed conflict with Israel in what was known as the “Gaza Support” operation. According to Abdel-Rahman, as well as many commentators in the Egyptian and Arab press, one of the main objectives of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland appears to be to facilitate strikes against the Houthis in their entrenched positions in Yemen’s rugged mountains. However, Palestinian researcher Mohannad Mustafa, while not rejecting this interpretation, suggests that the underlying aim may be to secure a location for the relocation of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. Several media reports have indicated Israeli efforts to explore the possibility of Somaliland and Somalia accepting Gazans in numbers potentially reaching hundreds of thousands.
Somali President Mahmoud Sheikh, however, rejected those plans in a speech before the parliament in Mogadishu, opposing Israeli proposals to relocate Gazans from the Strip following the genocide in Gaza, which claimed the lives of more than 70,000 Palestinians and left 170,000 wounded, the majority women and children, in addition to destroying most homes and buildings and displacing over 90 per cent of Gaza’s 2.5 million residents.
Somaliland declared its independence in 1991, following the collapse of unified Somalia and the fall of its then-president, Siad Barre. Since that time, no country has recognised the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign state. Nonetheless, Somaliland, home to an estimated 5.7 million people as of 2019, has achieved a degree of stability and reconstruction, notably in its capital, Hargeisa, which has a population of 1.2 million and had been entirely destroyed during Barre’s brutal campaign in the 1980s. Somaliland has confronted extremist groups, held semi-regular elections, and issued its own currency, yet it remains unrecognised internationally. Despite repeated references in Western literature to Somalia as a “failed state”, several countries maintain a strong presence both in the Federal Republic of Somalia and its capital, Mogadishu, as well as in Somaliland and its capital, Hargeisa.
Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar have maintained a presence in Mogadishu, while Ethiopia has opted to focus on Hargeisa, seeking access to a seaport that would provide one of Africa’s largest landlocked countries with a vital maritime outlet. Following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Sheikh visited Ankara, where he held talks with his counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in a visit described as the first of several planned diplomatic activities.
Dubai Ports World has developed the port of Berbera, and Ethiopia has proposed a railway line linking it to its capital, Addis Ababa, given that existing transport routes would be insufficient to handle projected trade volumes. Ethiopia relies on the port of Djibouti for approximately 95 per cent of its international trade, exporting foodstuffs, fruits and vegetables, coffee, livestock, and raw materials such as hides and some minerals. The country also imports almost all of its goods via Djibouti, which has been connected to Addis Ababa by a railway line for a century. However, not all actors are aligned, as interests have never been unified. Somalia, naturally, rejects Israel’s recognition, invoking international law, which does not recognise the independence of Somaliland. Somaliland entered into union with Somalia voluntarily, to the satisfaction of its citizens, following the independence of both states.
According to Somali historical literature, the Somali territories were traditionally divided as follows: French Somaliland, now Djibouti; British Somaliland, now Somaliland; Italian Somaliland, corresponding to the internationally recognised Federal Republic of Somalia; Ethiopian Somaliland, part of Ethiopia; and Kenyan Somaliland, in north-eastern Kenya. French Somaliland gained independence in 1977 as Djibouti, while Italian Somaliland (Mogadishu) and British Somaliland (Hargeisa) became independent in 1960 and voluntarily united in 1962.
Although the Republic of Somaliland constructs its national narrative around being the heir to an independent Somali territory in 1960, the international community, represented by the United Nations, rejects this narrative. International law does not recognise the dissolution of a political union established by mutual consent except through a similarly consensual process grounded in international agreements and popular referendums — conditions that have not been met in Somaliland’s case.
Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1991, and South Sudan from Sudan in 2011, both through agreements between the respective governments supported by popular referendums. The African Union, as the successor to the Organisation of African Unity, refuses to alter established agreements, borders and commitments inherited from the colonial period, fearing the potential fragmentation of the vast majority of the continent’s states.
This appears to be one of the reasons Israel opted to recognise Somaliland, arguably as a measure of retaliation against a continent that consistently voted in favour of legitimate Palestinian rights from the early 1960s through to the present, despite repeated efforts by Tel Aviv to win over countries representing more than a quarter of the United Nations General Assembly’s voting bloc.
Djibouti has also rejected recognition, as the development of Berbera into an active port would reduce Djibouti’s central role in the Horn of Africa. Since independence, Djibouti has inherited the position formerly held by Aden (1869-1967) as the principal port along the Suez Canal route and remains Ethiopia’s only maritime gateway. Eritrea’s position is the same: an Israeli presence in Somaliland could reduce Tel Aviv’s reliance on Asmara, undermining its strategic significance as a key node in global trade, which handles more than 10 per cent of international shipping and a quarter of oil tankers.
Ethiopia, meanwhile, views Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as reinforcing its own ambitions and strengthening its position vis-à-vis both Somalia and Eritrea, which are concerned about Addis Ababa’s perceived designs on their ports, Berbera in Somaliland and Assab in Eritrea. Israel’s presence can therefore be seen as adding fuel to existing fires in the Horn of Africa. Somalia and Eritrea are already engaged in political and diplomatic confrontation with Ethiopia that could escalate into a military conflict.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 8 January, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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