In recent years, the term “war of attrition” has gained currency in global politics. This reflects the resurgence of international conflict among major powers following three decades of American dominance after the end of the Cold War. For one thing, headlines and articles discussing competition between major powers are increasingly prevalent. A defining feature of this new era, for another, is how traditional and rising global powers engage in inflicting harm on each other without engaging in direct confrontation.

The International Encyclopaedia of World War I defines a war of attrition as “the continuous process of exhausting the enemy to force its physical collapse through continuous losses of personnel, equipment, and supplies, or wearing them down to the point where they become susceptible to collapse and the elimination of their will to fight.”

Discussions of “wars of attrition” are often accompanied by references to “proxy wars,” where militarily and economically stronger states employ political systems and armed militias to act on their behalf. In this way they aim to maximise the attrition of other powers. The war in Ukraine has elevated the discourse surrounding proxy wars and wars of attrition to a new level due to it being an indirect confrontation between the United States and Russia. Subsequently, the Israel-Gaza conflict has further reinforced the notion that the world is heading towards a new Cold War, where regional conflicts are exploited to settle scores between major powers or to drain the strength of a dominant power on the international stage.

Former US president Dwight D Eisenhower once described proxy wars as “the cheapest insurance in the world,” while Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq termed them necessary and desirable to “keep the pot boiling.” Proxy wars serve as a logical alternative for states seeking to advance their strategic objectives while avoiding direct, costly and bloody engagement.

A 2023 Rand Corporation study, employing both quantitative and qualitative methods, concluded that the resurgence of proxy wars is a likely prospect in the near future due to geopolitical, domestic political, ideological, and economic considerations, which stem from the intensifying competition between major powers, particularly the United States and China. Despite the study’s recommendations that Washington should avoid entering new proxy wars to every extent possible to avert Cold War scenarios, all indications suggest that the United States is moving in the opposite direction. Its involvement in proxy wars and wars of attrition is in fact increasing following the protracted conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, as both Ukraine and Israel hold significant importance for US military strategy.

In his book New Cold Wars, journalist David Sanger highlights the shift in expectations: “We were also convinced that, for all the shock, trauma, and disorder of the twenty first century, the world would sort itself out in the way we had long anticipated. Key to that was the almost universally held assumption that Russia and China — a fast-declining power and a fast-rising one —would integrate themselves into the West in their own ways. Each, it was argued, had an overwhelming national interest in keeping its products, profits, and financial interactions flowing, even with geopolitical adversaries. Economics would ultimately trump nationalism and territorial ambition.”

However, events in recent years have contradicted the expectations of Western political circles. Tensions have escalated between China and Russia, on the one hand, and the Western camp led by the United States, on the other, driven by economic ambitions and the fading belief that globalisation possesses sufficient power to contain international tensions and conflicts.

Today, experts fear drastic shifts in international competition and resort to proxy wars to settle scores with adversaries, reminiscent of the US support for Afghan mujahideen at the height of the Cold War in the 1970s or the Soviet Union’s use of Cuban proxies in Angola in 1974. The dangerous variable today is the existence of highly trained armed groups dispersed across various regions, particularly the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. These groups can be employed in diverse ways, including purchasing cross-border loyalties more extensively and deeply than in the past.

Non-state actors can be recruited to engage in unprecedented ways. For instance, throughout most of the 20th century, private militaries were not an option, as the monopoly of force was restricted to states or government forces. However, the Cold War brought about a shift. By the end of 1991, individuals with exceptional military expertise were abundant, leading to the emergence of private militaries and military security companies. The market for such entities grew in numerous regions worldwide, reaching over 150 companies with activities valued at $223 billion in 2022, projected to double by 2030. Additionally, the mercenary market has reached $100 billion.

On the other hand, after awakening from the illusions of a unipolar world, US military institutions are preoccupied with studying the nature of future wars between the world’s two major powers: the United States and China.

Researchers suggest that conflicts between superpowers are rarely short and sharp, but rather tend to be long and gruelling wars of attrition that have a tendency to expand geographically, dragging other regions into the vortex of conflict. There are estimates that the US-China conflict over Taiwan might be an exception, potentially being short and contained, as opposed to a protracted and widespread conflict. However, generalising this assumption is not feasible considering historical precedent.

The world has entered a new phase of conflict among major powers, who are vying for political, economic, military, scientific and technological dominance as well as wealth accumulation. The rules of the game have not changed significantly, and the primary arena for draining capabilities remains indirect military confrontations and the exploitation of regional conflicts and small wars to weaken adversaries. All indications suggest that this conflict will intensify in the next decades.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 May, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly