Any country has three types of interests: strategic, material and reputational. Strategic interests relate to survival, be it that of the state as a political entity in a territorial realm or as a system of government. Material interests are generally of an economic nature and needed to sustain life and livelihoods. Reputational interests are what makes other countries take the state seriously, whether as a friend or foe. Interests, in general, have geographical and historical foundations that accumulate over time, especially in countries with a long history and long-established traditions of defence and offence, and maintaining a balance of power with potential adversaries. Just as people cannot choose their parents, countries cannot choose their neighbours. The problem arises when their respective interests clash.

All this applies to Iran in its present form, which has distinct characteristics. First, it is a revolutionary state that overthrew the Peacock Throne and replaced it with a Shiite Islamist theocratic regime that espouses jihad and martyrdom. Second, its political system, based on the “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist,” elevates the Supreme Leader of the Revolution to a quasi-divine status, investing him with near absolute power. Third, Iran’s long history as a regional power attests to imperial ambitions or the ability to challenge the dominant empires. Fourth, 45 years of revolution has generated a general state of fatigue among the Iranian people who are increasingly grumbling due to sanctions and other consequences of endless calls for jihad and the government prioritising external over internal affairs.

Since the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, a flurry of political and diplomatic activity in and out of Tehran has occurred. Visits and important statements have been made by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and former commander-in-chief of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Mohammad Ali Jafari. One senses the urgency. The Iranian dilemma began to accumulate with Israel’s assassinations of nuclear scientists and intelligence and security agencies’ personnel, beneath whose noses the late Hamas political bureau head Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated. With the assassinations of Hassan Nasrallah, a number of other Hizbullah leaders, and several Iranian IRGC officers in Syria and Lebanon, it became clear that the security breach was gaping. It will take time to assess and repair the damage, if possible. Meanwhile, some moves made when caught in a predicament, such as Iran’s retaliatory strike against Israel, only generate more significant pressure. At this point, the dilemma will flare into a full-blown crisis in which the state’s three sets of interests – survival of the state, survival of the regime, and the welfare of a population of 29 million people – clash.

Iran’s retaliatory strike was different from its last one. It used ballistic missiles which caused tangible damage in Israel, triggering Israel’s determination to carry out a counter strike. It is impossible to predict the scale of the response Israel intends to deliver. Certainly, its record so far, starting with the pager bombings in Lebanon and proceeding through the many bomb attacks leading to the assassinations of Nasrallah and his senior aides and successors, has been keeping the Iranians guessing at what exactly Israel has in store for them. But, meanwhile, they are accelerating uranium enrichment in the hope of reaching the breakout point to a possible nuclear deterrent.

The impending Israeli strike and the Iranian threat of a nuclear deterrent have brought the US into the confrontation as an active participant. It has further escalated its military footprint in the region and provided Israel with its latest missile defence system. It also notched up sanctions on the Iranian oil sector, as did several European countries. The purpose is to persuade Israel to keep its strike “reasonable,” which is to say not to harm Iranian oil and nuclear facilities.

The US, through its build-up, is simultaneously attempting to pressure Iran into keeping its response to whatever Israel does equally “reasonable” so that the confrontation ends, and ceasefire talks can resume on the Gaza and Lebanese fronts. But for Iran to go for this would put its revolutionary and jihadist reputation at risk, while further jeopardising its material interests. As for the regime’s interests, fear of another Israeli targeted assassination spree has prompted the Iranians to relocate Khamenei to a safer place.  

Fortunately for Tehran, its relations with its Arab neighbours have improved significantly. The thaw was already in motion before the fifth Gaza war. Will they be the ones to help Iran out of its current predicament? Or will the forces pushing for a regional war be unstoppable?

* A version of this article appears in print in the 24 October, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly