Understanding Netanyahu motives towards the current Palestinian situation

Mohamed Ibrahim Eldawiry
Saturday 20 Jul 2024

Deciphering Benjamin Netanyahu's approach to the Palestinian issue requires minimal effort, as his stance on this crucial matter has always been characterized by unwavering extremism.

 

Despite Netanyahu's signing of the Hebron Agreement in January 1997, which redeployed Israeli forces in the city and transferred some of its authority to the Palestinian Authority, and his endorsement of the two-state solution in his famous Bar-Ilan University speech in June 2009, these actions should not be interpreted as a shift in his ideology.

Instead, they should be viewed within the context of his exceptional maneuvering skills and his ability to employ all available tools to his advantage, regardless of the consequences.

This has enabled him to become Israel's longest-serving prime minister, surpassing even the founding fathers, led by David Ben-Gurion.

Setting aside historical considerations, it is worth noting that Netanyahu has been in office since December 2022, successfully forming a strong coalition government with a 64-seat majority that could last until 2026, unless unforeseen internal developments topple the coalition. It is also worth mentioning that he has remained unfazed by the protests that erupted against his judicial reform bill, which many Israelis perceived as an assault on democracy.

The Israeli-Gaza war that began on 7 October 2023 has highlighted the shortcomings of Israeli security measures in protecting the Gaza Envelope region adjacent to the strip. Additionally, it has demonstrated the Israeli military's inability to decisively conclude the war or achieve all of Netanyahu's objectives since the start of operations. This period, dating back to the war's inception, can be considered a new phase in Netanyahu's domestic conflict escalation.

Despite the ongoing waves of protests in Israel for several months aimed at pressuring Netanyahu to agree to a second truce that would lead to the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas and resistance factions, he remains capable of resisting public pressure, as reflected in recent polls showing a decline in his popularity as prime minister and that of his Likud Party.

Notably, Netanyahu's opposition extends beyond significant segments of Israeli society and even the regional and international levels, including International Court of Justice rulings. Furthermore, his stances have drawn strong opposition from key figures in the military and security establishments, as well as from the opposition led by Yair Lapid. Even some of the religious parties in his coalition, such as Shas, have begun to demand that he accept the deal.

Despite these stances, Netanyahu continues to refuse to accept the proposals bearing President Biden's name, even though they are essentially his own proposals. Strangely, he treats them as if they were counterproposals to his own positions, leading him to introduce some prohibitive conditions that have become an obstacle to reaching a new truce.

It is abundantly clear that Netanyahu's primary focus is on maintaining his current coalition, which remains cohesive and capable of thwarting any Knesset initiatives to bring down the government, disregarding all internal and external demands for a deal that would secure the release of Israeli hostages.

On 18 July, Netanyahu successfully passed a Knesset resolution rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state by a large majority, including members of the Gantz Party (considered moderate by some). This adds strength to Netanyahu's positions, as he can now present to the world a unified Israeli stance against the establishment of a Palestinian state, claiming that it poses a threat to Israel's security and existence.

Netanyahu's upcoming speech to the US Congress on 24 July, at the invitation of both houses, is expected to reinforce his position. Regardless of the nature or circumstances of this invitation, such a move underscores the depth of strategic relations between the two countries. It also signals that he will not succumb to any US pressure that contradicts his stances. Additionally, it is likely that Netanyahu is heavily betting on President Trump's return to power to revive the "deal of the century."

Netanyahu will ensure that his speech to Congress and his potential meeting with Biden send a clear message to the United States, on its own turf, as the biggest supporter of Israel. He will emphasize that the Jewish state faces an unprecedented existential threat from Iran and its proxies in the region, especially Hamas and Hezbollah. This situation demands that Washington continues its absolute support for Israel and refrains from exerting any pressure that contradicts Israel's security needs, specifically regarding the two-state solution advocated by the current administration.

In this context, Netanyahu will adopt a stalling tactic to avoid finalizing a truce until after his visit to Washington. During this visit, he aims to achieve four main objectives: first, to secure additional military, political, and economic support to maintain his coalition; second, to ensure that Washington does not impose any solutions he does not agree with, allowing him to achieve his goals in the war and eliminate Hamas; third, to ensure that Israel has the final say in the post-war scenario to prevent Gaza from becoming a future threat to Israel; and fourth, to assert that there is no place for a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the future.

Ultimately, we must observe in the coming days how Netanyahu will navigate the increasing internal pressures to finalize a deal before his trip to Washington, pressures he has successfully managed so far, and how he will manoeuvre regarding the issue of drafting the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim), which has come into effect and continues to threaten the coalition, a key element of his survival.

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