The Israel-Iran war: The American variable

Walid M. Abdelnasser
Wednesday 25 Jun 2025

On the tenth day of the Israeli war on Iran, the development that some had anticipated—and others dismissed—finally occurred: direct US military intervention through American bombers striking three Iranian nuclear sites in different parts of the country.

 

This was followed by an announcement from the US President and his Secretary of Defense declaring the attack a complete success, claiming it had eliminated Iran’s nuclear programme. Israeli officials then stated they were assessing the impact and results of the US strike while affirming that Israel would continue its attacks on Iran regardless of the American strike’s outcome.

At the time of writing, Iran had not yet announced the full results of the US strike, aside from confirming there was no risk of nuclear radiation spreading, as enriched materials had been relocated from those sites in anticipation of such an attack.

Following Iran’s missile strike on the US military base at Al-Udeid in Qatar on 23 June—in retaliation for the American attacks—the US President announced, in coordination with Qatar, a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Iran. However, he was soon compelled to call the Israeli Prime Minister personally on 24 June to pressure him to respect the ceasefire amid continued Israeli violations. Later, the US President claimed that both Israel and Iran were violating the ceasefire.

As mentioned in a previous article (Ahram Weekly, Thursday, 19 June 2025 edition), while Israel initially claimed it did not need external support at the start of its military strikes on Iran, by the third day of the war, it announced that the United States was assisting it on “defensive issues.”

The US airstrikes on Iranian nuclear sites effectively signalled Washington’s entry into the war alongside Tel Aviv, despite American officials insisting that if Iran ceased its fire, the US would discontinue military actions. The US President also rushed to deny that the missile strike on the Qatar base caused any casualties, even thanking the Iranians for warning Washington, which allowed US forces to evacuate before the strike.

Simultaneously, he communicated promptly with Qatari officials to seek mediation with Iran for an immediate ceasefire. Some attributed this move to an urgent Israeli request for Washington to impose a ceasefire; others saw it as a response to warnings from US advisors about the risks of the war expanding and dragging on—with catastrophic repercussions for US national security, its Middle East interests, and the stability of Washington’s regional allies.

Moreover, the war’s adverse effects were already hitting the global economy, particularly the US, reflected in recent fluctuations across financial and bond markets, treasury bills, and a sudden rise in oil and gas prices. Both explanations may well be valid simultaneously.

As of writing, uncertainty remains— even within the United States—about whether the American strikes and twelve days of Israeli bombardment have truly succeeded in “eliminating” Iran’s nuclear programme. On 24 June, the US President went so far as to attack CNN, accusing the network of casting doubt on the success of the airstrikes.

Additionally, some in Washington, Tel Aviv, and perhaps other regional and international capitals are unhappy with the ceasefire. These parties had hoped the war would lead to the complete overthrow of Iran’s ruling regime and a full restructuring of its political landscape, similar to Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

Undoubtedly, the American strikes lent some credibility to Iran’s earlier assertions that the Israeli attack had been coordinated in advance between the Israeli government and the US administration, sharing strategic objectives.

More importantly, the US attack and subsequent mediation of the ceasefire lend credibility to three additional points: first, that US military intervention tacitly acknowledged that ten days of intensive Israeli strikes across numerous Iranian sites and cities had failed, and the American push to enforce a ceasefire cemented this reality.

Second, Tel Aviv had requested specific bombs from Washington to target deep underground Iranian facilities. Still, the US refused, preferring to conduct the operation itself through its air force rather than let Israel act by proxy.

Third, Israel, unprepared for a prolonged war of attrition, concluded it had reached the maximum achievable gains, prompting it to ask the US to intervene and impose a ceasefire. Yet, following historical precedent, Israel violated the ceasefire shortly after to secure last-minute advantages.

The coming days will undoubtedly reveal the full extent of American involvement in the Israeli attacks on Iran from the outset, whether the US- and Qatari-brokered ceasefire holds or collapses, the scale of Iran’s losses, and Tehran’s future intentions regarding its nuclear programme—whether it insists on maintaining it as officials claim, becomes willing to trade it for Western concessions, or decides to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty altogether.

A deeper analysis is also required of the positions of influential regional and international actors regarding the war on Iran—especially in light of the ongoing, escalating Israeli war in Gaza, with its catastrophic humanitarian consequences that have exposed the failures of the international community. Such analysis will be crucial to understanding what lies ahead in this highly volatile region of the world.
 

* The writer is a diplomat and commentator.

 

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