Hizbullah delayed its confirmation of the death of Fouad Shukr on 30 July for several hours, leaving observers in suspense between Israeli claims that its missile had succeeded in taking out its target and Iranian claims that the Hizbullah military commander was still alive.

In the interim, the Lebanese began to clear the rubble of the residential building the Israelis struck, killing, in addition to Shukr, an unidentified Iranian individual as well as at least five civilians, including three women and two children.

In his speech at Shukr’s funeral and another address on Tuesday, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah vowed retaliation for the murders and also delivered several messages to various parties.

On his second speech on Tuesday, marking a week on Shukr’s killing in an Israeli strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs, Nasrallah promised that Hizbullah’s response will be “strong and effective”. The “uncertainty over the timing of the retaliation is part of Israel’s punishment,” he added.

Nasrallah stated that Hizbullah will “respond alone or in the context of a unified response from all the axis” of Iran’s allied groups.

Addressing pro-resistance sympathisers in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region, he sought to counter the sense of frustration caused by Israel’s dual assassination of Shukr and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Coming on top of the Israeli bombardment of the Yemeni port of Hodeida several days earlier and the assassination of Hamas commander Mohamed Al-Deif in Gaza two weeks ago, these developments appear to corroborate the revival of the overall military superiority Israel enjoyed before 7 October.

Nasrallah reminded his followers that Shukr, one of the founding fathers of the Lebanese resistance organisation’s military wing, has disciples of equal calibre who can fill the gap he has left. He stressed that the resistance and Sunni-Shia solidarity were strong. This was one of the gains from the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation last October after years of Israeli attempts to foment sectarian and civil strife in the region, he said.

He said that the Israeli strike against Beirut was not in response to the Majdal Shams incident last week. It had targeted a suburb in the Lebanese capital, had struck a residential building next to a healthcare facility in a crowded residential quarter, and had caused the deaths of innocent civilians, he said.

Perhaps in outlining the Israeli attack in this manner, he was also outlining the anticipated Hizbullah response.

No amount of Western pressure will temper that response which, Nasrallah said, will be stronger and more extensive than Tehran’s response to the Israeli strike against the Iranian Consulate in Damascus in April.

“If you want to keep the war from expanding, then stop Israel from responding to our retaliation. If you want to keep the war from expanding, then stop the war on Gaza,” he said, addressing Western leaders.

Aware that his speeches are followed by the Israelis, Nasrallah also took the opportunity to underscore the impacts of the continued state of military mobilisation on daily life in Israel, not just in the northern strip adjacent to Lebanon, but also throughout the country. Alluding to the current state of anticipation in Israel, he effectively told the Israelis that they do not know the direction from which the Hizbullah response will come or whether it will be a succession of strikes.

Hizbullah is also in no hurry. It is aware of the attrition that the sustained mobilisation is wreaking on Israel, economically, militarily, and sociologically. The evacuation of military bases, suspension of production activities, and removing of incendiary substances such as ammonia from warehouses are among the precautionary measures that Israel has had to take.

Nasrallah said that the response Hizbullah will deliver to Israel will be unlike anything Israel has seen to date. It will not obey the unspoken rules of engagement that have governed the exchanges of rockets along the Israeli-Lebanese border since Israel launched its assault on Gaza last October, he said. The fact that Hizbullah has resumed routine exchanges along that front does not mean that the response has begun.

Nevertheless, the notion of two tracks of operations – the usual cross-border exchanges and the anticipated retaliation – reinforces the idea of an attrition strategy. Every missile fired into Israel in the framework of the first track triggers a false alarm, necessitating precautionary measures that constantly disrupt normal life in Israel.

It will take some time for Hizbullah to reorganise its military command following the death of its leader. But it will also need this time to investigate the security breach that made it possible for Israel to assassinate Shukr. Hizbullah conducts such probes after every attempt to assassinate one of its military leaders to determine whether the source of the breach was a mole or a failure in intelligence. This time the investigations will be much more thorough.

To prepare its retaliation, Hizbullah must put into place the logistics, troops, and weapons deployments in anticipation of a likely response from Israel. At the same time, it will be studying Israeli troop and weapons movements and other preparations and will calibrate its retaliatory strike accordingly.

Most likely, it will aim for targets that are at once strategically sensitive but also underdefended, so as to inflict maximum damage at minimum cost to itself. Hizbullah strategists will also have to factor in assessments on US military deployments and the likely nature of US military responses in support of Israel.

It might take up to two weeks or more before Hizbullah delivers its response to Shukr’s assassination. Perhaps the Iranian and Yemeni responses to the Israeli attacks on their territory will come first. However, regardless of when it acts, Hizbullah is confident that it controls the front that can have the greatest impact on Israel, both militarily and economically. It has already brought life in northern Israel to a halt, and it has the ability to disrupt normal life beyond that.

One facet of the Israeli assassination of Shukr suggests that the balance of terror between Israel and Hizbullah remains unchanged. While Israel did indeed strike a suburb of the Lebanese capital, it limited it to some floors of a building, rather than demolishing it entirely. The strike therefore seemed to anticipate a Hizbullah response that would be similarly precise and limited, and perhaps Hizbullah is thinking along these lines.

Indeed, given its attritional capacities, Hizbullah may be calculating that its military response does not need to wreak massive destruction. Iran and the Houthis may be more set on such a response than Hizbullah.

Hizbullah still has quite a few options as to where to strike, including Israeli embassies and other offices abroad. However, whereas Hizbullah has struck such targets in the past when it was less powerful, it is unlikely to do so today when it can hit Israel directly in its own backyard.

Targeting embassies abroad also comes with certain drawbacks, including the opening it gives Israel to rally sympathy among foreign audiences and to shift the focus away from the crux of the issue, namely the Israeli occupation and aggression.

On the other hand, Hizbullah may opt for surgical strikes that yield both military and civilian attrition. Since Israel broke the current rules of engagement along the border to strike Beirut, Hizbullah will probably respond in kind, striking much deeper into Israel than before.

The recently released video footage taken by Hizbullah reconnaissance drones inside Israel suggests some possible targets.

In attempting to predict the scale of the Hizbullah response to Shukr’s assassination, it is useful to bear in mind that he was the architect of Hizbullah’s military doctrine of parity and precise responses. It is hard to conceive that Hizbullah would break from this doctrine, and one of the aims of its retaliatory action will be to restore mutual deterrence rather than to open a new front in a broader war.

The last thing Hizbullah wants is to perform a service for Netanyahu free of charge. It is obvious to all that Netanyahu is desperate for a wider war to save his political career and keep himself out of jail.

As for the civilian component of Hizbullah’s response, it is unlikely to behave like Israel and strike residential areas. Throughout the war, it has avoided causing civilian casualties, and it is conscious of the need not to give the international media an opening to build up sympathy for Israel.

On the other hand, this time it might opt to target dual-use sectors, such as telecommunications, electricity, fuel and munitions supply facilities. It will avoid offshore natural gas facilities, as it will not want to alienate European or other regional parties which process or import this vital resource.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 8 August, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly