As Ethiopia proceeds with the fifth filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) – unilaterally, as with its predecessors – the government of South Sudan has ratified the Entebbe Agreement, which calls for the establishment of the Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC) to manage and supervise the development and conservation of the Basin and the use of its waters.

These developments have aggravated tensions between Cairo and Juba, Cairo and Addis Ababa, and in the Nile Basin region in general. It is as though the world needed further stress on top of the intensifying regional and international tensions surrounding the war on Gaza, the war in Ukraine, threats to navigation in the Red Sea, and the Civil War in Sudan, which is now in its second year, not to mention the mounting economic strains, the impacts on international cooperation and decision-making institutions, and the undeniable implications of all this for environmental concerns.

The South Sudanese parliament’s decision to ratify the Entebbe Agreement has been described as a breach of the protocols and ethics of bilateral relations. The vote occurred immediately after a visit by the Egyptian minister of irrigation to Juba, resulting in important agreements to serve the people of South Sudan.  

The suddenness of the subsequent decision gave the impression of haste, a lack of thorough study, and poor coordination between the government and parliament of South Sudan. Alternatively, the South Sudanese lawmakers might have come under pressure from regional and international powers that want to tighten the screws on Egypt for the usual reasons, none of which include concern for the welfare of the people of this region or for regional peace and security.

It is well known that the weaponisation of water is a potential tool of coercion alongside the customary military, security, and economic ones.

Now that the agreement has been ratified by the South Sudanese parliament, it must be submitted to the president for his signature. In other words, its provisions cannot come into force until it is signed by South Sudanese President Salva Kiir. President William Ruto has also yet to sign the agreement into law in Kenya, even though it has been ratified by the Kenyan parliament.

As significant as the procedural dimensions are, the Entebbe Agreement cannot be fully effective without the inclusion of the downriver nations of Sudan and Egypt. The most crucial factor in the management of any river is the relationship between its source and its mouth. Regardless of the number of riparian countries in between, they will be to varying degrees dependant on this relationship. So, if an agreement of this sort does not include all the countries from the source of the river to its mouth, it will be unable to claim that it is a genuine one.

It will only be representative of the source countries, and under international law it will be ranked as a sub-regional organisation, since it serves the interests of the upper riparian countries alone, rather than all the Nile Basin countries combined. At best, it will be on a par with other sub-regional river basin agreements and organisations, such as the Kagera River Basin Agreement (the Kagera River is a tributary of the Nile) and the Lake Victoria Basin Organisation. These agreements only serve the interests of the countries in their respective sub-regions.

Whether or not President Kiir signs the agreement into law in South Sudan, as long as the downstream nations, Sudan and Egypt, are not brought on board, it will remain incomplete and will signal to the international community that the Nile Basin is divided.

The upriver and source countries will not be able to access the international support they are looking for to achieve their development aims because the international community will be wary of the divide, and donors will be reluctant to take major risks. This means that financing prospects will be ad hoc and limited to relatively low-cost projects for the upper riparian nations.

The second dimension of the question involves compliance with Egypt’s demand, as upheld by international treaties and conventions, that its historic rights and interests be recognised. Egypt has signed binding and irrevocable border agreements with the upper riparian nations, all including a provision stating that the upstream nations may not establish a major hydraulic project in their territory without obtaining Egypt’s approval.

The prototype of such agreements was signed with Menelik II, the then Emperor of Ethiopia, in 1902. Ethiopia was an independent state at the time. This and similar agreements with the other Nile Basin countries are irrevocable under international law, which upholds the principle that states inherit the international contractual obligations of their predecessors. The Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect of Treaties enshrines this principle.  

Border agreements are virtually sacrosanct under international law in view of their importance for sustaining international peace and security. The charters of the Organisation of African Unity and the African Union (AU) accord equal priority to upholding the border agreements of pre-independence governments, which is to say the agreements concluded by the former colonial powers. They feared that any reignition of border disputes could precipitate armed conflicts that could rapidly engulf large portions of the continent. This is why even colonial-era border agreements have remained binding.

The final dimension to note is that Egypt has always worked to create an all-inclusive organisation that would preserve and develop good relations in the Nile Basin. It proceeds from the premise that such an organisation would be able to fulfill the hopes and aspirations of present and future generation with respect to the Nile, because its inclusive nature would facilitate the management of the Basin’s immense resources, including water resources, through the application of an integrated framework that would serve the interests of all the nations concerned from the sources of the Nile to its mouth on the Mediterranean.

If Egypt and Ethiopia could resolve their differences, there would be few problems coming from the other Nile Basin countries. The Equatorial Nilotic countries supply Egypt with 14 per cent of its water through the White Nile, compared to 86 per cent from Ethiopia through the Blue Nile. Once such figures are put into perspective, it should not be difficult to bring the White Nile countries on board in a multilateral agreement for the type of organisation Egypt envisions. Without such a comprehensive framework, especially one that includes the estuary nations, the organisation will not work. Not only will it fail to attract development partners, but it will also be vulnerable to dangerous politicisation. Undoubtedly, there are certain parties who would like to see just this.

Now that Ethiopia has completed the construction of the GERD and begun the filling of its reservoir, we are looking at the most crucial stage: establishing the rules of the dam’s operation. A binding legal agreement is of the essence, because the rules of filling not only apply now, at a time when good fortune has blessed us with several years of higher-than-average floods, but also in the future, when low floods and drought could force Ethiopia to refill the GERD reservoir, potentially cutting off large amounts of water from Sudan and Egypt.

Perhaps the clearest proof of the need for the joint operation of the dams in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt occurred during the first filling of the GERD reservoir. Sudan suffered from sudden water shortages during the filling, causing its irrigation systems to grind to a halt and farmland to go dry. Then, just as suddenly, the water gushed forth again, causing destructive flooding. Much of the damage could have been prevented had there been prior coordination between the two countries’ irrigation authorities.

As for Egypt, even if, as is the case at present, there is a full reservoir of water behind the Aswan High Dam, it cannot implement a long-term agricultural policy, involving rice cultivation, for example, which depends on regular supplies of water over an extended period, when it cannot be sure of the amounts of water that it will receive from Ethiopia from one year to the next. This is why it is important to drive home to Ethiopia and international partners that Ethiopia’s unfriendly and, indeed, unethical behaviour towards the estuary countries is unacceptable and inconsistent with the principles of good neighbourliness.

Addis Ababa should be wary of international or regional powers that are trying to use it as a catspaw against Egypt by using the Nile’s water as a form of blackmail. Egypt knows how to protect its interests, and if others try to harm it, it will not be the only one to suffer. Addis Ababa must not succumb to the temptation of wielding water as a weapon to achieve hegemony in the Horn of Africa region. Such policies would be certain to backfire. Far more practical and beneficial would be for all to work together, which is precisely what Egypt has been trying to promote over the years.

An avenue is open before us to reach a historic agreement. It requires leaderships with a certain degree of wisdom and foresight, but with that condition met, it would probably receive support from major international partners. The EU could be foremost among them in view of the major cooperation agreement it has reached with Egypt. China would also step forward to help, given its strategic relations with both Egypt and Ethiopia bilaterally and in the framework of the BRICS Plus group and the Belt and Road Initiative.

Washington, too, would be keen to support a landmark agreement, especially since it has played a major mediating role in the past. It would have succeeded in bringing the parties together to sign the Washington Agreement some years ago, if Addis had not suddenly backed out at the last moment. The World Bank, with its long record of experience in water resource management and which also took part in the Washington negotiations, would also be willing to help. Nor should we dismiss the considerable contributions that would be forthcoming from influential Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, as well as from the relevant UN organisations with their wealth of expertise on the technical, security, legal, and political facets of the matter.

Of course, to promote and optimise such efforts, Egyptian diplomacy must work proactively through the Ministry of Irrigation, the Foreign Ministry, and other agencies. Summit diplomacy may also be called into play at the appropriate time. What is important is to keep a focus on the subject, because not doing so serves Ethiopia, freeing it of pressure as it presses ahead with its agenda, which now includes constructing three more dams between Lake Tana and the GERD.

Egypt must use all the diplomatic tools at its disposal to mobilise partners, international organisations, and donor institutions to prevent Ethiopia from implementing these projects until the parties concerned work out a comprehensive agreement on the joint management of the Blue Nile Basin. No country should be allowed to act as though an international river is its own exclusive property.

Egypt aspires to see a framework for regional cooperation in which collective water management is one facet. Operationally connecting the dams in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt would advance other major joint development projects, such as the planned international highway and railroad between Ethiopia and Egypt passing through Sudan. These infrastructure projects will make it possible for a landlocked country such as Ethiopia to have direct access to ports on the Mediterranean and, simultaneously, benefit from the industrial zones in these ports and the Suez Canal Economic Zone. Cooperation is the key to development and stability. The alternative leads to tensions and conflict, which benefit no one but the enemies of African peace and stability and the costs of which would have to be borne by this region’s future generations.  

Lastly, we must bring this ambitious regional cooperation project to the attention of international partners and prospective donors who would be interested in financing the envisioned road, rail, and electricity grid connections. It is important to impress upon them how this project will lead the Nile Basin countries to a higher plane of stability, security, and development and how this, in turn, will benefit a broader array of strategic interests connected to the navigation of commercial and military ships through the Gulf of Aden, the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal, which is to say the vital nexus of global trade, global energy security, and regional and international security.

The more we look at the matter through this lens, the clearer it becomes that the regional cooperation framework described above will lay the foundations for nothing less than a historic transformation of the Nile Basin region to the benefit of all its peoples.

*The writer is former assistant to the foreign minister.

** A version of this article appears in print on 1 August 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly