Last week’s headlines were dominated by stories of regional instability and a renewal of US President Donald Trump’s threats to attack Iran and his warnings to block the nomination of a new Shia prime minister in Iraq in his bid to curb Iran-linked groups’ influence in the country.
Given the precarious situation in a religiously and ethnically divided Syria following a US-backed incursion in the Kurdish-controlled northeastern region by Sunni-led government forces leading to the collapse of the self-declared Kurdish administration, there are also real worries about a broader regional conflict.
What is most feared is that behind Trump’s messaging, bolstered by a military build-up, there is a serious attempt to recalibrate US strategy in the Middle East in line with the Sunni-led nations’ efforts to reverse the so-called “Shia rise” following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.
There are fears that such an adventurous strategy will certainly broaden the divides between the peoples of the Middle East and deepen the regional instability driven by the ongoing and wide-ranging conflicts.
In recent weeks the United States has stepped up its military presence in the Arabian Gulf, deploying a large influx of naval and air assets amid heightened tensions with Iran. The increase includes deploying various air-defence systems to the region that will be key to defending US military assets and allies.
Trump has sharply intensified his threats against Iran, suggesting that if the Islamic Republic does not agree to his demands the US could soon mount an attack “with speed and violence” by “a massive armada” he has ordered to amass in the Middle East.
Trump has not publicly detailed what he is looking for in Iran, but he has been talking about a set of demands directed to the country’s leaders that include an end to all enrichment of uranium and disposal of current stockpiles, limits on the range and number of ballistic missiles, and an end to all support for proxy groups in the Middle East.
Of late, Trump has added to the list halting the repression of the demonstrators in Iran who have been protesting against rampant inflation and the high prices of basic goods before morphing into general protests against the autocratic regime.
Owing to his repeated threats, Trump seems to be on the precipice of taking military action against Iran, although he keeps suggesting that the United States is ready for a deal that would end the standoff.
The US media have been awash with leaks that a military action is in the offing and that Trump has been presented with military options against Iran even though it is unclear what a US attack on Iran would achieve.
Among these leaked options, which go beyond Trump’s declared proposals, is “regime change” through targeted strikes on the country’s security forces and leaders that might even include the potential for American forces to carry out raids on sites inside Iran.
In retaliation, Iran has threatened to strike US military bases and aircraft carriers in the region immediately in the event of any such attack, with some officials even saying that Tehran would attack Israel in an “unprecedented” retaliation.
Doubling down on the Iran conflict, Trump has moved to escalate against Iran’s allies in Iraq and has threatened to cut off all US support for Iraq if the country re-elects former Shia hardline prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki for a third term in office.
Al-Maliki, who earlier served two consecutive terms, was chosen by the Coordination Alliance, Iraq’s coalition of Shia political blocs, to be the country’s next prime minister following Iraq’s parliamentary elections in November.
In a post on Truth Social on 27 January, Trump called Al-Maliki a “very bad choice” for Iraq, arguing that his previous leadership, between 2006 and 2014, was defined by “poverty and total chaos.”
“Because of his insane policies and ideologies, if [he is] elected the United States of America will no longer help Iraq and, if we are not there to help, Iraq has ZERO chance of Success, Prosperity, or Freedom,” Trump wrote.
Trump’s vociferous opposition to Al-Maliki appears to be part of a renewed effort by Washington to curb the influence wielded over Shia-majority Iraq by its neighbour Iran, the largest Shia power in the region.
In a statement posted on social media, Al-Maliki said that “we categorically reject blatant US interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, which we consider a violation of its sovereignty and a contradiction of the democratic system established in Iraq after 2003.”
Washington has threatened senior Iraqi politicians with sanctions targeting the Iraqi state, including potentially its critical oil revenues, should armed groups backed by Iran be included in the next government.
In Syria, where the Trump administration has strongly backed Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, a former Sunni jihadist, the White House has abandoned the Syrian Kurds by coercing the leaders of their self-ruled region into rejoining Damascus.
The Kurdish-led Democratic Syrian Forces (SDF) have agreed to a phased integration of their military and administrative bodies into the Syrian state under a broad deal that basically ends more than a decade of Kurdish autonomy.
