During moments of major transformation in turbulent regions, the question of collective security becomes more urgent than ever.
For decades, the Middle East has been trapped in a vicious cycle of civil wars, regional conflicts, external interventions, arms races, economic collapses, and the political instrumentalisation of sectarian and ethnic identities. Although the region’s states have expended vast resources on armaments and military alliances, security has remained elusive, stability has remained fragile, and the nation-state itself has, in multiple instances, suffered erosion or disintegration.
Hence arises the need to contemplate a new approach to regional security, one grounded not merely in military deterrence or traditional power balances, but rather in constructing a collective framework for conflict management, dispute resolution, and the prevention of the perpetual volatility that now threatens everyone without exception.
In the European experience following World War II, stability was achieved not solely through military alliances or economic growth, but also through a lengthy and complex political process that culminated in what became known as the “Helsinki Process,” an initiative launched in the 1970s that established a framework for European security and cooperation.
At that time, Europe was no less divided than the contemporary Middle East. The continent was split between East and West, between two nuclear-armed camps, and between political systems that were ideologically diametrically opposed. Nevertheless, European nations along with the United States and the then Soviet Union came to realise that open conflict posed a threat to all and that security could not be built against others alone, but rather must be built with them and through shared norms that would regulate conduct and mitigate the likelihood of explosive conflict.
The Middle East today requires a similar process, not with the aim of literally replicating the European experience, for every region possesses its own unique historical and political characteristics, but rather to construct a new vision of collective security that transcends the logic of hegemony, proxy wars, and acute polarisation.
Any serious regional initiative of this sort must begin, first and foremost, with the Arab states and Turkey, as they are the parties most in need of restoring regional equilibrium and most capable of forging shared spheres of economic, security, and political interests. As for Iran and Israel, they cannot be integrated into a sustainable collective security framework unless such inclusion is contingent upon genuine guarantees to alter their aggressive regional conduct and to desist from policies of expansion, infiltration, and intervention.
Recent decades have exposed the limitations of approaches predicated upon narrow military alliances. The United States, despite its immense military superiority, has failed to generate lasting stability in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Gulf region. Similarly, Israel’s deterrence policies have not prevented periodic eruptions of violence in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria.
Iran, for its part, has succeeded in expanding its regional influence through armed networks and non-state actors; yet, it has produced neither stability nor regional legitimacy. Instead, it has deepened sectarian rifts and driven numerous Arab states into security arms races and acute polarisation. The ultimate outcome has been a region that is more fragile and less secure for all.
Consequently, the need for a process akin to that which led to the Helsinki Accords in Europe stems not merely from a desire to de-escalate tensions, but also from the necessity of redefining the very concept of security.
In the Middle East, security cannot be reduced solely to the protection of borders or the enhancement of military capabilities. True security also entails safeguarding the nation-state from collapse, preventing external interference, stemming the sources of civil wars, and inextricably linking stability with economic development, social justice, and regional cooperation. Economically debilitated states and societies suffering from marginalisation and polarisation are far more susceptible to penetration and vulnerable to violence and extremism.
A regional process initiated within the Arab sphere and undertaken in partnership with Turkey could gradually establish a set of shared principles. Foremost among these would be respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Many of the region’s crises have been exacerbated by the deployment of transnational militias or by the instrumentalisation of sectarian and ethnic divisions as tools for political and security leverage.
The second principle would be a commitment to resolving disputes through political and diplomatic channels rather than through military force. The third would be the integration of security and development through regional economic projects that rebuild shared interests and mitigate the underlying drivers of conflict.
In this context, Turkey represents a vital partner, not merely due to its geopolitical and military weight, but also because it is bound to the Arab world by extensive networks of economic, commercial, and security interests. While it is true that Arab-Turkish relations have experienced acute tensions in recent years, stemming from divergent approaches towards issues such as Syria, Libya, and Political Islam, recent history has also demonstrated that these disagreements can be effectively contained through dialogue and mutual understanding.
Moreover, unlike Iran, Turkey does not rely on the creation of transnational sectarian militias nor on the internal dismantling of the Arab nation-state to advance its regional expansion.
As for Iran, the fundamental problem lies not in its status as a major regional power with legitimate interests, but rather in the nature of the regional conduct it has pursued for decades. Policies aimed at building influence through armed groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria have created a state of chronic instability, undermined national state institutions, and tethered regional security to the logic of open-ended conflict.
Consequently, any integration of Iran into a collective security framework must be preceded by a clear shift in its regional policies and one that entails respecting the sovereignty of Arab states, ceasing the instrumentalisation of non-state armed actors, and adhering to clear norms of non-interference.
The same principle applies to Israel, albeit from a different perspective. While Israel possesses immense military and technological superiority, it has not leveraged this advantage to foster a just and sustainable peace in the region. On the contrary, the persistence of the occupation, the expansion of the settlements, the recurrent wars in Gaza and Lebanon, and the continuous military strikes across multiple Arab theatres are all factors that render it difficult to speak of integration.
Israel cannot find a natural place within a regional security framework without a fundamental shift in its political and military conduct. Genuine collective security in the Middle East cannot be established while the Palestinian people remain deprived of their fundamental national rights and while Israel continues to engage with its neighbours through the logic of unilateral force and military superiority.
Consequently, any Helsinki-style process in the Middle East must be grounded in gradualism and realism. The logical starting point is to forge Arab-Turkish understandings regarding the norms of regional security, then to gradually expand these understandings, making any Iranian or Israeli accession contingent upon clear and verifiable commitments.
This process will not yield immediate results, nor will it resolve all conflicts overnight; however, it could for the first time establish an institutional framework for dialogue, crisis management, and confidence-building.
Experience has demonstrated that the absence of inclusive regional frameworks leaves the Middle East vulnerable to external intervention and proxy conflicts. Furthermore, the perpetual reliance on the major global powers to provide security has proven to be of limited utility, particularly in a world trending towards multipolarity, where the US capacity to impose stable, long-term arrangements is on the decline. Thus, the construction of a regional collective security system is no longer a mere intellectual exercise, but rather a strategic imperative.
Ultimately, the Middle East must transition from a logic of “managing chaos” to a logic of “generating stability”. This transition cannot be achieved through further wars, arms races, or policies of hegemony; rather, it requires the mutual recognition of shared interests and concerns and the establishment of collective norms to govern regional conduct.
Just as Europe, following decades of devastating wars, required a “Helsinki moment” to end them, so the Middle East today stands in need of a similar moment, one that would begin with an Arab initiative and a Turkish partnership, while keeping the door open to Iran and Israel provided that they accept the transition a from logic of expansion and conflict to a logic of the normal state and shared security.
The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 28 May, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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