Anyone who thinks that the policies of US President Donald Trump towards the Middle East, North Africa, the Nile Basin, and the Horn of Africa intersect only negatively with Egypt’s interests and foreign priorities in its extended neighbourhood and in regions vital to its national security is mistaken.
Recently, the political and diplomatic landscape has been dominated by differences between the United States and Egypt regarding Gaza, where war has flared again, the West Bank, where violence is escalating, and the overall conditions of the Palestinian people, who face catastrophic humanitarian conditions, imminent threats of displacement, and systematic attempts to liquidate their national rights.
However, the differences regarding Palestine, no matter how intense, should not push the Egyptian government away from ongoing dialogue with the US administration, whether regarding ways to restore the ceasefire in Gaza, the opportunities to activate the Egyptian-Arab reconstruction plan, the revival of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, or the consideration of possible measures to restore peace and security in the Middle East.
The differences between the US and Egyptian sides regarding Palestine should never prevent consideration of opportunities for joint action and positive engagement between the two countries in other regional arenas that impact US interests and lie at the heart of Egypt’s interests and national security.
With regard to the security of the Red Sea and the stability of shipping lanes in and through this vital waterway, from the south at the Bab Al-Mandab Strait to the north at the Suez Canal, the US and Egyptian sides agree on the imperative need for the Yemeni Houthi group to halt its indiscriminate attacks on commercial and military vessels and to end the resulting threats. These have resulted in a significant decline in Red Sea navigation, harmed global trade, prompted the US and other major powers to respond militarily to Houthi missiles and drones, and harmed Egypt’s revenues from the Suez Canal.
While the US administration has shifted from a partial to a comprehensive response to the Houthis in recent weeks, targeting the Iranian-backed group’s missile and military capabilities (Operation Rough Rider launched by the US Air Force and Navy last March and continuing to this day), the Egyptian government has also been active on security matters in the Red Sea within the framework of Task Force 153 (CTF 153), which is concerned with enhancing stability in the Red Sea, Bab Al-Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden, (Egypt assumed command of Task Force 153 a few days ago).
Egypt is also moving diplomatically in the Middle East to restore calm and urge everyone to exercise restraint, as seen in statements by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesperson regarding a communication that took place on 10 April between the foreign ministers of Egypt and Iran. It is also moving regionally and internationally to build a broad consensus among influential countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Iran, and Israel, and major powers with a stake in stability in the Red Sea, alongside the US, China, India, Russia, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, regarding collective measures to secure navigation and maintain peace.
Regarding the situation in Sudan, our southern neighbour which has been suffering from a catastrophic Civil War since 2023, the US administration and the Egyptian government agree on the priority that must be given to a rapid cessation of hostilities without allowing the country to disintegrate or national institutions to collapse.
They also agree on the priority that needs to be given to effectively addressing the threats of famine, insecurity, and displacement that afflict the Sudanese people and have driven a large segment of them to seek safe havens in Egypt and other neighbouring countries. They agree on the need to launch an inclusive political process that will re-establish stability, coexistence, and sustainable development.
To achieve these goals, Washington and Cairo share a common desire to prevent the sale or supply of weapons to militias in Sudan, especially the Rapid Support Forces which receive weapons from various regional and international sources, and to encourage the leadership of the national Sudanese Army to link the military operations that recently enabled it to regain control of the capital Khartoum and other cities and regions with the initiation of national-reconciliation measures and the avoidance of retaliatory actions against the followers of the defeated militias.
Indeed, the US administration, currently considering the feasibility of appointing a special envoy or presidential coordinator for Sudan, East Africa, and the Horn of Africa, appears to be open (especially the State Department) to reviving the dialogue between regional mediators with the participation of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Ethiopia, and Kenya, and possibly the Arab League and the African Union and international mediators with the participation of the US, the UK, the EU, possibly Russia, and, to a lesser extent, China on ways to end the Civil War in Sudan and agree on national reconciliation and reconstruction plans.
The US vision here does not depart from the Egyptian preference for integrating all regional and international stakeholders with diverse interests in Sudan, including economic and commercial as well as security and counterterrorism, into an institutional framework that effectively mediates between the warring parties and seeks common ground between the conflicting interests that have exhausted Sudan and plagued its people.
What is being said here about Sudan must also be emphasised regarding Libya, where US and Egyptian interests converge. The situation in Libya calls for the activation of regional and international mediation to impose stability and support a comprehensive political process that will restore the health of national institutions, unify them, both civilian and military, remove armed militias and foreign forces from Libyan territory, and open up prospects for societal consensus.
The opportunities for coordination and cooperation between the US and Egypt regarding Middle East and North African issues are not limited to Red Sea security and the situation in Sudan and Libya. They also extend to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and Nile River water resources and their equitable distribution between upstream and downstream countries without prejudice to the historical rights and developmental requirements of either group, as well as to established international rules.
During his first administration (2016-2020), Trump, with the participation of relevant officials in the US National Security Council, the State Department, and representatives from the World Bank, led mediation efforts between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia to reach a “final agreement” on the GERD and the Nile water, which included a “binding mechanism for resolving all disputes.” This agreement was close to being signed in 2020, but it failed owing to the intransigence of the Ethiopian government.
While the Biden administration ignored the GERD issue and largely refrained from active diplomacy towards the Nile Basin, Trump’s return to the White House promises to revive US mediation efforts and enable the Egyptian government to combine its serious political steps in the Nile Basin and the Horn of Africa region in order to pressure the Ethiopian government into signing a final agreement.
This would be supported by Cairo’s working with the US administration to restore the international momentum to ending Addis Ababa’s intransigence by the signature of a binding agreement by the three parties involved, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia.
The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 17 April, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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