A decade and a half has passed since the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring. The seeds of many more recent, major events in the Arab region were first sown during those turbulent moments at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. Said “Spring” exacted a heavy price at many levels. But we should bear in mind that the French Revolution not only triggered the Napoleonic Wars and continent-wide upheaval but also gave rise to a wave of reforms that fundamentally changed political, economic, and technological systems. Although most historical analogies are imperfect, the idea of the “Concert of Europe” can be useful for analysing Arab regional security.
Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Palestinian Intifadas in 1987 and 2000, and the various manifestations of the “Arab Spring” since 2011, the region has seen many kinds of “revolutions”. Meanwhile, at the global level, the third industrial and technological revolution in communications and information swept the world in the last quarter of the 20th century, leading to the globalisation of ideas, values, and lifestyles. The Arab world was hardly isolated from these developments. Therefore, in conjunction with major demographic shifts, including a growing youth share in booming populations, these developments placed a profound strain on social structures and value systems. If such pressures are not properly managed, they can lead to the collapse of states and civil wars, as has already happened in Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.
The Middle East, with the Arab world at its core, is a complex region that defies reductionist notions by definition. Many widely circulated policy ideas for this region were, in fact, borrowed from European experiences in conflict resolution, peace-making, and regional integration. Generally, their aim is to promote peace – especially between the Arab states and Israel – while simultaneously encouraging regional integration and modernisation. The irony is that attempts to apply these ideas exacted a heavy toll on a region suffering from deep historical wounds, flawed ideologies, and economic and social underdevelopment. The result has been more “failed” states, wars, fragmentation, and a growing developmental gap between the Arab world and the world’s fast-growing regions.
Against this backdrop of rapid change – especially given the fifth Gaza war – we need to return to the drawing boards of regional and international relations, where two crucial issues stand out: the state and power. The most important successes in achieving peace and stability in this region have been the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace treaties, followed later by the “Abraham Accords” between Israel and several other Arab countries. These agreements have withstood the test of time, as well as the recent Gaza war, because they rested firmly in the hands of states and leaders acting in accordance with their countries’ needs and interests. In addition to these agreements, there have been other peace processes sponsored not by states but by institutions. These tried to import the European model of peace and integration. However, at present, the “American model”, led by Trump, has come to prevail for the handling of the Gaza war, which has lasted over two years.
The reality of the Middle East can be summed up in two points. First, the region is divided between proponents and opponents of peace and stability – those being the conditions for development and an essential part of profound reform processes unfolding in the Gulf states, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. In general, the opposition to peace and stability is motivated by historical factors, religious ideologies, or vested interests in obstructing progress and development. Secondly, an overt or undeclared war is raging between these two camps, one of which comprises militias operating outside the framework of the state. This region’s first priority at present should be to encourage states to reach peace by relying on their own resources while denying radical forces the ability to sabotage peace-making efforts.
This is an exercise of state power in which power should be conceived of as a complex system. To achieve regional security, it can draw on diverse resources to encourage, entice, pressure, and – if necessary – combat sources of instability in the region. Several examples serve to illustrate this. The armed forces of the Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Saudi Arabia, suppressed the unrest in Bahrain in 2011. Following the 30 June 2013 Revolution in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan provided invaluable moral and material aid to Cairo. In July 2014, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE combined efforts to resolve the Gaza cris is. Similar joint Arab initiatives helped resolve subsequent crises in Gaza and Lebanon.
What the region needs now is an organised consortium of Arab powers that is not captive to catchy slogans but rather informed by a realistic vision and the awareness that a failed and fragmented region will be more intractable than ever.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 5 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Short link: