Founded in 1821 at the junction of the White Nile that originates in Lake Victoria and the Blue Nile that flows from the Ethiopian highlands, the city of Khartoum is now the scene of fierce battles between the two major military forces in Sudan: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Though it is of course shocking that the situation has plunged into fighting between the two “guarantors” of the political process in post-Omar Al-Bashir Sudan, it comes as no surprise.
Prior to the tragic triggering of the first bullet in the conflict, which the two warring parties blame each other for, the tension in Sudan had already been rising, since the powers that should have pulled out all the stops to extricate the country from its “semi-failed state” status had instead opted to fight for a place in the sun instead of for the Sudanese people. They did so willingly in some cases and unwillingly in others due to tenacious pressures by regional powers.
All the stakeholders in Sudan, including the head of the UN Integrated Transition Mission in Sudan (UNITAMAS) Volker Perthes, must be held accountable for the unfortunate situation now plaguing the Sudanese people. Perthes’ mandate should have been to facilitate good-faith talks between the civilian powers and the military, including the two now-warring generals Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan, commander of the SAF, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemedti, commander of the RSF. Instead, the UN mission in Sudan took sides disguised under the “installation” of a civilian-led government.
Regrettably, the Perthes-led UNITAMAS allowed itself to be an actor in the political process in Sudan and even sidelined the African Union (AU). This is why AU Envoy Mohamed Belaiche cited issues of a “lack of transparency and exclusion” when he announced a temporary freeze of AU participation in the Sudan Tripartite Mechanism in June last year.
Meanwhile, the civilian Forces of Change and Freedom (FCF) and Central Council have been acting irresponsibly since the day former president Al-Bashir was ousted by labelling the other partners as “puppets” in the hands of the military. This chauvinistic claim of being the only party that could be entrusted with steering the transitional period led the Central Council to raise its bets.
The outcome was inevitable: a resounding loss for all concerned. Before the fighting started on 15 April, the Central Council was already losing ground after it signed the Framework Agreement with the military without engaging other influential partners even within the FCF itself. This led to a split within the civilian groups that had joined forces to topple the Al-Bashir regime. More alarmingly, it allowed some Western and non-African regional powers to meddle in the country as part of their bid to have a say in Sudan’s future, or, more precisely, a share in Sudan’s fortunes.
Now that the temple has fallen, those who used to do the talking are seeking refuge, with footage showing them fleeing Sudan on evacuation planes side by side with foreign nationals.
The RSF, formerly the Janjaweed militia that has a notorious record in Darfur, have seized a golden opportunity that only knocks once. Considering himself to be the second most important man in post-Al-Bashir Sudan, Hemedti has an insatiable desire for a more powerful role in the region. From neighbouring Libya and the Central African Republic into the Sahel, the Sahara, and Yemen, forces loyal to the RSF are present on the ground. With his intricate network of relations with the Arab and European powers, the commander of the RSF was not content with being only the man next to the commander of the SAF.
He would often get the red-carpet treatment in his own right when visiting allies in the Middle East and Europe and speak his mind on sensitive issues like the proposed Russian nuclear base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea, even if his views collided with the government’s official position. He would also distribute millions of pounds in cash to different Sudanese groups and parties on different occasions. Hemedti was clearly preparing himself for a key position in the country and one in which he would brook no rivals.
All this happened in full view of the Sudanese state agencies. Before the ouster of Al-Bashir, the RSF was composed of nearly 7,000 fighters equipped with four-wheel drive vehicles that allowed them to act “rapidly” when needed. Four years after the Sudanese December 2019 Revolution, the RSF had grown in size to some 100,000 fighters including mercenaries from Sudan’s restive neighbours. It had multiplied its advanced weaponry more than tenfold, becoming a force parallel with, but more experienced in guerilla warfare than the Sudanese army itself.
Regular army and intelligence officers miscalculated by providing training for RSF soldiers on combat operations thanks to the handsome pay that the government with its limited resources could not afford. Command centres in sensitive areas in Khartoum and other Sudanese states were given to the RSF. This tells us why the current battles are expected to inflict heavy damage to state property.
But even more than this, the present conflict in Sudan goes beyond the country’s territory as parties with different agendas are already involved. As a result, a permanent ceasefire is not likely to take effect in the near future.
For the country’s immediate neighbours, this has a variety of implications. South Sudan and Egypt both now bear the brunt of refugees pouring across their borders, and this makes it imperative for mediators to listen attentively to the views shared by the two countries to end this tragedy before it spirals into an uncontrollable regional conflict. Egypt and South Sudan should therefore work together to host a summit of Sudan’s neighbours in order to find a lasting solution to the crisis that will ensure Sudan’s territorial integrity and, most importantly, unify all the armed groups into one powerful army.
Sudan must not be allowed to collapse into anarchy. Instability in this nation of some 47 million people, a third of whom are in urgent need of humanitarian aid, would have a domino effect on Libya, Egypt, the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, and Eritrea since the economies of Sudan’s immediate neighbours are still reeling from the adverse impacts of two global disasters: the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian war on Ukraine.
Both these crises have sent inflation higher than what their peoples can afford. A continued refugee influx into Sudan’s neighbours would press hard on these already ailing economies, particularly given the day-to-day global increases in the prices of basic commodities and oil and already large foreign debts.
Should the international community fail to address the Sudanese crisis effectively and quickly, a Pandora’s Box will be opened in the region and beyond.
The writer is a former press attaché in Ethiopia and an expert on African and international affairs.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 18 May, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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