Egypt, Gaza war and critical week ahead

Mohamed Ibrahim Eldawiry
Sunday 25 Aug 2024

Egypt's steadfast opposition to Israel's ongoing occupation of the Philadelphi Route and Rafah crossing is inextricably linked to its broader stance on the Gaza crisis.

 

Egypt has consistently repudiated Israel's control over significant portions of the Gaza Strip and the notion of an indefinite Israeli military presence in the region, even after hostilities.

While the Philadelphi Route and Rafah crossing are situated within Palestinian territory and not directly governed by the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of March 1979, Egypt's position has remained resolute since the conflict's inception.

Its message has been unequivocal: a truce must culminate in a ceasefire, prisoner exchange, complete cessation of hostilities, and subsequent reconstruction of Gaza, ultimately paving the way for negotiations toward a Palestinian state.

Egypt's insistence on Israel's withdrawal from the Philadelphi Route and Rafah crossing is grounded in several considerations.

First, there exists no legitimate justification for Israel's military presence along the route, and claims of tunnels on the Gaza-Egypt border are spurious, serving merely to bolster Israel's illicit occupation.

In addition, the Rafah crossing serves as the sole land gateway between Gaza and Egypt, facilitating the movement of people between the two nations and the wider world.

Meanwhile, the other land crossing, Erez, is under Israeli control and requires prior security coordination, which is not universally accessible to Palestinians.

It is imperative to recall that Egypt was not a signatory to the 2005 border crossing agreement, signed on 15 November between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, which included European police and monitoring forces at the crossing.

Any equitable assessment of Egypt's stance on the Gaza crisis must acknowledge its historical role in the Palestinian cause throughout its various phases.

Regarding the current Gaza conflict, Egypt has been proactive from the outset, presenting the first comprehensive proposals for a resolution last December, which have subsequently served as the foundation for all subsequent negotiations.

On the Israeli front, Egypt has not been a passive observer. It has employed all available means to deliver aid to Gaza, mitigate the humanitarian catastrophe, and bring about an end to the war.

The country has also maintained ongoing communication with all relevant parties, including Israel, Hamas, Qatar, and the United States while ensuring the preservation of the core principles of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, provided Israel does not violate it.

This treaty serves as a crucial instrument for Egypt, enabling it to play an active mediating role under the most challenging circumstances.

Egypt was not taken aback by the intransigence of Netanyahu's administration and the additional constraints imposed by his ruling coalition. However, it acted swiftly and decisively to halt the unjust war on Gaza and has engaged in intensive negotiations to resolve the conflict for the past 10 months, including during this critical week.

In my estimation, Egypt's firm demand for Israel's withdrawal from the Philadelphi Route and Rafah crossing will serve as a turning point in the war, leading to a ceasefire.

This is contingent upon the understanding that there is room for discussion of any American or Israeli proposals, provided that the outcome is Israel's withdrawal from these areas as a precursor to a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

Concurrently, I will continue to pose a series of interrelated questions to Netanyahu: What are his strategic calculations for the war's conclusion? What will the post-ceasefire landscape look like? How far is he willing to go in his future dealings with Egypt? What are his aspirations for the trajectory of Arab normalization? And how capable is he of confronting a regional war that he is unlikely to win?

I anticipate that a discerning analysis of the current reality will provide the framework for answering these questions.

Regarding the United States, I find myself at a loss for words, save to say that the situation in Gaza has laid bare the double standards that characterize its policies.

The US administration has proven incapable of confronting Netanyahu, who was hailed as a hero in Congress last July.

Despite 10 visits to the region by the secretary of state of the world's greatest superpower, the war has not been brought to an end. I can only hope that the oft-repeated slogan "It is time to end the war on Gaza immediately" becomes a tangible reality, at least once, to safeguard the remnants of American credibility.

As for the region, it has sadly fallen captive to the threats posed by Iran, which has sent a clear message to all that it can escalate the conflict and shatter the current illusion of relative stability.

Iran's primary condition — an end to the war on Gaza — might prompt it to reconsider the nature of its anticipated response, which is to target Israel, as it alone holds the key to the region's stability.

In conclusion, we are facing not merely critical days but decisive hours to achieve a truce that is theoretically within reach. This situation imposes the greatest responsibility not only on the mediators but also on the two primary parties of the conflict, with Israel taking precedence and Hamas following, to seize what could be the final opportunity for a truce to halt the escalating crisis that, if left unchecked, could engulf all those who underestimate its peril.

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