Almost a month has passed since the end of the rule of the Al-Assad family in Syria, and it is time to begin an assessment of the reasons that led to its fall in the way that it did in late November and early December 2024.

However, any such assessment must have a preliminary character and be open to revisions and additions in the light of expected disclosures about the rule of the Al-Assad family in Syria, which lasted for over 54 years. This article will address four of the most important domestic reasons that led to the end of Al-Assad family rule.

The first is its failure to provide the Syrian people with sustainable and dignified economic, social, and living conditions, as well as its refusal to allow the people to practice their political rights. This was the case in general, even if we admit that the rule of the Al-Assad family did include relatively short periods that witnessed improvements in the economic, social, and living conditions of the Syrian people.

However, these exceptional periods resulted from the temporary alliance between late president Hafez Al-Assad, the father of former Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad and the founder of the Al-Assad regime in the early 1970s, and the Sunni industrial and commercial bourgeoisie in Syria, as well as from the relative economic liberalisation and economic open-door policy which characterised the first few years of the rule of Bashar Al-Assad in the early 2000s.

In the latter case, the results were not positive due to the rise of corruption in state institutions and the attempts of individuals close to the former President, as well as leading figures in the ruling Syrian Baath Party, the government, and the military and security institutions, to use their political influence to make financial and economic gains.

For over half a century, there was an absence of political pluralism in Syria. Even the parties that accepted the leading role of the Baath Party in governing Syria were grouped into one formal alliance under the name of the “Progressive National Front” with a view to controlling them. They were given a tiny margin of freedom for political action, while the Baath Party monopolised the tools and practice of power.

The second reason that led to the end of the rule of the Al-Assad family, and with it the end of the rule of the Baath Party, was its dependence on certain political alliances that would seem from the outside to have been aimed at balancing the different sects that compose the Syrian people. These include the country’s Sunni majority, as well as the strong representation of Syria’s religious, sectarian, and ethnic minorities, in the forefront of which are the Alawites, the Ismailis, the Druze, the Kurds, and the Christians, among others.

However, whatever this balancing act may have looked like from the outside, its real aim was to maintain the control of the ruling party, the government, and the military and security institutions in the hands mainly of the Alawite sect. There was always an Alawite deputy or assistant to a senior official from the Sunni or other sects, with the real decision-making authority and actual power being in the hands of this deputy or assistant. The senior official, whether Sunni or from another sect other than the Alawite, was a mere façade or post-holder, and the official’s remaining in office depended entirely on support received from the incumbent president.

These practices were enhanced after president Hafez Al-Assad managed to gradually get rid of all the non-Alawite political and military leaders who supported his coup d’etat of 16 November 1970 that led to his control of Syria. It became clear to the Sunni majority in the country that their share of power had been marginalised, and it became equally clear to the other non-Alawite minorities that individuals belonging to them, though theoretically occupying important posts in the government, the Baath Party, and the military and security institutions, did not enjoy any real authority.

This situation was further complicated by the absence of democratic practices or political pluralism. The practices of the Al-Assad family also clearly contradicted the supposedly secular nature of the Syrian state under the leadership of the supposedly secular Ba’ath Party.

The third important domestic reason that contributed to the end of the rule of the Al-Assad family was the resort by the authorities to the excessive use of force against the protests of the opposition.

This was seen during the rule of president Hafez Al-Assad, who used excessive force, and was even criticised for it by some members of his regime, against political opponents of different affiliations. The bloodiest demonstration, although not the only one, of such force came with the bombardment of the city of Hama and the partial bombardment of other Syrian cities during the confrontations between the Al-Assad regime and the Syrian Muslim Brothers in the early 1980s.

It was also seen when president Bashar Al-Assad used excessive force against the popular uprising of broad sectors of the Syrian people in the context of the “Arab Spring” in 2011, even though there is wide agreement among observers that this uprising started peacefully and was led by an opposition most of which was not based on sectarian affiliations.

The excessive use of force by the Syrian authorities against the uprising played a role in making it more violent and in transferring its leadership to fundamentalist or Salafi-Jihadist groups, thus highlighting the sectarian character of the confrontations with the authorities. The militarisation of the Syrian uprising and the violent way the authorities dealt with it contributed to the civil war that then took place in Syria.

The fourth reason that contributed to the end of the rule of the Al-Assad family is related to the loss of control by the central government over parts of Syrian territory, whether these parts were controlled by armed militias supported and protected by regional and international powers or by troops sent in by foreign countries, as was the case for over more than a decade.

Many observers considered that the Al-Assad government had implicitly recognised its loss of sovereignty over some parts of Syrian territory and some portions of the Syrian people in return for a guarantee of the continuation of Al-Assad family rule in the capital Damascus and other parts of the country.

This brings back memories of another episode in the history of Syria under the rule of the Baath Party, when the leadership of the party after the military defeat of Syria in the 1967 War and the occupation by Israel of the Syrian Golan Heights announced that there had been no defeat as long as the Baath Party was still in power in Damascus.

There are other domestic reasons that contributed to the end of the rule of the Al-Assad family in Syria. It is equally evident that there were external reasons that also contributed to it. However, these are the four most important domestic reasons that helped bring the rule of the Al-Assad family to an end after more than half a century in power.

The writer is a diplomat and commentator.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 January, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly