Three days before the devastating series of earthquakes that ravaged Turkey and northern Syria last week an Amsterdam-based researcher warned that a disaster was about to strike in the region.
“Sooner or later there will be a 7.5 Magnitude earthquake in this region (South-Central Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon),” Frank Hoogerbeets wrote on Twitter on 3 February.
In hindsight, the prediction of one of the strongest earthquakes in the region on record appeared prescient. It started to go viral and hit the headlines.
In Turkey, as heartbreaking pictures of the results of the huge tremors began to emerge, anger mounted at the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and its perceived failure to prepare and respond to the catastrophe.
In Syria, the regime of Bashar Al-Assad is also under fire for deliberately slowing down the response to the tragedy, which has largely hit the rebel-controlled north of the country, because it does not recognise the aid groups operating there.
But as anger grows at the two governments’ response and preparation for the earthquakes, questions have emerged as to whether predictions can now be made about the fallout of the tragedy on the political front.
As the response to many devastating earthquakes, droughts, and pandemics in the past has shown, political consequences can be understood and predicted using the same methods as for natural disasters.
But while the disaster could upend domestic politics in Turkey and Syria, many doubt that a dramatic post-quake transformation could emerge in the Middle East, which is known for its inter-regional conflicts.
Many in Turkey challenged what they said was the slow and inadequate emergency response from the Erdogan government in the immediate hours after the tremors struck in southeast Turkey leaving tens of thousands of people either dead or wounded.
Facing re-election in May or June, Erdogan is aware that his political fortunes depend on a rapid and decisive response to the earthquake that devastated towns in southern Turkey and left hundreds of thousands without shelter, water, fuel or electricity.
But it is not just the public frustration over the speed of the government’s response and failure to take the necessary precautions to deal with its terrible effects that is sparking anger. Many have pointed to government corruption in the construction and infrastructure sector preceding the earthquake.
Politics may also be wreaking the response to the earthquake, and political rivals are accusing Erdogan and the ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) of planning to use the disaster to steal the upcoming election.
While a domestic political battle over the fallout from the earthquake is expected, all eyes are now on Erdogan and what might be expected in his foreign policy as governments and organisations around the world have responded with offers of support to those affected by the catastrophe.
In the two decades since Erdogan came to power his proactive and sometimes confrontational style has become a defining part of Turkey’s foreign policy. The dire situation in Turkey now has exposed the weaknesses of Erdogan’s foreign policy and brought them to the fore.
Indeed, nothing in Erdogan’s record suggests that he will not try to exploit the disaster, which he has described as “destiny’s plan,” as he seeks to deflect growing criticism over shortcomings in the wake of the disaster.
To maintain his propaganda bubble ahead of the crucial election, Erdogan flew 16 babies pulled from the rubble of buildings destroyed in the earthquake to safety on his presidential plane and offered his 1,150-room White Palace to victims, saying they should treat it as their home and stay as long as they wanted.
No one has any doubt that Erdogan will exploit the global sympathy that Turkey is receiving in the wake of the earthquake to bolster his image and the country’s foreign relations. In recent years, he has signalled a thaw in relations with many countries he had previously antagonised, including Turkey’s NATO allies, Israel, and Egypt.
For the Syrians, victims of a 12-year conflict, the public despair after the earthquake has been no less evident. Beset by an economic collapse, food shortages, and a recent cholera outbreak, the earthquake will be a devastating blow to an already struggling population.
Syria’s woes can be largely traced back to the Al-Assad regime’s policy of refusing to engage constructively with the UN-backed Geneva Process to achieve an end to the conflict in the country under UN Security Council Resolution 2245, which calls for a political resolution.
Instead of immediately starting to contain the disaster, the Syrian regime took upon itself to stage-manage the crisis and sought to go ahead with its policy of cutting off support for the affected rebel-held areas.
Initially, the Syrian government required all humanitarian aid sent to northwest Syria to go through government channels, which could have inevitably slowed down the delivery of aid in areas where the humanitarian needs of the population are great.
Many Syrians fear Al-Assad will politicise the disaster, which has largely hit the already decimated northern area of the country, in a bid to end his isolation and lift the Western sanctions imposed on his regime over humanitarian abuses during Syria’s nearly 12-year civil war.
Like Erdogan, Al-Assad made a trip to a quake-hit area of Aleppo to show off his care in a carefully choreographed tour. He also struck back at critics, especially in the Western nations, accusing them of exhibiting a “deficit of humanity.”
Al-Assad seems to have been emboldened by the support offered by several governments to send humanitarian aid to Syria, with the country’s state-run media hailing this as an act of defiance to the sanctions imposed on his regime.
The embattled Syrian leader hopes he can build on the sympathy and generosity showed by the world to victims of the earthquake as an opportunity to push for an easing of his regime’s isolation.
Al-Assad has recently achieved significant diplomatic victories, with several Arab governments normalising relations with the Syrian regime. His hopes for rapprochement were further bolstered by telephone calls with some Arab leaders in the wake of the earthquake.
The fact that Erdogan and Al-Assad are looking for new partners and appear willing to try to mend relations is understandable. They both face multiple political and economic crises and opposition to their rule, and they are looking for ways to calm many disputes.
But if scientists have invented models that can predict where and when earthquakes will likely strike, as was reported after the quake in Turkey and Syria, political predictions about the future of these two governments may be harder to make.
Considering the complex and deep-rooted conflicts in the region, it would be hard to assume that the ground is shifting again in the Middle East as a result of diplomatic niceties or some of the basic aspects of human nature.
In international relations, disaster diplomacy has a limited shelf-life. In most past cases, there is little evidence to suggest that it has a long-term impact.
Seeing foreign aid planes unloading or rescue workers dispatched to disaster areas is meant to serve as an instrument in domestic politics and a catalyst to promote foreign policy aims abroad.
The US, EU, Israel and many Arab countries that have mobilised support for Turkey and Syria in the wake of the earthquake have done so as a humanitarian gesture, but they are unlikely to believe that it will end their long-time disagreements and tensions with Ankara and Damascus.
It ought to come as no surprise, therefore, that both Erdogan and Al-Assad, merely as part of their personal and leadership styles, would regard the disaster as an object for political manipulation.
However, even before the dust of the earthquake settles, it has become abundantly clear that the challenges posed to Erdogan and Al-Assad from its political shockwaves are piling up and could threaten their rule.
Ostensibly, the massive earthquakes on 6 February that have shattered the lives and livelihoods of millions of people across Turkey and Syria could generate sympathy and solidarity, but they are also highly unlikely to create solid bases for long-term relations with Erdogan or Al-Assad.
The dominant Middle East narrative is that Erdogan has survived military coups, political opposition, a Kurdish rebellion, economic troubles and a pandemic. Meanwhile, Al-Assad continues to hold onto power despite a civil war, the loss of control of territory to rebels, international isolation, and total economic collapse.
As is the case with earth tremors or volcanoes, where seismologists can predict eruptions even if not precisely, political analysts may also be able to see through the fallout of last week’s earthquakes, building their own conclusions on the history of people’s behaviour and above all on the overstated abilities and blunders of their leaders.
A closer look at the catastrophic outcome of the deadly earthquake shows that Erdogan will not be spared the political difficulties awaiting him and his party in the next election. For Al-Assad, the devastating impacts of the quake will certainly reignite questions about his ability to stay in power.
In both cases, there will be reverberations throughout the Middle East, although it might not be clear what direction they will take. Considering the regional ramifications, the countries of the region will continue to eye both Turkey and Syria warily.
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* A version of this article appears in print in the 16 February, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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