The fire that broke out on the Greek-flagged oil tanker Sounion on 22 August while it was transiting the Red Sea bound for Israel underscores the growing need for joint international and regional action to enhance security in the Red Sea region.

Since Israel launched its military operation against Gaza on 7 October 2023, freedom of navigation in the Red Sea has been hampered due to attacks by the Yemeni Ansar Allah (Houthi) Movement. Houthi officials have stated that the attacks target ships bound for Israel and that their aim is to build pressure to end the war.

Although the US and UK have announced military initiatives to secure navigation in the Red Sea, none of the countries bordering that strategic body of water, which are the most affected by the disruption in shipping, have agreed to participate in or support them.

In December 2023, Washington launched Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG), under the umbrella of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) Coalition, to weaken the Houthis’ power and deter attacks on ships in the Red Sea. The CMF covers a wide range of maritime security operations across several regions, including the Red Sea, but also the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean.

The coalition has 45 members, among them the US, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, the Seychelles, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, the UK, and Yemen. In 2021, Israel announced its intention to join the CMF, but it has not yet been formally admitted.

The coalition aims to combat drug trafficking and piracy, encourage regional cooperation, and secure navigation against potential threats from non-state actors.

The OPG includes the US, UK, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the Seychelles, and Spain. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both CMF members and both Red Sea littoral countries, are not officially participating in or supporting the OPG.

In January 2024, Washington launched another initiative in partnership with the UK called Operation Poseidon Archer. This moved to an offensive footing, using missile strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. Soon afterwards, in February 2024, the EU launched EUNAVFOR Aspides, a defensive operation to protect merchant vessels against strikes. The Red Sea littoral countries have not supported these operations either, which may affect their effectiveness.

These three operations have not weakened the Houthis’ ability to threaten navigation in the Red Sea, to which the over 100 attacks they have mounted since January this year, according to the US Defence Department website, bears witness.

The Red Sea littoral countries, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are among the countries most harmed by the disruption to shipping in the Red Sea and, hence, to supply chains. The Houthi threat to navigation has led to major and costly changes in ports and shipping routes. For Saudi Arabia, for example, this has meant a sharp decline in cargo trade out of the port of Jeddah since October 2023 and a comparable increase in port operations in Dammam.

Operations have also declined in the Suez Canal and Port of Aqaba, due to their proximity to Israel’s war theatre. According to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Regional Economic Outlook report for the Middle East, published in April 2024, Jordan’s export and import trade through Aqaba between November 2023 and February 2024 shrank by half of its pre-October 2023 levels. The report observes similar declines during the same period for the ports of Yemen and Sudan, as well as for commercial shipping passing through the Suez Canal, which handles 12 to 15 per cent of global trade.

By contrast, operations in Djibouti have flourished due to increased gold production. The East African port has experienced a seven per cent growth in commercial operations since the beginning of this year.

Meanwhile, this region faces other security risks and threats, such as the growing maritime smuggling of illicit arms, drugs, and other contraband. This has been made possible by the ongoing conflict in Yemen, the growing military power of the Houthis, and the consequent decline in maritime combing and inspection operations.

Although Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other regional powers have refrained from taking part in the above-mentioned counter-Houthi initiatives, they are at the forefront of mediating efforts to end the war on Gaza and facilitate the entry of humanitarian relief into the Strip. Egypt, Qatar, and the US have been working together intensively to promote a ceasefire agreement, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia are actively involved in the ministerial committee tasked by the Arab Islamic Extraordinary Summit in December 2023 with formulating international action to stop the war in Gaza and bring humanitarian relief to its besieged population.  

As important as these diplomatic efforts are to achieving security in the Red Sea in the medium and long terms, it is also necessary to think about the short term. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both of which possess significant air and naval capacities, should think about playing an active role in the international initiatives to protect navigation in the Red Sea.

If recent months tell us anything, it is that the US, UK, and EU cannot weaken the Houthis and secure shipping in the Red Sea without the participation of partners from the region.

The writer is director-general of the Regional Expertise Centre for Combating Drugs and Crime at NAUSS.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 5 September, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly