A lot of water has passed under the bridge since the last Arab summit in the city of Dammam in eastern Saudi Arabia five years ago. At the time, in 2018, the aftershocks of the Arab Spring were still splitting the Arab region between two camps. One believed the “spring” had ushered in changes in the essence of the Arab state to mould it in an Islamist revolutionary or neo-Ottoman cast, while the other saw it as a way out of a cyclical past that had lasted longer than it should have. The most salient manifestation of the polarisation was the “Arab Quartet” consisting of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain, versus the alliance between Qatar and Turkey. Other Arab countries gravitated towards one of the two poles. Some were being ravaged by civil wars. Others were hit by a sudden overflow of human tragedy and misery from neighbouring states. The direct and indirect fallout from conflict jeopardised the stability and security of every state in the region, at a time, moreover, when hearts grieved for the tragedy of thousands of lives lost at sea or tens of thousands caught in the barbed wired gates of Europe in search of refugee.

 Nevertheless, the regional landscape had a brighter side. Some Arab countries, such as the Gulf countries, Jordan and Morocco, had weathered the “spring.” Others, such as Egypt, overthrew Muslim Brotherhood rule. Moreover, a current of political, economic and social reform injected a new dynamism in some Arab countries, producing a thrust towards peaceful change epitomised by ambitious sustainable development visions with sights set 15 or 20 years ahead to 2030 or 2035. Regardless of how they differed in timeframe or other details, the projects all agreed to reject stagnation and work towards renewal, opening up the economy, and setting in motion nationwide mega projects, renewing religious and civil thought, and taking what steps were necessary to build the modern nation state.

It had been a long time since the Arab state underwent such fundamental change. Moreover, this was not an imitation of previous revolutionary-type experiences led by army officer movements and/or political parties with Arab nationalist ideologies that sanctioned meddling in the domestic affairs of other Arab nations. It was clear that the Arab nation state, with its particular geopolitical interests and calculations, was both able to and needed to be a distinct and dynamic entity if the larger Arab front was to be effective. 

Developments both within and outside the framework of the Arab state since the last Arab summit have reflected progress in the reform process. A landmark is to be found in the AlUla Declaration adopted in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit on 5 January 2021. Its deescalation of the tension between the Arab Quartet and the Qatari-Turkish axis constituted the first step towards overcoming regional polarisation. Not only did a rapprochement begin soon afterwards, but a “New Levant” process, spearheaded by Baghdad, Cairo and Amman, was set in motion to lead Iraq out of its isolation. Baghdad demonstrated its ability to act as a bridge between Tehran and Riyadh, then Muscat joined in as a mediator and a hub for negotiating efforts to end the long intractable Yemeni crisis. 

A unified and constructive Arab front was needed for other reasons. If at first, the second wave of Arab Spring, which broke out in Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria, seemed to have heeded the lessons of the first wave, that assessment soon proved inaccurate. Algeria and Baghdad may have been spared, but Lebanon and, more recently, Sudan have suffered, and both look like they are in for a very hot summer. Between the first and second Arab Springs, non-Arab regional powers such as Iran, Turkey and Israel also sought to take advantage of the situation in order to penetrate the region in their own ways. Fortunately, the process within the reform bloc had matured sufficiently to forge coordinated reformist foreign policies. 

While Saudi Arabia and the UAE moved to restore relations with Iran, the UAE and Bahrain moved towards normalisation with Israel in the framework of the “Abraham Accords.”  Saudi Arabia occupied a central place and performed important roles during this period. Just as it was instrumental in helping Egypt emerge from the Muslim Brotherhood, it was the starting point for regional deescalation and the Arabs’ return to the international stage. It was no coincidence Saudi Arabia hosted the Arab-US summit and the Arab-Chinese summit, which eventually led to that regional turning point: the Chinese-brokered Iranian-Saudi agreement to resume relations. 

Whatever one might say about coincidences, they can create exceptional circumstances that can either accelerate or decelerate history. The dual earthquake that struck Syria and Turkey in February generated a grassroots Arab outpouring of sympathy and calls for coming to the aid of those two countries. As a fellow Arab nation, Syria had a special place in this context. Arab and, especially, Saudi Arabian relief and assistance were immediately forthcoming and this created a climate favourable to Syria’s return to the Arab League.

The 33rd Arab summit held in Jeddah on Thursday,19 May, and the one held in Dammam five years ago are as different as day and night. The blaring ideological posturing and empty slogans have fallen silent. The Arab gathering that attended the Arab summits with the US and China consisted of the GGC countries, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq and all had experienced the moments of polarisation to reconciliation, the struggle to defend national interests, and the desire to reach out to others through such initiatives as the Abraham Accords, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, or the Red Sea Security Order. This is the gathering that formulated the recent call to offer Damascus new options and avenues even as it continues to struggle with the difficult challenges to the security and stability of the Syrian state. All these forms of regionalism offer new horizons whether to foster new approaches to the northern Red Sea region or to enable Palestinians to tap their gas resources off the coast of Gaza just as a recent Lebanese-Israeli border demarcation agreement had made it possible for both sides to benefit from underwater oil wealth that had previously been out of reach to them both. 

The 33rd Arab summit in Jeddah occurs at a time when the Arab League is facing  another test borne of a complex of interwoven crises, one of which is the current conflict in Sudan. Another is that, despite all the inroads the Arabs have made in dealing with Israel, that state has become more fundamentalist – Jewish in this case – than the fundamentalism that preceded it in Arab countries and its relations with both Gaza and the West Bank are a permanent tinderbox. Still, as volatile as conditions may be, the Arabs are more able to grapple with new and unfamiliar situations. Exactly how they will do that will certainly be discussed in the summit, which will be more focused on talks and consultations than issuing fiery slogans. In this new climate, participants will also be able to entertain new and innovative initiatives to improve conditions in the region, augment its international standing and make it both more cohesive and more interdependent than ever before.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 18 May, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly