About 13 years ago, under the headline “A new look at the Sudanese question”, I wrote, “We need to think about what we have not been able to think about until now. We need to think in unconventional and unfamiliar ways. We need to think of the worst possible scenario for the Sudanese question, which is that the South Sudanese referendum on the right to self determination, scheduled for 9 January next year, will result in the secession of South Sudan accompanied by new waves of violence between and within Sudan and South Sudan. This scenario may seem extremely pessimistic, and other more optimistic scenarios may prevail, which is the general outlook in the Sudanese government which believes that the South Sudanese will choose to sustain the Sudanese unity. Alternatively, secession could occur peacefully or in the framework of a mutually agreeable confederal framework whereby the south could appear separate and independent while the north could still speak of eternal unbreakable unity. All these possibilities have their proponents, so it is good to discuss them all. Seers and soothsayers could also be asked to offer their predictions.”
The article in which that passage appeared was published in Al-Ahram on 8 November 2010. It was a critical moment in the history of Sudan. The country stood at the crossroads between continued territorial integrity and political unity on the one hand, and secession and geographical division on the other. Whether it went this way or that, it was impossible to predict what would happen or how the two sides would conduct relations should they part ways. As we now know, the worst scenario took place. The south voted to secede and secession ushered in much violence both in the nascent South Sudan and in the country it broke away from, the Republic of Sudan. The Arab Spring had not come about yet, even if what happened in Sudan was a horrible prophecy come true or a never ending nightmare.
It appears we are watching something of this nature unfold again there today. As I write this, a few days before Eid Al-Fitr, the violence is mounting while appeals for peace emanate from elsewhere in the region and the world calling for a truce between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), whether for the sake of respect for the end of the holy month of Ramadan or to take a breathing space for talks and negotiations during the feast. In either case, it appears that some have overlooked an important fact, namely that the belligerents would not have started military operations if they did not have plans or preparations for eliminating the other side. Also missing so far, is thought of a solution that will not only resolve the current Sudanese question but, more importantly, propel the country forward towards progress while sustaining the unity of the state, at least within its current borders.
It appears that diplomatic efforts are underway to gain time and ground in order to avert the very worst scenario and to give both sides a pretext for claiming victory. However, as I see this situation - and I may be wrong - both sides are currently more interested in defeating the other after a period of tensions, frustration, mutual harm and bloodshed has taken its toll. One particularly troublesome aspect of the clash between the two sides of the Sudanese “military component” is that it virtually ignores the shockwaves this is sending across the rest of the country, not to mention how it might be whetting appetites among neighbouring countries. Nor can we rule out possible echoes and influences of the East-West conflict over Ukraine.
The current conflict in Sudan is hardly the first to rattle the region. The major political earthquake that given the name “Arab Spring” gave rise to two types of states. One is not unlike what we see in Sudan today. It consists of a fusion of military clashes and ethnic disintegration, oscillations between violence and ceasefires, and a state of instability and disruption favourable to the ambitions of outside powers which may not necessarily have planned events as they transpired but have no compunctions about capitalising on the situation. The second type of state is that which was jolted into awareness of what the mistakes and dead ends of the past had led to and realised the need to forge a different kind of future. The Arab reformist state, as I have termed this model, is founded on the principles of the modern nation state, carefully planned sustainable development and renovation of religious and civil thought. It has set its sights on comprehensive progress and prosperity in order to catch up with the world and peacefully compete with others in the realms of economy, technology, creativity and innovation. There is no third option. In terms of the current crisis in Sudan, the second model - the reformist state - offers the best approach to a viable and lasting solution, as opposed to simply patching over the wounds and hoping the bleeding stops.
The situation in Sudan today is the product of a second wave of Arab Spring. It was generally thought that the lessons had been learned from the mistakes and tragedies of the first wave, but apparently this was not the case. The Sudanese edition proceeded on the premise of a power sharing formula between the “military component” and “civilian component”, as opposed to the premise of affiliation to a single nation state. As a consequence, each component was divided. The military side was armed with two forces, one for combat, the other for deterrence. The civilian side also armed itself, in the form of uninterrupted demonstrations, sit-ins and other actions on the street. There was no overarching national project to build a new Sudan. It was as though all sides had tacitly agreed that the three-year transition period would not be used to think about how to build the country but rather to negotiate and haggle, spar and occasionally clash, or to silently fume. So nothing changed, except possibly for the worse.
This is the opposite direction to that of the Arab reform countries, which are trying to lead the region through expanding the scope of construction and development and striving to bridge the gap between the present and the future. Sudan is of great importance in terms of its size, stature and history, and the Arabs would be wrong to leave it to its own fate. If today the Arab reformist order is working to help Syria overcome its tragedies, heal its wounds and return to the Arab fold, it makes little sense to let Sudan take Syria’s place as an arena for never ending strife and warfare.
The situation requires more than Arab League meetings and appeals for a halt to violence and a ceasefire. We need to be open and frank enough to insist that the nation state, as properly defined, must hold the monopoly on the legitimate recourse to arms, which means one national army. This is essential if the Sudanese state is to embody a truly national project that steers the country out of its current plight and towards a brighter future for all Sudanese citizens.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 27 April, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Short link: