Major events from 11 September 2001 through the 2011 Arab Spring led Al-Qaeda to reshape its geopolitical strategy, which entailed abandoning its base in Afghanistan to establish new footholds in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
The key developments included the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the rise of the Islamic State (IS) group during and after the Arab Spring, and the return of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda’s closest ally, to power in Afghanistan in 2021, with US and Western approval. The latter development inspired jihadist Islamist efforts to internationalise the model of Taliban rule in Middle East.
With the loss of Afghanistan as its base after 11 September and the subsequent US invasion of that country, followed by then Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf’s crackdown on the group in 2002, Al-Qaeda was compelled to reshape its geostrategic outlook.
Taking advantage of certain geopolitical realities, it established franchises in the Arabian Peninsula, began leveraging geopolitical factors by establishing branches in the Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Iraq in 2003 (Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Mosques, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq [AQI], respectively) and then in North Africa in 2007 (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM]).
The upheavals that accompanied the Arab Spring presented opportunities for these franchises to seize control of some rural and urban territories in Syria, Libya, Mali, and Yemen. This control lasted only a year in Yemen and northern Mali. In Libya and Syria, it lasted longer but it was also fragile. To assert and consolidate its control, the franchises formed alliances with local jihadist groups based on declarations of allegiance (bayaa), organisational affiliation, or cooperation.
The antagonism between Al-Qaeda and IS was not a product of the Arab Spring. Tensions between these groups surfaced well before this date during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Al-Qaeda’s operations in Saudi Arabia in the same year. The nature of the tensions was reflected in internal disputes within Al-Qaeda’s core leadership, which split into two main factions.
One of these factions, led by Osama bin Laden and favouring the position of Khaled Al-Hajj, the “emir” of the Yemeni franchise, advocated operations inside Saudi Arabia to disrupt Saudi ties with the US. The other faction, led by Abdel-Aziz Al-Muqrin, argued against this idea, citing the lack of experience among the jihadist cells in Saudi Arabia. Instead, it sought to replicate the Sunni-Shia sectarian polarisation strategy from Iraq in Saudi Arabia. The difference between the two factions was on tactics, not aim, however, since both emphasised the need to target the Saudi regime.
Disagreements within Al-Qaeda’s decision-making body extended to AQI, which was then attracting Saudi jihadists to Iraq. The concern was that this trend would detract from the quality and quantity of Al-Qaeda’s operations within Saudi Arabia and undermine the principle that Muslims should fight on their own soil against regimes aligned with the West.
These factional conflicts within Al-Qaeda became increasingly pronounced in 2004 with the surge of Iraqi Salafi jihadism under Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, leader of the Tawhid and Jihad group in Iraq.
Al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Bin Laden, changing the name of his group to Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Around that time, the Saudi security forces were intensifying their clampdown on Saudi jihadists, leading many to flee to Iraq. An estimated 3,500 of them joined Al-Zarqawi’s ranks between 2004 and 2005.
MIDDLE EAST REGION: The foregoing political and organisational developments in areas remote from Al-Qaeda’s traditional base in South Asia and the Indian subcontinent (Pakistan and Afghanistan) positioned its leadership to adapt to and take advantage of the conditions in the MENA region in the post-2011 period.
In Yemen (2011-2012), the African Sahel (2012), and Libya (2013), Al-Qaeda activated its recently formed tribal alliances in the framework of the local circumstances and tribal dynamics in these countries and in collaboration with affiliated jihadist groups.
The uprising in Syria in 2011 presented Al-Qaeda with unprecedented opportunities to accomplish several strategic goals in the Middle East via the Syrian gateway. To the group, the revolution against former Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad symbolised the broader revolution against secular authoritarian regimes and a link in the series of uprisings in the region.
It saw Syria itself as the nexus of a global jihad against the US and Russia, a platform to counter Shia influence as epitomised by the Lebanese Shia group Hizbullah, Iran, and Iraq, and a potential staging point for operations against Israel.
In April 2013, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi broke away from Al-Qaeda and attempted to absorb Jabhat Al-Nusra (the Al-Nusra Front) by merging it with the Islamic State of Iraq under his direct leadership, forming what he called the Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS).
This move threatened Al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria and its broader strategic position in the Middle East, especially as many foreign fighters within the Al-Nusra Front defected to IS.
However, the group’s leader, Mohamed Al-Golani (Interim Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s nom de guerre at the time), rejected Al-Baghdadi’s unilateral decision and instead pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahri.
He also sought to preserve key alliances, particularly with factions within the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian Islamic Front that were fighting against the then Al-Assad regime in Syria.
With this, Syria became a battleground for rival jihadist factions. The Al-Nusra Front relied on Al-Qaeda’s networks to retain operational control in northwest Syria, while IS extended its influence from Aleppo in northern Syria to areas bordering Iraq, thereby connecting its forces in both countries.
Tensions between the two sides escalated, and then in February 2014 the assassination of Abu Khalid Al-Suri, leader of the Al-Qaeda affiliate Ahrar Al-Sham, triggered armed skirmishes between the jihadist groups in Syria.
Commenting on the developments in Syria in 2016, Al-Zawahri stressed the need to establish an Islamic entity, adding that Al-Qaeda’s primary goal was to sustain the popular war until the fall of the Al-Assad regime and to build a jihadist emirate on its ruins.
AL-QAEDA’S ADVANTAGE: Whereas Al-Qaeda was highly centralised after 11 September 2001, it decentralised under Al-Zawahri’s leadership in the post-2011 period.
This involved strengthening its ties with Salafi jihadist groups, especially after Bin Laden’s assassination in 2011 in Pakistan, and granting greater autonomy to affiliated groups in Syria and North Africa. Al-Qaeda also established a new branch in the Indian subcontinent, led by exclusively Asian members. Until this point, there had always been an Arab leadership component, and the move reflected the strength of the organisation’s historical ties with South Asian jihadist elements.
Although Al-Qaeda aimed to establish an Islamic caliphate in the long term, as Al-Zawahri’s remark above indicates, the Arab Spring provided an opportunity to expand its geopolitical reach. But it also presented challenges. Foremost among these were the temporary rise in Egypt and Tunisia of Islamist movements offering a more moderate model of Islamic governance. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia also proved to have an extraordinary ability to mobilise grassroots support, something Al-Qaeda lacked.
While Al-Qaeda maintained its short- and medium-term strategy of targeting what it called the “far enemy”, namely the US and Europe, and building local jihadist cells to fight Western-backed Arab regimes, after 2011 it shifted its focus towards supporting jihadist groups operating in the Arab Spring countries where it sought to consolidate its influence and expand its local presence amid the collapse of state authority.
One of Al-Qaeda’s toughest challenges came from its Iraqi branch, with its excessive wont for ethno-sectarian violence targeting above all that country’s Shia majority, especially after 2003. Taking stock of the damage this was causing to Al-Qaeda’s global jihadist image, in 2005 Al-Zawahri sharply criticised Al-Zarqawi’s policy of chaos in Iraq, which he feared would threaten Al-Qaeda’s geographical cohesion and sustainability in the Middle East.
These tensions would subsequently extend to Al-Qaeda’s Syria branch after 2011 and contribute to the emergence of IS in 2014.
The breakaway of its Iraqi branch (AQI) and this branch’s transformation into IS did not significantly alter Al-Qaeda’s strategy, but it inspired efforts to improve its image. For instance, AQIM “emir” Abu Musab Abdel-Wadoud instructed its members in Mali to be gentle with the populations under their control.
The decision to rename Al-Qaeda in Yemen as the “Ansar Al-Sharia” was part of this effort to reshape its image, and the rebranded organisation quickly attracted significant tribal alliances against the backdrop of the Arab Spring dynamics. The same applied to post-Gaddafi Libya, where Al-Qaeda gained support among some tribes and recruited some local militia groups.
However, Al-Qaeda met with its greatest success in Syria starting in 2012, when Al-Zawahri issued new jihadist guidelines that emphasised the need to refrain from targeting civilians, minorities, and public places.
Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda’s geographical expansion ran up against US/Western counterterrorism actions, which included military strikes. Washington and its allies also encouraged the Yemeni government and its allied tribes to fight Al-Qaeda elements in southern Yemen.
However, perhaps the biggest challenge to Al-Qaeda in the Arab Spring era came in the form of the Islamic caliphate that IS declared in the middle of 2014 and the rapid and unprecedented expansion of this entity in Syria and Iraq. This development directly threatened the Al-Nusra Front in Syria, while across the Middle East in general jihadists pledged allegiance to IS, diminishing Al-Qaeda’s global jihadist influence.
To some extent, a generational conflict played a part in the IS-Al-Qaeda competition. IS’ establishment of a caliphate straddling Iraq and Syria captured the imaginations of Sunni Islamist Muslims worldwide and drew young, radically minded Muslims to the region from across the Arab and Islamic world as well as the West.
IS’ ability to recruit fighters to its ranks in Iraq and Syria skyrocketed after 2014. By contrast, Al-Qaeda’s message, with its emphasis on fighting distant enemies rather than creating a concrete caliphate on the ground, was more selective and elitist.
Al-Qaeda’s fortunes reversed somewhat following the defeat of IS in Iraq by US forces. It was now in a stronger position on the global jihadist stage, while its less extremist ideology, more coherent proposals, and local settlement projects for affiliated groups enabled it to recapture some of its lost popularity and control, especially as the international community was focused on eliminating IS.
It was thus able to consolidate its presence in northwestern Syria through the Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) group. It also regained its foothold in Yemen by allying with Sunni tribes against the Houthis who had seized control of northern Yemen several years earlier. At the same time, it continued to carry out albeit limited operations in Pakistan, North Africa, and Afghanistan before the US withdrawal from Kabul in 2021.
It should also be borne in mind that while many jihadist groups pledged or switched their allegiance to IS during the Arab Spring, these allegiances were fleeting and geographically limited. They mostly involved relatively marginal groups compared to those that pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in Libya and Yemen. In Libya, for example, it was restricted to Sirte and its surroundings, while in Afghanistan it did not extend beyond a few villages in the Nangarhar Province beneath the banner of the Wilayat Khorasan, the Khorasan Province.
IS differed from Al-Qaeda in both form and substance. IS’ rhetoric, including Al-Baghdadi’s speeches, lacked the ideological depth exhibited in Al-Zawahri’s writings and speeches. IS was focused on sensationalist media propaganda and on glorifying IS fighters in Syria and Iraq.
POST-ARAB SPRING: Factional conflicts within the jihadist current often expose significant differences over goals and concepts of the enemy, as was evident in the tensions between Al-Qaeda’s central leadership and the leaderships of its franchises.
The most salient example of this was the sharp disagreement between Al-Zawahri, who prioritised targeting the “distant enemy” (the US and the West), and AQI leader Al-Zarqawi, who prioritised sectarian war against Shia over battling the US-led occupation of Iraq.
In like manner, Al-Zawahri clashed with Al-Nusra Front commander Abu Mohamed Al-Golani, who was focused on Syrian targets without attacking Western interests. This difference was among the factors that led to Al-Golani’s effective break with Al-Qaeda, despite his continued nominal allegiance.
The Levant remains a strategic jihadist hub, despite IS’ defeat in Iraq and the physical collapse of its caliphate. According to a Pentagon report in 2018, IS retained around 14,000 fighters in Syria and 15,000 in Iraq. In Iraq, moreover, IS restructured its operations, creating new provinces and diversifying its sources of income through the drug trade and hostage-taking. It also returned to the strategy of suicide operations.
In Syria, in July 2016 Al-Golani recast the Al-Nusra Front as the Jabhat Fath Al-Sham and severed organisational ties with external parties, suggesting an official break with Al-Qaeda. In January 2017, the Jabhat Fath Al-Sham allied with local groups to form HTS, which spearheaded the military drive to overthrow the Al-Assad regime in late 2024.
Meanwhile, the jihadist wave began to recede as of mid-2016, which is when Al-Qaeda withdrew from its stronghold in Yemen, and IS was driven out of Sirte. IS also withdrew from Iraq’s Ramadi and Fallujah cities in that year, followed by Mosul and Raqqa in Syria in 2017. Both organisations now faced the challenge of maintaining a permanent geographical presence in the Islamic world.
The wane in jihadist operations was reflected in the sharp decrease in attacks against the West, especially France, after the summer of 2016. Whereas terrorist operations claimed 238 dead in France from January 2015 to July 2016, the figure fell to 13 between August 2016 and late 2018. Elsewhere in Europe, only 10 people were killed in the attacks in Manchester and Barcelona in 2017, and five were killed in the Strasbourg market attack in 2018.
However, despite the decline in the jihadist groups’ strength and operational capacities in the West since 2016, it would be wrong to presume they are on the verge of extinction. A 2014 report by the US Institute of Peace and the Wilson Center observed that numerous factors contribute to sustaining transcontinental terrorist groups, such as a coherent jihadist ideology that appeals to some marginalised individuals in the West, weak political and security structures in parts of the Middle East and Africa, ongoing geopolitical conflicts, and continued US-led Western intervention in these regions.
The report warned that such factors generate a situation conducive to the resurgence of new terrorist waves.
Since then, the global jihadist movement has experienced another crucial turning point. The Taliban’s return to power following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 marked the beginning of a new model for restructuring global jihad through the internationally sanctioned control of a national government.
In December 2024, this model was replicated in Syria where the new regime is in the process of emulating the Taliban’s success in bringing the jihadist assets in the country under its control.
*The writer is a researcher in international relations and holds a PhD in Political Islam from Paris-Sorbonne University (Paris IV).
* A version of this article appears in print in the 10 April, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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