There is no doubt that the relationship of the West in general, and the US in particular, with what has come to be called “the democratic question” in the Middle East has been among the topics that have long enjoyed a lot of interest among both historians and political scientists.
Therefore, it came as no surprise to learn that the most recent book by US political scientist Fawaz Gerges, who is of Lebanese origin, is on this complex topic, analysing important phases in the role of the West in establishing democracy in the countries of the Middle East.
Gerges addresses this topic from the perspective of Western, particularly American, policies towards two countries in the Middle East, while focusing on specific periods in the post-World War II history of these countries. One of the countries is an Arab one, while the other is non-Arab. More specifically he looks at Egypt under the rule of late president Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Iran during the premiership of late prime minister Mohamed Mosaddeq.
The choice of these case studies of Egypt and Iran is optimal for a number of reasons. First, both Egypt and Iran are central countries in the Middle East. Second, both have had a long history of interaction with the West in general and the US in particular. Third, there have been differences in the nature of Western, particularly US, intervention in the internal affairs of both countries in recent history, and fourth and finally, there were substantial differences between the political systems of Egypt under Nasser and Iran under Mosaddeq.
Regarding the first reason, Egypt and Iran have long been pivotal countries, not only in the Middle East, but also at the global level. Both witnessed the birth of several ancient civilisations, which contributed for centuries to the development of human civilisation in general and from which modern Western civilisation has benefited a lot.
Regarding the second reason, namely the historical relations between both Egypt and Iran with the West in general and the US in particular, these relations have been notably intense and diverse. Egypt had its first encounter with the modern West during Napoleon’s expedition to the country in 1798, which served as the window for Egypt on modern Western civilisation. This was followed by a period of relative stability under the rule of the Mohamed Ali Dynasty and a renaissance project characterised by openness to and cooperation with the West. This was aborted by the British occupation to Egypt in 1882.
At the same time, the West was dealing with the successive dynasties that ruled Iran, whether the Safavi, the Qajari, or the Pahlavi. The West was trying to balance its relations with the Shia Iranian Empire and the Sunni Ottoman Empire. It was the guarantor of the unity and territorial integrity of Iran in the aftermath of both World War I and World War II in the face of neighbouring countries that had territorial ambitions in Iran.
The third reason mentioned above has to do with similarities in the methods used by the West, particularly the US, in dealing with both countries. In brief, the pattern of the interactions of the West with both Mosaddeq’s Iran and Nasser’s Egypt did not have among its practical priorities helping either country to build a solid and sustainable democratic system. The lessons learned from both experiences is that Western objectives were related to either protecting or promoting Western interests in both countries and in the region as a whole.
Democracy did not figure highly among Western, including US, priorities in either case, even if what was declared by the US administrations and the Western governments of the time was different.
In the case of Nasser’s Egypt, the West’s goals were primarily to get Egypt to accept and be part of a network of Western-led regional alliances in the region following the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of October 1954. This goal fitted very much into the context of the Western-Eastern confrontation in the Cold War era following the end of World War II. In addition, there was the goal of securing the existence of the then newly established State of Israel.
In the case of Mosaddeq’s Iran, there was equally the Western goal of incorporating Iran in a network of pro-Western alliances that were opposed to the former Soviet Union, a neighbour of Iran, and the Soviet bloc as a whole in the context of the Cold War. However, there was also the no less important goal of Iran’s role in ensuring the flow of oil, not only from Iran but also from the Gulf region as a whole, to the West and its allies.
If we move to the fourth reason and the topic of the book and how the author handles it, we find that the political systems of Egypt and Iran were drastically different from each other in the period he chooses.
If we start with Iran, we find that the Iranian political system was officially a constitutional monarchy. However, in reality the former Shah was seeking to both reign and rule. There was a parliament that was democratically elected and a majority government chaired between 1951 and 1953 by Mosaddeq, the most popular political figure in Iran at the time. He was also the leader of Iran’s National Front, which combined national, democratic and semi-secular orientations.
On the other hand, the political regime in Egypt under Nasser was a presidential one, in which political parties had been banned since 1953 and were replaced by “a single political organisation” starting with the “Liberation Rally” and followed by the “National Union” and finally the “Arab Socialist Union.” This formula was later blamed for causing the failure of the 23 July Revolution in achieving its declared sixth objective, namely “establishing a true democratic life” in Egypt.
In the light of these differences between the two political systems in Egypt and Iran, the nature of the Western, particularly US, role also varied between the two cases.
In the case of Mosaddeq’s Iran, the Western, particularly US, role took the form of clandestine intervention using a number of tools, including the Pentagon and the CIA, and in consultation and coordination with other Western powers. The West’s relations with leading figures in the Iranian armed forces, who had received training in Western military institutions, exerted pressure on Mosaddeq and his government and led to the 1953 coup d’etat, orchestrated by the CIA, that toppled the democratically elected government.
In the case of Nasser’s Egypt, the Western, particularly US, role, well researched and documented in Gerges’ book, did not seek at any stage to encourage the Egyptian leadership to adopt policies and measures aimed at establishing a liberal and democratic system that would avoid the defects of the one that had existed prior to July 1952. The West could have done so through a “carrot” policy, i.e. providing incentives to the Egyptian leadership through economic, or even military, cooperation or other tools.
The author interprets Western and US behaviour by providing concrete examples throughout his book and shows that the prevailing vision of the Western countries in general, and the US in particular, during these periods was to see developments in the countries of the region, irrespective of the nature of the existing political systems, not through the lens of seeking to establish healthy and viable democratic systems, if these did not exist, or to protect existing ones, but rather through the lens of the then Cold War between the Western camp led by Washington and the Eastern camp led by Moscow.
This led to identifying governments as either friends or foes, both inside and outside the Middle East, on the basis of their stands towards the Cold War and the side they took within it.
The writer is a diplomat and commentator.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 18 July, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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