The Arab Gulf capitals have been closely following the confrontation between Iran and Israel that has been unfolding during the past few weeks, especially in the wake of an intensive Iranian missile attack on Israeli targets to avenge the Israeli assassination of leading Hizbullah and Hamas figures in Lebanon and Iran.

With an Israeli response widely anticipated, these capitals are becoming increasingly worried about being caught in the crossfire despite leaked information about US and European pressure on Israel to pursue a carefully measured response.

According to sources described as close to government circles in the countries concerned, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and other Gulf states are concerned their own oil facilities could come under fire from Tehran’s proxies if the conflict escalates.

These proxies are stationed partially in Yemen and partially in Iraq to the north and south of the Arab Gulf countries. As part of their attempts to avoid being caught in the crossfire, the Arab Gulf states, including the UAE and Bahrain which have had diplomatic relations with Israel since late 2020, say that they will not allow Israeli jetfighters to fly over their airspace in any attack on Iran and have conveyed this to Washington.

It has not been confirmed how far Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has paid very little attention to international appeals, will accommodate appeals for a non-escalatory response to Iran.

However, according to a Dubai-based British commentator, Netanyahu knows very well that both US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, running for president in this November’s presidential elections, have been unequivocal in demanding a contained response in order to avoid a deteriorating regional situation as Harris counts down to the elections on 5 November.

Meanwhile, it is also an open secret that the Arab Gulf countries might not all be unhappy if Iran suffers from an Israeli strike. However, none of these countries want to be directly or openly involved in such a matter as they have worries about how far the US would go in providing military protection in case they come under attack irrespective of who sits in the Oval Office after this year’s elections.

The Saudis have not overcome their dismay when former US president Donald Trump looked the other way in the wake of a Yemeni missile and drone attack on the oil company Aramco’s facilities in 2019.

At the time, the Saudis accused Iran of ordering the attack that halted half of Saudi oil production. Iran denied any involvement, and the Houthi militia in Yemen claimed responsibility. Trump responded to the incident with lip-service and rhetoric.

In 2022, with Biden then in office, the Houthis also targeted oil installations in the UAE, but there was no support from the US in terms of a response.

Attacking its oil facilities might be a major blow to Iran, but the global oil markets have spare capacity that could make up for the loss of the entire Iranian oil production. However, there will be a wider impact, especially for China and other importers of Iranian oil.

If markets react by raising oil prices above $100 a barrel, fuel prices at the pump in the US will go up. This will adversely affect the chances of Harris walking into the White House after November’s elections.

High oil prices would be good for the Arab Gulf oil exporters, as most of global spare capacity is in the region, mainly in Saudi Arabia. But there are still real fears of Iran’s proxies in the region attacking Gulf oil facilities.

A spokesman for the Iraqi Shiite militia Kataib Hizbullah said in a statement on Telegram that “the world will lose 12 million barrels of oil per day” if Iran is targeted by Israel and threatened to target “American bases, camps, and interests in Iraq and the region” in retaliation.

Though oil fields were not directly specified in the threat made by Kataib Hizbullah, they are obviously possible targets.

Last week, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Saudi Arabia and Qatar to discuss de-escalation and propose dialogue with Iran’s Arab neighbours. The objective of the visit was an attempt to “neutralise” the Gulf in any future conflict with Israel, and the fact that Araghchi was received by top state officials both in Riyadh and Doha was seen as an indication of the commitment of these two capitals to stay away from the Iran-Israel confrontation.

The US network CNN has reported that “Iran has been particularly interested in getting help from Saudi Arabia in preventing an Israeli attack and using its influence with Washington to help find a solution to the crisis.”

Araghchi’s visits came as the Iranian press has suggested that if Iran were to come under an Israeli attack its regional allies would have to respond. For the most part, the Arab Gulf countries have publicly indicated a preference to pursue dialogue and cooperation. This seems to be the case despite the dismay that most Arab Gulf countries demonstrate with regards to the influence that Iran has been attempting to expand across the region through its proxy militias.

Saudi Arabia, arguably the most influential member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which brings together the Arab Gulf countries, has been on a track of normalisation and cooperation with Iran. This has been the case despite the long years of a Saudi-led military confrontation with the Houthis in Yemen and its opposition to the role that Hizbullah has been playing in Lebanon and for that matter also in Syria.

Academic Andrew Hammond of Oxford University in the UK noted that the Saudi rapprochement towards Iran is solid and that it will likely lead to Gulf opposition to any Israeli attacks on it.

He told Al-Ahram Weekly that even if the US condones an Israeli retaliatory attack on Iran, the Gulf is not taking the same position. This, he said, was the case despite the fact that most Arab Gulf capitals would like to see the power of Iran’s proxies in the region, such as the Lebanese group Hizbullah, the Yemeni Houthis, the Iraqi Shiite militias, and even Hamas in Gaza, eliminated.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 17 October, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly