Last Wednesday, the US and NATO handed the Russian government their written replies in separate official notes to the document Moscow conveyed to them last December. In this document, the Russian government outlined its security concerns concerning the eastward expansion of NATO to near the Russian border as well as the possibility of accepting Ukraine as a new member of NATO.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters on 26 January that the US administration and NATO had provided the Russians with their answers as he had promised his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov in Geneva the previous week, adding that they opened a way forward for diplomacy if the Russian side took them seriously. The US and NATO notes were not made public in order to give Moscow the time to study their contents.

Blinken explained that the note submitted by Washington dealt with US concerns in addition to those of its allies and partners relating to “Russian actions” that compromise, according to the wording of the note, European security. It included a pragmatic “assessment” of Russian concerns and preoccupations as to the general security situation in Europe and outlined some of the fundamental principles that underpinned the US and NATO replies. 

The most important of these is respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and the right of every country to decide on its external alliances and to reach the security agreements it deems convenient.

After emphasising the fact that there has not been any difference in opinion between the US and the NATO member countries as to the content of the two aforementioned notes, Blinken made it clear that other ideas in the US document talked about the US interest in elaborating a follow-up agreement to the New START Treaty between the US and Russia in the form of a treaty that covers all nuclear weapons. Also included in the document was the question of arms control as far as missiles are concerned. 

At the same press briefing, he said that Washington had sent three shipments of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine that week. He talked about an additional anti-tank missile, the Javelin, in addition to anti-armour weapons and 288 tons of ammunition in order to enhance the forward-based defencive capabilities of the Ukrainian army. 

It is interesting to note that US President Joe Biden, talking to reporters at Joint Base Andrews on 28 January, said that he would order the deployment of US forces “in the near term” but stressing “not too many.” This announcement came on the heels of the US decision last week to order 8,500 soldiers to be ready for deployment depending on developments in the Ukrainian crisis.

 Biden also talked about this measure after talking over the telephone the previous day with President of Ukraine Volodymr Zelensky, reassuring him that the US and its European allies would “respond decisively” in the event of Moscow deciding to order its forces to cross the Ukrainian border.

The official Russian reaction to the two notes was measured. While saying that there was “not much cause for optimism” that the West would satisfy Russia’s demands in the showdown over Ukraine, Moscow still kept the door open for a studied analysis of the two documents and is in no hurry to give a definitive official reaction immediately. 

Spokesperson for Russian President Vladimir Putin Dmitri Peskov commented that “there will… be some time needed to analyse them – we won’t rush to any conclusions.” The next Russian steps would be decided by Putin after thoroughly studying them, he said. 

In other words, neither side in the crisis is dealing with the proposals and counter-proposals on a take it or leave it basis. Neither wants to be blamed for thwarting the diplomatic path, but neither wants to de-escalate at the present moment either, maybe biding their time to reach accords that answer most of their respective demands and not all of them. 

In fact, the path of diplomacy would only go so far under present circumstances. Strangely enough, there is no definite US position as to whether Russia has the intention of invading Ukraine. While US press reports keep quoting unnamed “senior American officials” saying that what they call “Russian aggression” is imminent, some of these officials talk about the middle of next month, and Pentagon and military sources rule out any Russian advance into Ukrainian territory. 

Following official US statements and the “official assessments” leaked to the press, one gets the feeling that the US administration is walking on a tightrope and understandably so. After fulfilling the promise of bringing an end to the “forever wars in the Middle East,” Biden will think a thousand times before committing US forces to fighting a far-away war in Ukraine. However, while taking into account the criticism of some Republicans that the Biden administration is not doing enough to stop “Russian aggression,” the US administration is leading NATO and the EU on the diplomatic path while beefing up NATO forces on the eastern flank of NATO as well as the Ukrainian army.  

On the diplomatic front, the US administration has called for a UN Security Council meeting on 31 January to discuss the situation on the Ukrainian border. A senior US official explained that this “boils down to the question of whether there should be a path of war, or whether there should be a path for diplomacy.” He added that the “expectation is that members of the Security Council will be weighing this question and supportive of a diplomatic approach.”

On the other hand, fewer than 24 hours after calling for a UN Security Council meeting, US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin said that he does not believe that “Putin has made a final decision to use [his] forces against Ukraine,” while admitting that Russia already has such a “capability.”

It seems that the major players in the Ukrainian confrontation want to climb down, but each aspires to do this also while claiming victory. If this is the price to be paid for preventing the outbreak of a war that no one wants, including the Ukrainians themselves, so be it.

* The writer is former assistant foreign minister.

*A version of this article appears in print in the 3 February, 2022 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.