During the state visit that French President Emmanuel Macron paid to Great Britain from 8 to 10 July, a first for a French president since the British people voted in 2016 to exit the European Union, the French and British governments agreed, in an unprecedented move, to coordinate the use of their nuclear arsenals in the context of nuclear dissuasion to protect Europe from what both have called “extreme threat.”
It goes without saying that this “extreme threat” is the Russia of Russian President Vladimir Putin, from the perspective of these two governments and some other European countries, especially those with direct borders with Russia.
The agreement to coordinate the use of nuclear weapons was reached in a meeting between British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and the French president. The British government said on 9 July that the agreement meant that “for the first time the respective deterrents of both countries are independent but can be coordinated.”
A “nuclear supervision group” was established, chaired jointly by the British Cabinet Office and the French Presidency. This is tasked with coordinating the “growing” cooperation between the two sides in terms of policy, capabilities, and operations.
The concept of coordinating the use of British and French nuclear weapons to respond to situations of “extreme threat” could be considered revolutionary not only in the context of British-French bilateral relations but also in terms of overall European security. This is the first time since the end of World War II that the two European Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council have decided to coordinate the joint use of their nuclear arsenals and act as a joint deterrent force in the future.
It is an important step on the long and challenging road of gaining greater independence from the US nuclear umbrella that was the main deterrent in Europe against the former Soviet Union in the past and in order to dissuade Russia from attacking any European country. The question gained greater urgency after the war in Ukraine broke out in February 2022, and of course this is still raging with no end in sight.
Furthermore, the agreement gains in importance, at least theoretically, when one takes into account the most important question on the minds of member countries of NATO – namely whether US President Donald Trump is committed to Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which commits each country to come to the defence of any other in the alliance that comes under attack.
The widespread perception in some European capitals, particularly in the Baltic region and Poland, is that once Russia is victorious in Ukraine, it will invade other European countries. At least, this is the threat perception that is being widely discussed in Europe. It is worth noting in this respect that Macron, in addressing a joint session of the House of Lords and the House of Commons in London on 8 July, said that he believed that the UK and France have a “special responsibility for the security of Europe.”
Defence and security cooperation between London and Paris is not new. In a summit meeting between former French president Jacques Chirac and former British prime minister John Major in 1995, the two men launched a “global partnership” between France and the UK and announced that their mutual aim was to strengthen deterrence “whilst retaining the independence of our nuclear forces.”
Several years later on 9 May 2011, former British prime minister David Cameron and former French president Nicolas Sarkozy signed a Treaty for Defence and Security Cooperation between their two countries in London. The two leaders said that greater defence and security cooperation strengthened NATO, which remained, according to the treaty, the “foundation of collective defence.”
The two parties also reaffirmed their commitment to supporting the role of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy. The treaty stressed that the control of their armed forces, the decision to employ them, and the use of force shall “always remain a matter of national sovereignty”.
I doubt that the new agreement to cooperate on and coordinate the use of British and French nuclear weapons has altered this condition, even as it states in the meantime that the “vital interests of one cannot be threatened without the vital interests of the other equally being at risk.”
The question is whether the two countries have a clear definition of their respective “vital interests” aside from Europe being a target of a Russian threat, referred to as the “extreme threat” in the agreement. While the British-French coordination and cooperation in the use of nuclear forces will be welcomed in Europe, most member countries of the European Union will still depend on the US nuclear umbrella as the ultimate deterrent of Russia.
The writer is former assistant foreign minister.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 17 July, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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