The ceasefire agreement reached in Sharm El-Sheikh in October represents a pivotal moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, coming after years of recurrent military escalation and political deadlock that have undermined the capacity of the parties involved to achieve sustainable solutions.
What distinguishes this agreement is its phased approach, which includes initial tangible steps such as a partial military withdrawal, the release of hostages, and the expansion of humanitarian aid, alongside commitments to subsequent measures addressing more complex issues such as the governance of the Gaza Strip and long-term security guarantees.
Regional and international shifts, including the proactive role of Egypt and other Arab states, as well as new balances in the region, contributed to creating a political space that made this agreement possible.
Within this context, the United States emerges as the primary driver and guarantor of the agreement’s success, offering a comprehensive set of guarantees, incentives, and sanctions designed to ensure Israel and Hamas adhere to its implementation.
For Israel, these guarantees could include explicit US commitments to its security, encompassing reassurance regarding potential future threats from Gaza, coupled with continued limited military support to maintain defensive capabilities, thereby ensuring that compliance with the agreement does not come at the expense of national security.
In addition, Washington could leverage its influence through security cooperation, intelligence sharing, and defence technology transfers, making some elements contingent on the degree of compliance with the ceasefire. Political leverage could also be applied in international forums, where US backing for Israel could be linked to visible adherence to the terms of the agreement, thus creating reputational and diplomatic incentives.
For Hamas, the US leverage must be carefully calibrated given its status as a non-state actor. Incentives might include accelerated humanitarian assistance, support for reconstruction projects, and targeted economic facilitation in Gaza, providing tangible political and economic rewards for compliance. The US could also use diplomatic pressure on states or organisations that provide material or political support to Hamas, conditioning such assistance on adherence to the agreement.
In addition, Washington could coordinate with regional partners to establish monitoring mechanisms that track compliance with military and security provisions, linking violations to the suspension of aid, trade restrictions, or other graduated sanctions. The key is to combine positive inducements with credible, enforceable consequences to create a cost-benefit environment where compliance becomes the rational strategic choice.
Simultaneously, sanctions must be designed to be targeted, graduated, and transparent, ensuring they deter violations without exacerbating humanitarian crises or fostering political frustration among civilians. For instance, sanctions could be linked to conditional economic or aid programmes, making any breach of commitments carry clear and immediate costs, thus reinforcing the seriousness of compliance.
The United States could further enhance its leverage by coordinating closely with international financial institutions, using mechanisms such as conditional loans, grants, and investment programmes to encourage adherence.
The US cannot operate in isolation from the supportive regional and international environment. Here, the Arab role, particularly that of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, is crucial in providing additional guarantees and logistical and political facilitation that complement US efforts. Egypt, for example, could act as a permanent monitoring party, overseeing field implementation and providing accurate assessments of compliance, while other Arab states could offer political and economic support that increases the cost of non-compliance.
The European role could focus on financial and technical support, implementing monitoring programmes for humanitarian and development projects, thereby providing a multi-layered safety net that reinforces the sustainability of the agreement. The interaction between US guarantees and economic incentives, supplemented by regional facilitation and European oversight, could significantly reduce the risks associated with potential violations and create an effective and graduated pressure mechanism.
It is also essential that the US package remains flexible enough to address the internal political complexities of both parties. Israel, for instance, faces internal pressures from parties and policies that may oppose any military rollback or territorial concessions, while Hamas operates within a local political and social context requiring a balance between political concessions and maintaining internal influence. Carefully tailored US guarantees and incentives could provide clear political exit options for each party, coupled with strong signals that adherence to the agreement serves their strategic interests.
Another critical element is the need for strict and transparent monitoring mechanisms, including periodic reports and field oversight, ensuring any violation is visible and actionable. Such mechanisms should involve direct US supervision, with limited Egyptian and European participation to ensure credibility without diluting American control over the process.
The success of the Sharm El-Sheikh Agreement depends on the US ability to act as the primary driver and guarantor, delivering a carefully calibrated combination of guarantees, incentives, and sanctions tailored to the interests of both parties, supported by measured Arab and European engagement.
By leveraging military, political, economic, and diplomatic tools in a coordinated manner, Washington can create a strategic environment in which compliance is the rational and desirable choice for both Israel and Hamas.
Balancing pressure and incentives and combining deterrence with flexibility in response to political developments represent the key to long-term stability in the Gaza Strip, ensuring sustained implementation of the agreement, minimising the risk of renewed escalation, and establishing a more enduring framework for political and security coexistence among the involved parties.
The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 23 October, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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