The move will certainly embolden the ex-jihadists who are now in control of Syria, with these being backed by Turkey and other regional Sunni powerhouses that have persuaded Trump to embrace the new regime in Syria.
But it is difficult to imagine that the Syrian Kurds’ aspirations for autonomy will vanish or even that the Kurdish fighters will surrender their weapons to the former Sunni jihadists who refuse to recognise the Kurds’ and other minorities’ national rights or self-determination.
Whether in Iran, Iraq, or Syria, the escalation seems to be unpacking Trump’s obsession with foreign-policy disruption but this time targeting one of the Middle East’s most burning issues, namely sectarianism which continues to stoke inter-communal fissures and sometimes also fear and hatred.
Trump’s sudden fury at Iran is not accidental, however, since its seeds were sown at the time of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 that toppled the Sunni-led regime of Saddam Hussein and opened the way for empowering the Shias in Iraq.
The Shias’ rise in Iraq also unleashed a Shia Muslim revival across the Middle East and encouraged the clergy-led regime in Iran to assert its influence and dominant regional power status.
Much of the current escalation could be interpreted as a way of reversing that course, which has been largely blamed on the George W Bush administration owing to its war on Iraq in 2003 and its toppling of Saddam.
Countries in West Asia where the majority population is Shia or where there is a strong Shia minority in the population were then called the “Shia Crescent”, and this became a geopolitical term for the arc of Iranian influence spanning from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to the Mediterranean.
This is the other side to the unfolding standoff. A brash and even bellicose Trump has not minced his words in declaring that his focus on Iran is part of a wider strategy to stop and contain its influence in the Middle East.
By weakening Iran and containing its Shia allies in the region a strategy will unfold that aims to alter the political balance of power in the Middle East through eclipsing the Shia Crescent and exacerbating the regional divide between Islam’s two main sects.
This aim is not new. In his first term in office, Trump wanted to block Iran from building a strong military and security presence in Syria in order to stop Tehran from establishing regional influence through an array of Shia proxies.
Trump told a joint press conference with visiting French counterpart Emmanuel Macron on 24 April 2018, that he wanted to prevent Iran from establishing an axis with Tehran at the centre that would extend across much of the Middle East to the Mediterranean.
One aspect of Trump’s intentions then and now has remained crystal clear: to stop Iran from dominating the Middle East through a dual strategy of constraining its regional influence and depriving it of nuclear and missile capabilities and regional alliances.
But a common dichotomy is already emerging mostly in private discussions of Iran and the revival of Shiism in the contemporary Middle East as a result of the conflict.
Herein lies the danger of stirring up sectarian and ethnic struggles by targeting Shias and Kurds, since these could bleed into other lingering conflicts in the Middle East and lead to rising tensions or spasms of inter-communal violence.
Trump’s threats to Iran have touched off strong rhetoric from Iranian leaders and Tehran’s regional proxies. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has warned that any attack by the United States on Iran would spark a “regional war” in the Middle East.
Iraq’s Shia alliance has also rejected Trump’s threats and reaffirmed Al-Maliki as its choice for prime minister. Shia militias in Iraq have warned of “total war” if Iran is attacked, signalling they will militarily support Tehran.
In Lebanon, Hizbullah Chief Naim Qassem has warned that any attack on the group’s backer Iran will also be seen as an attack on the militants and that any new war on Iran will ignite the region.
Meanwhile, Turkey and Sunni Arab states like Saudi Arabia and others may share the objective of putting Iran on notice, but they remain wary about the consequences of doing so, including the possibility of emboldening Iran and the Shia political groups in the region in the case of a confrontation and if a war fails to subdue Iran.
The Sunni Arab powerhouses and Turkey cannot afford to lose sight of the Iranian danger, but to address it they will need to forge a strategy based on the region’s interests and away from Trump’s misconceptions and Israel’s push for a war against Iran.
It remains to be seen if a summit in Ankara to be convened before US-Iran talks on Friday which will include US envoys Steve Witkoff Jared Kushner and foreign ministers from Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan will come out with this strategy.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 5 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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