The Ansar Allah (Houthi) Movement in Yemen has linked its attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea since 7 October 2023 to Israel’s military operations against the Palestinian people in Gaza.
Despite the peace agreement reached in Sharm El-Sheikh on 13 October 2025, which lays the groundwork for a lasting truce to end the war, the Houthi group has not declared an end to its threats against maritime traffic in this vital corridor, as well as the adjacent Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea.
This situation sends a worrying message to shipping firms and ship and shipping insurers that the risks of transiting the Red Sea remain. Ships and tankers continue to face possible sabotage by the Houthis, as occurred with the arson attack against the Dutch-flagged tanker Minervagracht in early October while sailing in the Gulf of Aden.
Around 15 per cent of international trade passed through the Red Sea up to the October 2023 attacks which led to a sharp reduction in maritime traffic through that vital waterway, the Suez Canal being the most adversely impacted, with revenues plummeting by about 60 per cent in 2024 and 62 per cent during the first six months of 2025, according to the Suez Canal Authority. The disruption has also impacted Red Sea littoral states, forcing them to reconsider some tourism and other investment projects. For example, many experts link the downsizing of Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project to instability in the Red Sea, while some countries have begun to reconsider plans for laying submarine communications cables there. Meanwhile, shipping and insurance companies have used alternative shipping routes that avoid the Red Sea.
There is still no regional or international consensus on how to handle the Houthi threat. The US has attempted to solve the problem militarily, most recently through Operation Rough Rider in March 2025, which aimed to degrade Houthi missile and drone launching capabilities. This led to an Oman-brokered agreement announced by Washington on 6 May 2025, according to which the US would halt its bombardment of targets in Yemen in exchange for cessation of Houthi attacks against US ships in the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandab.
China, for its part, reached a diplomatic understanding with the Houthis, ensuring safe passage for Chinese container ships through the Red Sea in exchange for logistical support. This arrangement helps the Houthis sustain the current status quo in the Red Sea and reflects China’s interest in maintaining its use of this critical maritime corridor in a way that enhances its competitive edge in European and African markets.
Houthi operations have also targeted Israeli territory, turning the Red Sea into a platform for missile exchanges by both sides and jeopardising air navigation over this region. For example, on 4 May, a Houthi missile fell in the vicinity of Ben Gurion Airport, prompting Israel to respond by launching missile strikes against the port of Hudaydah and the international airport in Sanaa.
The de facto navigation rule imposed by the Houthis in the Red Sea only allows passage to vessels that are not linked to Israel or bound for Israeli ports. Should the Houthis receive information leading them to conclude a vessel is violating this embargo, they will attack it. This was their justification for attacking the Greek-owned cargo ships M/V Magic Seas and M/V Eternity C in the Red Sea in July. Both were allegedly bound for an Israeli port.
The Houthis filmed and then broadcast the footage of these two attacks, showcasing the qualitative and quantitative advances in their offensive capacities for this purpose. The operation against the M/V Magic Seas opened with fast-attack craft, followed by cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as military drones. The crew was forced to abandon ship. The attack on M/V Eternity C lasted for 16 hours and resulted in the sinking of the Liberian-flagged cargo ship. Some members of the crew died during the ordeal while others were captured.
This situation in the Red Sea leaves states and shipping companies with three options. The first is to continue to rely on alternative routes, as has been the case for two years, despite the costs incurred – especially for Egypt and other Red Sea littoral states. The second is to form an international coalition to undertake multilateral military operations and disarm and dismantle the Houthi group after declaring it a terrorist organisation. The third is for other countries to follow the lead of the US and China and negotiate agreements with the Houthis, even though such arrangements would only bolster the movement’s legitimacy, enhance their ability to enforce the new maritime reality, and further complicate efforts to resolve the crisis in Yemen itself.
The writer is an expert on security policies in the MENA region.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 November, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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