At a time when the Arab world is facing six strategic changes, as discussed in the first article in this series, and is confronting the question of whether there is one or more political Arab worlds, discussed in the second, six non-Arab political projects are trying to reform the region and shape its future to achieve their own, often clashing, objectives.
The first is the Turkish project, which has recently achieved notable successes. Turkey was the key force behind the advance of militant Islamist groups from northern Syria south to Damascus and large parts of the country in December last year, leading to the toppling of Al-Assad regime and their own ascent to power. This success has several aspects.
First, it marks Turkey’s return to the Levant a century after its withdrawal, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey is now returning not merely as a power able to cajole and convince, but also, and primarily, as one that is able to mould political circumstances to what it considers to be its strategic goals in the region.
Second, moulding circumstances in Syria entails the possession of political, military, economic, and intelligence resources in areas beyond Turkey. Turkey has always been a key power in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the presence of Turkish assets, or assets over which Turkey has significant influence, beyond Turkish borders signifies a new strategic posture that the country has not had in the region for over a century.
Third, Turkey understands that this new, or historically resuscitated, strategic positioning is alarming a number of powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. These powers understand that such strategic positioning is never temporary. A country with Turkey’s decision-making sophistication would not carve out such a strategic positioning if it was not determined to preserve it for the foreseeable future. This means that Turkey’s relationship with several Eastern Mediterranean countries will soon undergo changes.
Fourth, some of these changes will exacerbate old tensions; some will stir up new ones; and some will entail new strategic calculations. But underpinning these changes will be a realisation by most Eastern Mediterranean countries that Turkey has taken its most assertive step in almost a century in order to re-orient its strategic positioning towards the south and the Arab world rather than towards Europe.
Fifth, for many Arab countries, and for Israel, this marks the entry of a serious power in a much more significant way into Middle Eastern politics. Turkey has the second-largest army in NATO, a significant demography, and a sizeable economy with solid exporting power. It is a proud nation that had a decisive influence over the Middle East for over 400 years.
Sixth, Turkey commands one of the most important geographical locations in the world at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and northeast Africa. Its building of a potentially long-term strategic presence in a key corner of the Eastern Mediterranean has repercussions beyond the Middle East. Europe, the US, and Russia have taken note.
Already, these three have begun to approach Turkey in different ways in the light of its recent success. The US and Russia might well have reservations, but they also see areas of cooperation with Turkey as it attempts to consolidate its new strategic positioning. Europe partly sees this step as a way for Turkey to negotiate with it on multiple dossiers in which Turkey has leverage and that are important for Europe. These include particularly the future of irregular migration from the southeastern Mediterranean to Europe.
Seventh, Turkey’s return to the Levant and the changes it has backed in Syria have strengthened Political Islam. Although this had not gone away even after its defeat at the hands of nationalist and secular forces in much of the Arab world over the past decade, the change in Syria and Turkey’s new positioning in the region have given it a strong momentum, in all of its different facets and streams, that it has not had in over a decade.
This will have implications not only for domestic politics in several Middle Eastern countries, but also for the strategies of different countries in the region in dealing with pan-regional Political Islamist forces.
Eighth, the change in Turkey’s strategic positioning comes at a significant moment in the country’s history. The Turkish Republic is celebrating a century since its emergence from the death throes of the Ottoman Empire, and after various tumults throughout that century Turkey now seems to have internalised ways of coexistence between constituents of its society that have opposing views on not only socio-politics, but also on the idea of what Turkish identity means.
Turkey is thus returning to the Middle East and the Arab world in search of more than specific political opportunities and economic interests. Arguably, it is returning in pursuit of a dimension of its historical identity that has been in the shadows over the past century. But resuscitating that dimension will clash with other strategic interests being pursued in the region, as well as with other regional countries’ conceptions of their national identities.
The writer is the author of Islamism: A History of Political Islam (2017) and Egypt on the Brink (2010).
* A version of this article appears in print in the 30 January, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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