The simultaneous acceptance of the Trump peace plan by both the Israeli government and Hamas announced in October 2025 marks an unprecedented political moment in the long trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
After years of open confrontation, genocidal warfare, and the systematic destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure, a realistic prospect has finally emerged for a political process that restores the primacy of politics after the dominance of violence.
With regional and international actors exhausted by the protracted conflict, a central question arises: how can this joint acceptance be used to end Gaza’s humanitarian catastrophe and initiate reconstruction on foundations that ensure security and stability?
The shift in the positions of both Israel and Hamas should be understood in the broader context of structural fatigue after years of war, mounting international pressure, and significant regional transformations over the last two years. The last round of fighting exposed the fragility of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, demonstrated the limits of Israeli military power, and forced Hamas to reassess its political and military strategies after immense human and institutional losses.
At the same time, the re-emergence of the United States as an active broker through the new Trump plan after years of relative disengagement has provided both sides with a potential exit strategy that restores a degree of legitimacy before war-weary domestic constituencies.
Internationally, the persistence of the status quo has become untenable. The United Nations, the European Union, and an increasingly assertive Global South now frame Gaza as a large-scale humanitarian disaster that cannot be managed through temporary aid mechanisms. The October 2025 announcement of the plan thus represents a collective acknowledgement that the time has come to move from crisis management to political settlement.
Israel’s acceptance of the plan rests on three main factors. First, a growing realisation that military deterrence has lost its efficacy vis-à-vis Gaza, and that perpetual conflict threatens the cohesion of Israeli society itself. Second, US pressure has re-linked strategic cooperation and aid to engagement with a realistic political track that reduces conflict intensity. Third, the Israeli leadership seeks to break its deepening international isolation after repeated accusations of war crimes and eroding European support.
For Hamas, acceptance of the plan offers a pragmatic exit from siege and internal collapse. It does not signify abandoning the narrative of resistance, but rather reconfiguring it within a political framework that recognises a limited Palestinian state in Gaza and parts of the West Bank — subject to security arrangements that preserve Hamas’ role in Gaza’s governance. This shift marks a transition from existential confrontation to conditional coexistence, driven by necessity rather than free choice.
The plan rests on three interlinked pillars: permanent de-escalation, economic reconstruction, and regional-international security guarantees. On the humanitarian front, it calls for the creation of a Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism jointly managed by the United Nations, the World Bank, and a coalition of Arab and Western donor states. This body would oversee the flow of aid, rebuild housing and infrastructure, and restore essential public services.
Economically, the plan envisions integrating Gaza into regional frameworks through projects in energy, ports, and telecommunications that generate employment and reduce dependency on foreign assistance.
As for the security dimension, it establishes joint monitoring arrangements to enforce the ceasefire, prevent arms smuggling, and regulate security structures within Gaza under a unified Palestinian framework with international oversight.
These elements do not offer a definitive solution, but they constitute the first realistic opportunity in years to halt destruction and restore a semblance of normal life in the Strip.
Moving from political acceptance to concrete implementation requires a coordinated network of regional and international engagements. Arab Gulf states possess the financial capacity to support large scale reconstruction while Jordan and Qatar bring in the negotiation experience and administrative expertise necessary for security and governance arrangements.
At the international level, sustained coordination between Washington, Brussels, and the United Nations is vital to secure binding financial and political guarantees for both parties. Ultimately, a reconstruction alliance is needed, linking donors, regional powers, and international institutions, to prevent aid from becoming a tool of political manipulation or domestic corruption.
Moreover, Hamas’ inclusion in the plan, if consolidated, opens the door to its gradual reintegration into regional and international political dynamics, redefining it as a negotiable political actor rather than an isolated, militant entity. Such a transformation could ease security pressures on Gaza and establish a more stable framework for managing Israeli-Palestinian relations.
The prospects for success, however, remain uncertain. Acceptance of the plan by both Israel and Hamas does not imply agreement on its implementation, nor does it ensure a willingness to abandon zero-sum calculations. Within Israel, far-right factions are likely to obstruct any move that could be interpreted as recognition of a permanent Palestinian entity. Within Hamas, internal divisions between political pragmatists and hardline factions could undermine coherence.
Mutual distrust threatens to turn security and reconstruction arrangements into new arenas of confrontation. Furthermore, there is legitimate concern that the plan could evolve into an economic-security arrangement that entrenches Palestinian fragmentation rather than overcoming it, unless the Palestinian Authority is integrated into implementation mechanisms.
Internationally, ensuring sustained funding and oversight poses a major challenge. Past experience shows that global attention fades quickly once the immediate crisis subsides. Some regional powers may also continue to instrumentalise the Palestinian issue for domestic or strategic purposes, undermining the collective diplomatic momentum needed to operationalise the plan.
Leveraging the acceptance of the plan requires acknowledging its limitations while making full use of the opportunities it presents. Gaza’s humanitarian catastrophe will not end overnight; it demands a gradual process that rebuilds trust and redefines security — not merely as border control, but as the guarantee of life and dignity.
This is the realistic value of the plan: its potential to insert humanitarian and economic considerations into the very core of security politics. The acceptance of the plan by Israel and Hamas is not the end of the conflict but the beginning of a new test, whether regional and international actors can transform this rare moment of convergence into a sustainable project that restores Gazans’ right to life and stability to a fractured region.
The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 October, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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