Since the conclusion of the seventh round of prisoner and detainee exchanges last week, brokered by Egypt and Qatar, the negotiations for resuming these exchanges and reaching a ceasefire agreement have reached a critical juncture. Despite some interim progress, the situation is increasingly precarious, with a risk of complete collapse.
To understand the shifting domestic positions and the limited manoeuverability of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, one must consider the inherent contradiction between Israel’s stated war objectives, such as the destruction of Hamas, and the effort to secure the release of the prisoners and detainees. This has led the families of these prisoners to rally behind the slogan of “A Deal Now,” while Netanyahu has attempted to divide them through various tactics.
Netanyahu has often resorted to leaks and public statements casting doubt on the intentions of key Israeli institutions, particularly the military, with the defence minister at the forefront of them. Netanyahu has hinted at firing his defence minister, an action he even took for several weeks last year, and then reversed, when the latter spoke out against the judicial reforms in Israel that would curb the judiciary’s power to oversee the government.
Netanyahu has also deliberately targeted the chief of staff of the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF), engaging in a smear campaign and leaking information suggesting he is considering dismissing him during the ongoing conflict. This situation reveals the open conflicts within the Israeli government on multiple fronts during the war.
A recent poll conducted by the Institute for National Security at Tel Aviv University indicates that the credibility of Netanyahu pales in comparison to that of Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, with the latter enjoying nearly double the trust of the former. This is despite Halevi’s avoidance of political discourse, as he has confined himself to professional military statements, such as confirming the Israeli army’s readiness to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor.
This is a significant obstacle that Netanyahu has set against a ceasefire deal, and it was not part of the framework proposed by US President Joe Biden in May and agreed upon by Hamas on 2 July.
Simultaneously, the “No to Netanyahu” camp in Israel has grown increasingly suspicious of the actions and the intentions of the Israeli police, now colloquially referred to as “Ben Gvir’s police” in a reference to Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir.
The moniker reflects growing concerns over the violence used against anti-Netanyahu protesters in Israel, including the deployment of mounted police to disperse crowds. In contrast, the police were notably lax in dealing with protesters against the Israeli military police’s attempt to summon officers and soldiers involved in documented cases of the torture and sexual assault of Palestinians at the Sde Timan Prison.
The situation was exacerbated by the presence of armed and masked individuals, Knesset members, and ministers among the demonstrators who obstructed the arrest of the guilty parties. This inaction mirrors the same double standards and negligence seen when Israeli settlers commit crimes in Palestinian villages in the West Bank, where they kill and burn the homes and properties of defenceless Palestinians.
Similar negligence was displayed when several relief trucks destined for Gaza were sabotaged by right-wing activists.
Such turbulent developments within Israel’s domestic landscape are impacting the prisoner-exchange deal, the ceasefire, and its consolidation in the Gaza war. However, these shifts could also have far-reaching historical implications for Israel’s fragile society.
How will large segments of the Bedouin and Druze communities within Israel’s 1948 borders cooperate with policies they once hoped would establish a “state for all its citizens” when they are now asked to die for the “Jewish State”? This question is particularly pressing given that Israel now sits on the defendant’s bench in the international courts, facing arrest warrants and international condemnation.
Such policies are also alienating many secular Jews who reject rabbinical oversight, territorial expansionism, and the forced relocation of populations, all policies that could lead to unpredictable regional conflicts. This is especially concerning as the Israeli army, despite receiving substantial support from the US and Britain, including direct intervention, has been unable to maintain deterrence, secure the hostages’ release, or resettle displaced Israelis in northern and southern Israel.
Many Israelis now believe that the country’s security and budget priorities should focus on the 1948 borders rather than the West Bank, where only about six per cent of Israelis live in settlements that violate international law.
This sentiment is echoed by the majority, of up to 70 per cent, who oppose Netanyahu and advocate for a deal, seeing true victory in the Gaza war as the release of the detainees and prisoners. A slightly smaller majority believes the current Coalition Government must be replaced, allowing the opposition led by Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid the opportunity to course-correct, particularly concerning the ceasefire.
Some would even prefer former prime minister Naftali Bennett to return to the leadership instead of Netanyahu. In contrast, Netanyahu, along with Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, followers of the racist Kach Movement which advocates for the expulsion of all non-Jews from Israel, are vigorously attempting to shift the Arab-Israeli conflict into an Iranian-Israeli one.
This strategy aims to undermine domestic support for a deal and diminish international sympathy for the Palestinians by highlighting Iran’s expansionist ambitions in the region.
In sum, the internal Israeli situation reveals the bankruptcy of Zionist ideology, reflected in the increasing reverse migration from a land that now lacks the essential commodity of “security.” Israeli society has reached a point of mutual distrust between conflicting camps. A significant segment of the population no longer trusts its leadership, whether political or military, and feels that they are being unfairly burdened, particularly with the exemption of about 15 per cent of Israeli Jewish males from military service.
These intense changes are occurring at a time when Israel’s ability to deter or predict potential attacks, whether from the West Bank, Southern Lebanon, or the Golan Heights, has been severely compromised.
The writer is professor of Israel studies at Ain Shams University in Cairo.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 29 August, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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