Preceded by a reverential reception and peppered with standing ovations, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s US Congress appearance put forward India’s aspiration to a new global positioning.

The main international relations issue India faces today is its stance on the emergent American-Chinese confrontation. Given its decades-long tension with China over their borders, which at times escalated to serious military clashes, India is inclined to side with the US.

China’s increasing closeness to Pakistan, India’s key strategic opponent, also draws India to America. Not surprisingly, India agreed to be part of the “Quad” which brings it with the US, Japan, and Australia to a range of initiatives, some of which have an unmistakably military hue.

Economics too push India towards America and the West in general. Despite a notable role for the state in the economy and having highly assertive regulators in several industries, India is now a far cry from the centralised economy it was in the decades from the 1950s to the early 1990s. The most important sectors of India’s economy – technology, telecoms, information sciences, and pharmaceuticals ‒ are closely integrated into Western value chains, and almost totally dependent on Western investors and markets.

India’s diaspora also nudges the country in the direction of the West. The millions of Indians in the Gulf are an important source of remittances. But so are the tens of millions of Americans of Indian origin, many of whom have achieved immense success. The vast majority of the CEOs of America’s top 20 technology companies have familial or cultural connections to India. Americans of Indian origin are well represented in the leadership strata of the highly powerful finance industry. American-Indians have become among the most successful communities in US politics. Prime Minister Modi pointed to one such American, US Vice President Kamala Harris, who was sitting right behind him during his address to Congress, before joking that he was told that samosas are now a popular dish in US legislature.

India clearly wants closeness to America. In another joke at Congress, Modi referred to major advances in AI, reminding his audience that he refers to the American-Indian relationship rather than to artificial intelligence.

Despite all of these factors, India has adopted a position of strategic ambiguity vis-à-vis the upcoming US-China confrontation. India insists on being a US partner, but with full discretion over its positions and choices, with no commitments to any party concerning the future. This is a vastly different strategic position from that of key American allies in Europe or Asia (such as Japan), who at a moment of real tension between the US and China are expected to adopt roles closely coordinated with, if not prescribed by, Washington.

India’s insistence on maintaining an independent international stance stems from its strategic orientation, since its independence from Britain in the late 1940s, to be non-aligned with either the West or its opponents and competitors.

This is something that merits respect, since despite being historically the political opponent of India’s Congress Party, which designed India’s non-alignment strategy, Modi’s BJP party appreciate the rationale behind the foreign policy that India has adopted over the past seven decades. In this, like every country with a serious understanding of its historical trajectory and key objectives, India adheres to solid international relations policy frameworks. It adapts to changes but does not lose sight of the givens.

There is power in such consistency. Many in Congress are apprehensive about India’s stance, from both the Democratic and Republican parties, especially since India has become, in the past two decades, a major beneficiary of US trade, particularly in the service industry, but India’s consistency demonstrates a strong sense of institutionalised thought and policy-making, commanding respect.

India also correctly calculates that it ought to avoid direct tension with China in the foreseeable future. India’s economy has grown dramatically in the three decades since its opening up in the early 1990s, and it has surpassed China as the world’s most populous country. As Modi repeatedly emphasised in his address to Congress, several of India’s socio-economic projects, whether in education, healthcare or infrastructure, dwarf those of many Western countries. Still, there is a considerable power differential between India and China. India does not match China’s industrial prowess, decisive position in some of the most important value chains at the heart of international trade, global reach, or military power. A rising India, concerned about its economic growth, and about hundreds of millions of Indians who remain poor, is determined to avoid being drawn into a strategic confrontation with China, with which it shares a long border with a fraught history.

Culture plays a role as well. One of India’s key achievements since independence has been its insistence on preserving its cultural uniqueness. This has economic benefits. India’s entertainment industry is a major source of income for the country’s private sector and tax revenues, and a major source of foreign currency. But cultural power transcends economics. India’s culture and entertainment, let alone the rich philosophical strands of its heritage, are the country’s most powerful manifestations and generators of soft power. They draw tens of millions the world over to its fold. Strengthening this culture is a strategic investment. Acquiescence to cultural dilution is concession India is determined not to make.

Perhaps part of India’s strategic calculation is the desire to bide its time. On one hand, India’s economic rise would yield more developmental gains, social improvements, and therefore more power in different forms – all leading to strengthening its position vis-à-vis China. On the other hand, the BJP seems to be on a slow but steady mission to entrench a form of socio-political Hinduism as the primary strand of Indian identity. This stirs serious tensions in the country, which compels any decision maker to prioritise domestic concerns over foreign affairs.

Those who listened to Modi’s Congress speech, whether in American political circles or anywhere else where the shape of the world in the next few years is a subject of concern, could see that, while India wants to be close to the West, it does not want to be part of it. Modi was mindful of the pull of history as much as the present moment’s powerful drivers. He was also aware, realistically and without hyperbole, of the true weight of his nation. But  his government’s effort to position itself in the world will be far from easy as the confrontation between the US and China unfolds, particularly in East Asia, a region of strategic importance to India, since India’s actions will have a global impact.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 13 July, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly