On 2 August, The National Interest published an article entitled “Israel is at a Strategic Dead End” by Shai Feldman, former director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies and professor of political science at Brandeis University. The opening paragraph of the article states:
“Israel’s war in Gaza has reached a strategic dead end. In recent months, Israel has had phenomenal success in setting back Iran’s nuclear program by up to two years (with significant American help) and demolishing the threat posed by Hizbullah from Lebanon. By contrast, the results of Israel’s 22-month fight in Gaza are abysmal even by the stated objectives of the Israeli government. There are no signs of an imminent Hamas collapse; on the contrary, although the IDF is said to have gained control of 75 per cent of Gaza’s territory, a recent INSS assessment asserts that half of Gaza’s population is currently concentrated in areas still controlled by Hamas. The same assessment also asserts that Hamas continues to hijack ‘most’ of the humanitarian aid entering Gaza.”
The article then turns to the human cost borne by Gaza in what it describes as Israel’s unsuccessful war, the erosion of Israel’s international standing and the failure of negotiations, in which Hamas now appears confident that time is on its side. As Feldman surveys the proposals circulating in Israel — ranging from a deeper incursion into Gaza to the revival of old extremist aspirations of re-entering the Strip — he sees nothing more than the manifestation of the deadlock in which Israel now finds itself.
The central dilemma of the fifth Gaza war lies in the fact that both parties, Israel and Hamas, have reached a dead end. Yet the war persists, with each side evading ceasefires by proposing terms they know the other will reject, at the expense of the people of Gaza, the hostages and their families.
Hamas began the war on 7 October 2023 yet had no clear vision for 8 October beyond the expectation that the Israeli government would collapse and a “unification of arenas” uniting regional militias would emerge. The former prediction failed to materialise, while the latter — had it been realised — might have triggered a series of regional defeats for the so-called Axis of Resistance and Defiance, ultimately granting the Israeli leadership an unforeseen path to victory and providing the Israeli right with the momentum to persist unabated.
The toll has been devastating for Gaza, which has suffered 60,000 fatalities, twice as many wounded, and the near-total destruction of essential infrastructure: schools, universities, and healthcare facilities. Where once the central Palestinian demand was the liberation of Palestinian land, it has now been reduced to the struggle for basic sustenance. Meanwhile, escalating losses in the West Bank signal the erosion of the Palestinian dream of statehood, as the Israeli right intensifies settlement expansion and forcibly displaces Palestinians from their ancestral lands.
Hamas, having reached a dead end, hastened to lay the blame on Arab countries for failing to provide “rescue” or aid. The Muslim Brotherhood — Hamas’ global sponsor — launched a campaign against Egypt, accusing it of closing the Rafah border crossing in the face of aid convoys, despite Egypt having delivered 70 per cent of the humanitarian assistance entering Gaza.
In the light of these dead ends, Feldman proposed that the United States should sponsor negotiations involving Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the principal signatories to the Abraham Accords, with the goal of establishing a framework to replace Hamas with security forces and governing institutions affiliated with a reconstituted and empowered Palestinian Authority.
Under the proposal, a transitional phase would begin with the participating Arab states deploying forces into the Gaza Strip, compelling Hamas to immediately release all Israeli hostages, and assuming interim governance of the territory. The proposal outlines the duration of the transitional period, the necessary steps to realise Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem — which Israel would be required to accept — and security guarantees to protect Israelis as the Arab forces gradually cede authority to a “new and improved” Palestinian Authority.
Many of these proposals had already been put forward by the aforementioned Arab states during the conference on the two-state solution, where they suggested the establishment of an alternative Palestinian administrative authority, endorsed by the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. This entity would be tasked with disarming Hamas and holding elections to usher in a new governing authority. In truth, there is no viable alternative.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 14 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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