Scoping out the parameters of European defence necessitates defining what is being defended and assessing the degree to which European societies agree on priorities and the values behind them.
Europe agrees on many premises concerning its defence. All European societies agree on a collective cultural notion that brings them together, which, simple as it might appear, is in fact a serious achievement for the European project as a whole.
This is because not only have many of these European societies bitterly fought each other for centuries, including in World War II, the most devastating struggle in human history, but they have also hand diverse historical trajectories that have moulded vastly different collective consciousnesses. For these societies to agree on a common cultural framework is thus a major achievement.
Europe believes in that cultural framework. Despite reservations in different parts of Europe about the European project, there is a near consensus across the Continent that its cultural framework is the epitome of societal refinement.
As a result, whereas large sections of European societies have frustrations concerning many aspects of European political and economic policies, at the core of the European collective consciousness there is a belief that the Continent’s cultural experience over the past few centuries has been more successful than that in any other part of the world over the same time span. This makes the idea of Europe worth defending.
Yet, despite this, the notion of collective European defence faces some difficult questions, particularly when Europe stops reflecting on its own cultural and economic successes and begins to think about its parameters. Who are its true allies, for example, and who are its real opponents? Do the latter qualify as enemies, and what are Europe’s objectives vis-à-vis these opponents or enemies? What are the challenges and threats that they represent, and how will Europe confront them?
Such questions stir problems because there is no agreement on their answers. For example, different European societies have vastly different views about their relationship with the US, especially as the right continues its rise in American politics. Europe also see the Western alliance and the values it supposedly stands for through different lenses. European societies differ on how they see the future of their relationships with powers such as China, Russia, India, and Turkey, among others. They have different, and sometimes contradictory, conceptions of who are their allies, partners, opponents, and enemies.
Rhetoric buys time, and time helps to bridge the gaps between ideas. This is why the idea of Europe’s strategic autonomy has gained traction over the past few years, since this allows for varied interpretations and elastic definitions. However, this flexibility also brings its own problems as many devils reside in the details.
The first of these devils concerns defining the objectives of this strategic autonomy. European strategists have often tried to avoid major issues on which European opinions vary, choosing instead to concentrate on other ones that engender wider agreement, such as on irregular migration. Yet even here, the degree of urgency and the resources allocated to this issue vary considerably across Europe.
Another challenge is that Europe now has different political anchors. Agreements between France and Germany once propelled the European project forward and were sufficient to make their common position on any issue European policy. This is no longer the case today. Not only has the European Union expanded to include many more members over the past two decades, but the European project itself now has other definitions stemming from the experiences of countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
Their interpretations of what Europe means and where it is going are not only different from those of countries in Western Europe, but they are also gaining weight in European decision making.
Even in Western Europe, the consensus on Europe’s strategic objectives could well be diluted in the not-too-distant future. This is because in many Western European countries the rise of the far right threatens to shatter what seemed to be a consensus on fundamental European values, including on what were generally understood to be the foundations of Western liberal democracy.
If the far right continues its rise, a far from negligible scenario, then several Western European societies might face acute internal differences on their own strategic objectives.
There is also the problem of resources. Irrespective of its specific objectives, strategic autonomy means having advanced ways of defending borders, infrastructure, interests in Europe’s neighbourhood and serious means of projecting power. All of this costs money that is no longer easily available, given the hundreds of billions that have been borrowed and spent over the past 15 years since the 2008 financial crisis and during and after the Covid-19 pandemic.
In addition to all this, there is a question of expertise. Procuring arms and developing serious military capabilities is complicated. For almost 70 years, NATO has provided first most of Western Europe, and then almost the whole of Europe, with all the key weapons and military kit it has needed for defence.
This dependency has also transcended just weapons. NATO constitutes the world’s most sophisticated military and security architecture, spanning strategic planning, technological capabilities, logistical chains, and a network of well-equipped and staffed bases in different parts of the world, all supported by vast intelligence-gathering efforts with major reach across the globe.
European strategic autonomy would entail developing alternatives to many of NATO’s resources and capabilities. Such an endeavour would require serious expertise in different disciplines.
Time has also brought changes to the European project. Since the end of World War II, Europe has been the world’s most important geopolitical theatre, and geo-economics have augmented its importance. In the period from the 1960s to 2000, European manufacturing became a strong driver of the global economy. Even after several Asian countries emerged as key nodes of global manufacturing and in the value chains of important industries, Europe remained a leading centre of research and development, in addition to being a leading example of governance.
Today, however, geopolitical developments in East and North Asia are arguably more consequential than those in Europe. When it comes to geo-economics, Europe remains an important centre of innovation in different industries, and it is still arguably the single richest market in the world. Yet, the rise of Asian research and development and innovation has lessened Europe’s centrality in several industries, including in areas that will shape the future of humanity, such as in quantum fields, bio-engineering, and artificial intelligence.
These challenges do not render strategic autonomy and a serious European defence architecture impossible. But they make the road to it more difficult.
Such challenges could be surmounted. Europe is still one of the richest places in the world, and the European project remains the most successful in the world relative to any other that has emerged in the period since World War II.
As a result, Europe can certainly summon up immense resources to confront the challenges facing it. However, the key question remains of whether Europe has the will to seek strategic autonomy and to build its own defence architecture. The next and final article in this series will address this question.
The writer is the author of Islamism: A History of Political Islam (2017) and Egypt on the Brink (2010).
* A version of this article appears in print in the 10 April, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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