The concept of Arab national security has been the subject of significant intellectual and theoretical debate in recent decades.
This is largely due to profound transformations in the Middle East, shifts in Arab relations with non-Arab regional powers, and changes in the global order’s interaction with the region. Additionally, ideological shifts, generational transformations within Arab societies, and internal political changes in several Arab states have created openings for foreign interventions that have influenced domestic political processes.
For much of the period of the unipolar world order led by the United States, the Arab states operated under the assumption that this global order would ensure regional stability by eliminating great power rivalries and, consequently, proxy wars.
However, in practice, this system coincided with an alarming decline in regional security. The expansion of military interventions under the pretexts of combating terrorism and promoting democracy not only failed to bring stability but also exacerbated internal crises in several Arab states. These interventions revived sectarian divisions, weakened Arab military influence in the regional security equation, and ultimately failed to eliminate terrorist organisations. Moreover, the political and security costs of alliances with the US increased, as did the financial burdens of these relationships.
The so-called “Arab Spring” further destabilised the region, creating fragile political and security environments that invited foreign political and military interventions. These interventions not only deepened domestic political crises but also proved ineffective in preserving the very regimes that had maintained strong military ties with external powers. Some of these regimes collapsed despite their strategic partnerships with global actors.
At the same time, non-Arab regional powers have, over the past decade and a half, developed sophisticated mechanisms for intervention in Arab affairs. The rise of sectarianism and ethnic fragmentation, particularly following the Arab Spring, created an environment in which these powers exploited weak state-society relations and the erosion of national armies.
Their interventions transcended political and cultural influence, manifesting in direct military action in several cases. Despite recent attempts to mend relations with some of these powers, their interventionist policies remain largely unchanged, as the internal conditions of the targeted Arab states have not undergone substantial transformation.
A more troubling development has been Israel’s pursuit of regional hegemony, bolstered by unwavering US and Western support. This strategy seeks to reshape the balance of power in the Middle East and redraw its political maps, further entrenching Israeli dominance.
None of these geopolitical shifts could have taken their current trajectories without enabling internal Arab conditions. Therefore, an objective reassessment of Arab relations with the global system since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and of Arab interactions with regional powers over the past 15 years is crucial.
This evaluation must account for the political, economic, and security costs Arab states have incurred and seek ways to recalibrate these relationships in a manner that serves Arab national security.
STRATEGIC REASSESSMENT: In carrying out this strategic reassessment, the Arab states must first conduct a comprehensive and objective review of their historical relationships with global and regional powers.
Over the past four decades, what tangible gains have the Arab states secured from their engagements with these actors under the unipolar system? What costs have they borne? This assessment must integrate security considerations alongside economic and political factors, weighing each component appropriately. This does not imply adopting an adversarial stance towards any global or regional power but rather ensuring that these relationships are built on mutual interests and above all the preservation of Arab national security.
Second, the nature of great power relations with any given region is not solely dictated by the ambitions and policies of external actors; it is equally shaped by the strategies and priorities of regional players. Many regions have successfully structured their external engagements to reinforce their security. A critical factor in this process is regional consensus. The Arab states must work towards a unified vision of their core interests and determine how these interests should be reflected in their foreign relationships.
Third, the Arab states possess, and have always possessed, substantial leverage to protect their national security and negotiate from a position of strength with global and regional powers. However, realising the full potential of these strategic assets requires enhanced coordination and prioritisation within the Arab world.
Finally, the past four decades have demonstrated unequivocally that Arab national security cannot be approached in isolation. The security of one Arab state is inherently linked to the security of the region as a whole. Any instability or vulnerability in one state inevitably reverberates across the Arab world, even if the effects are not immediately apparent.
Encouragingly, there are emerging indications of a growing Arab awareness of the need for strategic reassessments and course corrections. However, such an evolution must be accompanied by concrete policies and decisive action. The Arab world requires a well-defined security framework that prioritises collective interests over fragmented alliances and short-term alignments.
An objective analysis of Arab relations with the global order since the onset of US unipolarity and with regional powers over the past 15 years is not merely an intellectual exercise. It is an urgent necessity for reestablishing a security architecture that shields the Arab world from further destabilisation and external manipulation.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 13 February, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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