The fifth round of negotiations between the United States and Iran on a possible new nuclear deal with Tehran concluded in Rome on 23 May. The Iranians announced that this round was highly professional, whereas the American side called it “constructive.”
The Omani foreign minister, whose country has been hosting the negotiations from day one, wrote on X that the Rome talks had concluded with “some progress but not conclusive progress”. He hoped for clarifications of the “remaining issues,” a step that would allow the parties to proceed towards the “common goal of reaching a sustainable and honourable agreement.”
Prior to the fifth round of the talks, White House Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, who has also been dealing with the war in Ukraine, met in Rome with Israeli Minister for Strategic Affairs Ron Demer and Mossad Director David Barnea, presumably for a coordination session.
In the meantime, Israeli press reports talked about the possibility of Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear installations. They gave the impression that these attacks could take place shortly, implying that Israel would launch them without outside help, in other words without American assistance.
It was not the first time that the Israelis have let it be known that they could attack Iran to destroy the country’s nuclear installations. I personally doubt that the Israeli government will resort to military force without prior coordination with the United States.
The Israelis do not have the kind of bombs that would be necessary to destroy Iranian nuclear installations deep underground. Moreover, attacking Iran while the Trump administration is actively involved in negotiating a new deal with Iran would be almost political suicide for embattled Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as far as his relations with US President Donald Trump are concerned.
Judging from the public positions of US and Iranian officials, notwithstanding their throwing doubt every now and then on the possibility of a deal, it seems that both governments have realised the benefits of changing the status quo, namely, the present non-implementation of the Iranian nuclear agreement of July 2015 reached during the Obama administration, from which Trump decided to withdraw during his first term in office and leading to Iranian non-compliance.
At that time, Trump justified the decision by saying that the “Iran deal is one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.”
The main sticking points in the negotiations now include uranium enrichment and what to do with the more than 200 kg of enriched uranium that Iran produced after the US withdrawal from the 2015 agreement in May 2018.
The US administration’s position is that Iran should stop enriching uranium altogether, a demand that the Iranians reject. They are prepared to accept limitations on the level of enrichment not to exceed 3.7 per cent.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio explained in April why the Trump administration considers the 2015 agreement a bad deal. According to him, the deal gave Iran immediate and full sanctions relief in exchange for enrichment capabilities that “at any point could be weaponised” in the future, and the limitations on them were for a defined period of time. The formula that he used was that “we gave them permanent concessions for temporary concessions on their part.”
Rubio added that if Iran wants a civil nuclear programme, then the path to follow would be that chosen by like-minded countries in importing enriched material. He said he believed that there was a pathway to a peaceful Iranian nuclear programme if that is what Iran wants. He pointed out that Iran already imports Russian enriched material at 3.67 per cent for a nuclear reactor that it operates.
Aside from the differences around uranium enrichment, the Iranians want a clear commitment on the part of the US government, or more precise guarantees, that the United States will always honour any future agreement with Iran concerning its nuclear programme. Taking into account the workings of American democracy, I am not sure that the Trump administration will provide such guarantees, and even if it would, any future US administration could abrogate them or demand amendments to certain articles.
What is most important from the Iranian standpoint is the lifting of the US sanctions, particularly in the oil, financial, and banking fields, and the sequencing and speed of such a process. The Iranian economy badly needs the lifting of the sanctions. However, the US administration wants to make sure that the billions of dollars that would be generated by the lifting of the sanctions will not be used to finance pro-Iranian militias in the Middle East and Yemen.
It goes without saying that the strategic environment in the Middle East has dramatically changed from what it was in 2015 when the Iranian nuclear deal was signed. In addition, the domestic political situation in Iran itself has grown more fragile and unstable, all the more so because of the struggle around who will succeed Supreme Guide Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
I would argue that the Trump administration could be the indirect and undeclared arbiter in the struggle for succession in Iran if it succeeds in negotiating a deal that the moderates in the country can market as a win for those who favour a foreign policy based on pragmatism and non-interference in the domestic affairs of neighbouring countries and one that would therefore be a total repudiation of the Iranian aggressiveness in the Middle East over the last four decades.
Rubio has said that the Trump administration is “committed to achieving a peaceful outcome that’s acceptable to everyone.” I don’t know if he had Israel in mind when he said “acceptable to everyone,” but it is reassuring that the US administration understands the risks of war in the Middle East.
Rubio explained the US position in this regard by stressing in April that any military conflict at this point in the Middle East, “whether by us against Iran or anybody else,” could “in fact trigger such a broader conflict that will not be the sort of thing that people have become accustomed to watching on television… This will be more complex.”
The phrase “or anybody else” meant Israel, whose prime minister has staked his political survival on a policy of permanent war in the Middle East. Iran has been in his crosshairs for a long period of time.
It is up to both the United States and Iran to negotiate a verifiable, sustainable, and durable agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme that will spare the Middle East a devastating war.
The writer is former assistant foreign minister.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 29 May, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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