The answer to the question of who will emerge the winner or loser from the Ukrainian crisis will only become clear at the end of the war, with one exception: China is certain to come out ahead. The Russian-Ukrainian war is on its eighth day as I write this. Russian President Vladimir Putin says the military operation is proceeding as planned and on schedule. Nothing in his remarks suggests that the Russian army’s halt outside the gates to Kyiv was otherwise – that, for example, Russian troops were forced to stop due to the strength of the Ukrainian resistance. Here as with other cities, it appears that the plan was to build up the pressure that would drive a million people, so far, to leave their country. Meanwhile, an agreement between the two sides to open “humanitarian corridors” to deliver food and medicine to civilians offered a glimmer of light. It is too soon to tell whether this arrangement is effective, whether it will last and whether it will lead to further such steps. Neither side seems in a rush to declare their need for a truce. Meanwhile, China is the only side that is cohesive and determined that, by the end of the crisis, the world will have given way to at least a partial change in the international order in which China has a seat at the top.
China has transitioned from its long “strategic latency”, during which it took its time to change according to its own wishes, to its “middle kingdom” phase in which it will continue to change according to its own schedule. The first noticeable sign of the transition occurred after the US departure from Afghanistan when Beijing organised a meeting with Russia, Iran and Pakistan after which they offered the Taliban a deal no one could refuse: the Taliban would have no dealings with terrorists and in exchange no one would intervene in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs. The second sign was how Beijing facilitated the complex negotiations between Tehran and Washington in Vienna and elsewhere over the Iranian nuclear programme.
Domestically, China had already emerged from its “latency”. In 1978, it embarked on a profound course of reform under the rubric of the “social market economy.” After more than four decades of massive economic and social development, China stepped onto the world stage as an economic and technological powerhouse, launching far-reaching international enterprises such as the Belt and Road Initiative whose flexibility appeals to many countries. On 4 February this year, on the sidelines of the Winter Olympics, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart signed a joint statement calling for a revision of the world order as it had stood since the end of the Cold War. Their manifesto, as it has been called, holds that democracy is a universal human value, not the preserve of a handful of states, and that promoting and protecting it is the common responsibility of the entire international community. However, it states, “there is no one-size-fits-all template to guide countries in establishing democracy,” and “only the people of a country have the right to decide how democratic their state is.” It also stresses that the attempts on the part of “certain states” to impose their own “democratic standards” on others and “to monopolise the right to assess the level of compliance with democratic criteria” fly in the face of the spirit and true values of democracy. “Such attempts at hegemony pose serious threats to global and regional peace and stability and undermine the stability of the world order.”
A thorough breakdown of this document merits a separate discussion. For now, suffice it to say that the fact that it was signed by both Russia and China sparked attention, to the extent that the more precipitous commentators concluded that it was the launch of an alliance against the US formed in response to President Joe Biden’s “summit for democracy.” That summit divided the world into democratic and authoritarian states and ranked China and Russia squarely in the latter category.
Because of the joint statement, many initial assessments of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis characterised China and Russia as allies in that conflict. China soon defied expectations. While it sided with Moscow in opposing NATO expansion to include Ukraine, arguing that this represented a threat to Russian borders, China simultaneously made it clear that it did not want the Russian military build-up to spiral into a global crisis, especially at a time when the world needed to work more closely together to fight the pandemic, the energy crisis and inflation. After the Russian troop amassments segued into the invasion of Ukraine, the difference between Russia and China became more distinct. The latter, a global economic power with the largest population in the world, sought a stable world climate conducive to cooperation and understanding. Therefore, while Beijing opposed military pacts such as NATO, it also felt that opposition to this alliance was not sufficient grounds to attack Ukraine before making a sufficient effort to negotiate and reach an agreement over a means to achieve collective security.
The Chinese decision to abstain from the UN Security Council vote on the resolution regarding the Ukraine crisis took many by surprise. In fact, it epitomised the Chinese point of view. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi explained that the decision to abstain was consistent with the principles of Chinese foreign policy, most notably the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. However, he said, China also supported the concept of sustainable, comprehensive and shared security whereby the security of one side does not come at the expense of another. In other words, China opposed the zero-sum approach as exemplified by five rounds of NATO enlargement to be capped by another round that would threaten Russian borders and further erode Russia’s sense of security. However, China underscored a third aspect. When Beijing says it is closely observing developments in Ukraine and that “the current situation is something China does not like to see,” it is referring to the humanitarian dimension. This is why it has appealed to all sides to contain the conflict and negotiate a solution whereby Ukraine will become a bridge between east and west, as opposed to a front in the confrontation between great powers.
China has urged a balance between Ukrainian sovereign rights and Russian security rights, not just in a bilateral framework but in a larger European regional security framework. In abstaining from the UN resolution to denounce Russia it conveyed the message that the UN and the Security Council should not be made to serve one side against another. That would only fuel conflict, whereas the purpose of the council is to resolve conflict. Indeed, this is why China has opposed invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to authorise sanctions or use of force.
The crisis is still in its early phases. It is too soon to say that Russia has exhausted its military strength, that Ukrainian resistance is on its last tether or that the West’s sanctions have debilitated the Russian economy. Meanwhile, China stands above the fray, waiting for the world to come to the “Middle Kingdom” to behold a different type of superpower, one commensurate with the 21st century.
*A version of this article appears in print in the 10 March, 2022 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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