Although Africa appears to be geographically distant from the epicentre of the current war between the US and Israel and Iran, its economic repercussions are likely to reach African societies indirectly through global market linkages.
Geopolitical tensions typically translate into volatility in energy markets and disruptions to international trade flows, which in turn drive up fuel prices and increase transportation costs. Such pressures can also spill over into food markets as higher shipping costs and disrupted supply chains raise the prices of essential commodities.
These dynamics disproportionately burden low-income households across the African continent. Moreover, a significant escalation of the war could trigger the return of segments of African migrant labour from the Gulf states, creating additional social and economic pressures on African labour markets and public services.
Despite Africa’s absence as a direct actor in the war, the continent remains vulnerable to the broader repercussions of global economic interdependence. Any disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, or a widening of the conflict’s geographic scope, could generate significant shocks in global energy and shipping markets.
Such developments would likely push oil and gas prices upwards while increasing transportation and insurance costs. For many African countries that are net importers of energy, these pressures would translate into rising inflation and higher production, electricity, and transportation costs. At the same time, the surge in import bills could intensify pressures on already fragile foreign-exchange reserves, while the potential gains for African oil exporters would remain uncertain due to volatile demand and supply conditions.
These pressures may intensify further as maritime supply chains across the Gulf and the Red Sea face heightened security risks. Shipping companies may increasingly divert vessels to longer routes, particularly around the Cape of Good Hope, to avoid potential threats. Such rerouting inevitably extends travel times and raises freight and insurance costs, costs that are ultimately passed on to consumers in African markets.
At the same time, food security concerns across the continent are likely to intensify given the heavy reliance of many African countries on imported grains, oils, and other staple commodities. Rising energy and shipping costs inflate import prices even when global commodity prices remain relatively stable, while logistical delays weaken distribution efficiency and increase losses in perishable goods.
Under these conditions, African governments may be compelled to expand food subsidies or temporarily reduce import tariffs in order to mitigate social pressures, thereby adding further strain to already constrained public finances amid high debt burdens and limited fiscal space.
Beyond economic effects, the war also raises potential security challenges for Africa, particularly along strategic maritime corridors such as the Red Sea and the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait. Heightened tensions in these waterways increase the risks facing commercial shipping and may disrupt vital trade routes linking African economies to global markets.
At the same time, the expansion of international military deployments in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden could contribute to the growing militarisation of African coastlines and complicate regional security dynamics, particularly in the already fragile Horn of Africa.
States across the African continent have adopted differing positions towards the war, but no unified continental stance has emerged. Instead, reactions have varied according to each country’s economic interests and diplomatic relationships with the parties involved.
At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has adopted a balanced position calling for de-escalation and a diplomatic solution while warning about the potential economic repercussions of the war on energy and food security in Africa.
Some African countries have adopted more explicit positions. South Africa has criticised the military strikes as a threat to international peace, while Kenya has condemned attacks targeting the Gulf states.
All these factors may encourage the African states to reassess their economic and security strategies by diversifying energy and food sources, strengthening regional integration, and improving logistical and maritime capacities, thereby transforming current pressures into an opportunity to build greater resilience and strategic autonomy in the long term.
The war is also likely to reshape patterns of foreign influence and engagement in Africa. The US military posture reinforces Washington’s image as willing to employ hard power to safeguard its strategic interests, which may prompt some African states to approach their external partnerships with greater caution to avoid being drawn into major geopolitical rivalries.
Israel may view the crisis as an opportunity to expand its political and security presence in the continent, particularly in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region, by strengthening intelligence, technological, and security cooperation.
Iran, meanwhile, is likely to face a relative contraction of its influence networks across the continent as international pressures mount and its economic capacity to sustain political and logistical engagement diminishes.
The writer is a researcher in African affairs.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 19 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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