Sometimes problems occur in Arabic when dealing with concepts that originated in other cultures, especially those coming from Europe in the past two centuries. An example is the “nation state,” defined as a discrete state entity consisting of a people with a shared identity who live within specific and recognised territorial boundaries. The confusion arises in Arabic with the use of the word “al-qawmi” (national), which in Arabic political culture has always been used to signify a gathering of Arab peoples in a single political framework. Arab nationalist parties and movements, such as the Baath, the Arab Nationalists, and the Nasserists, espoused the idea of a “single Arab people with an eternal mission” and a pan-Arab state that embodies their collective will.

It has been over a century since the Arab states, as we know them today, began to emerge in their current form, around three quarters of a century since they began to gain independence, and half a century since they all gained full independence. Although they maintained a collective Arab bond through membership in the Arab League, they began to develop their own identities, and although they sustained a spirit of mutual support as fellow Arab states, sometimes the search for identity went down ethnic, sectarian, and regional paths depending on local demographics, cultures, and ancient and modern histories. At this point, the nation state became the vehicle for shaping a distinct national identity and strengthening the sense of affiliation and loyalty to the state within its geographic realm.

The so called Arab Spring that hit in 2011 had the effect of a collision that juggles particles around, reorders them according to their intrinsic qualities and degrees of cohesion, and ushers them across a threshold into a new era. The particles intended here are of course Arab states.

The least affected were the Arab monarchies. This group of countries experienced some unrest on their fringes, but they stood firm in the face of the storm. Moreover, when one of them was invaded by a power bent on exploiting the upheaval at the time, it met the threat face on with military force. It then went on to help others through their difficulties.

Egypt is the epitome of the second group. Its army remained one with the people, and both remained whole and undivided. The Egyptian state and its institutions proved able to survive, emerging from two years of anarchy like a phoenix from the ashes.

The third group of countries were shaken to their foundations. In Syria, Yemen and Libya, the national armies fell apart, the state descended into rival militias and the country was plunged into civil war, lasting over a decade. In Libya, the country bifurcated into two political entities, one in the east and the other in the west. Tunisia, while spared civil war, has endured over a decade of chronic political crisis.

The fourth group of countries were part of the new wave of the Arab Spring which occurred at the end of the 2010s. It includes Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, and Sudan. While all championed the principle and interests of the nation state, they went in different directions. While Iraq and Algeria managed to hold together thanks to their oil wealth, Lebanon and Sudan began to disintegrate. If the latter two have so far managed to ward off civil war, the situation in Sudan is looking precarious because of the shadow cast over one of the most important prerequisites of sovereign statehood, the monopoly over the legitimate recourse to arms.

This variegated picture of the condition of the Arab nation state is reminiscent of 17th century Europe and developments in other regions in the three centuries between the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the end of World War II in 1945. The most important feature of that period in world history is the rise of the nation state, the political entity that forms the overarching bond between its constituent members as a product of shared historical experiences, a spiritual connection, or merely existing in that geographical space. This entity transcended tribal, sectarian, and ethnic affiliations and reaffirmed a shared identity borne of a mode of economic and political interaction that became something greater than the pursuit of mutual interests.

Whereas epics and sagas once eulogised ethnic or religious groups, songs and anthems now praised peoples and nations, and “international” recognition of a state became de facto recognition of the existence of a people with a distinct “identity” that differentiated them from other peoples. The Treaty of Westphalia was essentially an affirmation of the prevalence of national “identity” over pre-state identities that no longer had the right to command a higher transnational loyalty. If that inherently created the problem of “minorities,” geographical boundaries and national sovereignty created an identity through processes of voluntary or coerced fusion into a single communal experience.

The foregoing should not be understood as a call to repeat the European experience in an Arab context. History does not repeat itself and geography should not be so malleable. But as we contemplate the deterioration in Sudan and the insurmountable rift in Palestine, even before the establishment of the state, it seems that the first two groups of states mentioned above, the ones that weathered the Arab Spring and set into motion comprehensive reform processes, should pursue a kind of Arab Westphalia.

Such an arrangement would serve to safeguard the progress they have achieved through nationwide reforms and protect the Arab nation states by better enabling them to respond to current crises, the latest of which is the Sudanese crisis. An Arab Westphalia would proceed from the premise that the robust nation state, as defined by sovereignty and the monopoly on the legitimate recourse to arms, is the aim, and that sustainable development pursued through a comprehensive national project is the means. Herein resides the key to the New Regionalism which has already been born in the region.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 27 July, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly