For decades, the spectre of a transformative agreement between the US and Iran has loomed over the geopolitical landscape like a mirage, enticing yet perpetually out of reach. The idea of a “grand bargain” that could reshape the Middle East, end enduring hostilities, and integrate Iran into the regional and global order has re-emerged following the recent 12-day war involving Iran, Israel, and the US.
Despite sporadic signals suggesting diplomatic momentum, the structural and ideological divides between Tehran and Washington remain too vast. Recent events have only reaffirmed the deep-seated barriers that have consistently thwarted meaningful engagement.
Last week, while announcing the ceasefire between Iran and Israel, US President Donald Trump struck an unusually conciliatory tone: “On the assumption that everything works as it should, which it will, I would like to congratulate both Countries, Israel and Iran, on having the Stamina, Courage, and Intelligence to end what should be called ‘THE 12 DAY WAR,’” he posted on social media.
Trump claimed US strikes had “completely obliterated” three of Iran’s nuclear sites, effectively neutralising its nuclear ambitions. However, intelligence from both American and European sources contradicted this claim. According to US officials, the strikes may have delayed Iran’s programme by a few months, falling short of any strategic setback.
The US network CNN later reported, citing anonymous officials, that the Trump administration was considering a proposal to entice Iran back to the negotiating table. The plan involved facilitating access to up to $30 billion for developing a civilian nuclear programme, easing select sanctions, and releasing $6 billion in frozen Iranian assets. Quiet negotiations reportedly occurred between US, Middle Eastern, and Iranian officials even as Israeli military operations were ongoing.
Officials stressed the preliminary nature of the discussions, which centred on one non-negotiable US demand: a complete halt to uranium enrichment. Tehran has consistently rejected this condition. The US also stipulated that the proposed funds would not be provided directly by Washington, but rather by Arab allies in the Gulf.
This apparent thaw in relations was fleeting. Days later, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei adopted a defiant tone in a televised address. “The Islamic Republic slapped America in the face… It did not manage to do anything important to our nuclear facilities,” he declared, accusing Trump of exaggerating the impact of the strikes.
Khamenei went further, claiming “total victory” over Israel and suggesting that the US intervention stemmed from fear that “the Zionist regime would be totally annihilated” otherwise.
Trump responded with characteristic bluntness. “You’re a man of great faith. A man who’s highly respected in his country. You have to tell the truth. You got beat to hell,” he said during a White House press conference. When asked whether the US would strike again if Iran resumed nuclear activity, he replied, “sure, without question. Absolutely.”
He added that any plans to lift sanctions were immediately shelved following Khamenei’s remarks. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi fired back, urging Trump to “abandon his disrespectful tone” if he hoped to reach any sort of agreement.
“The great and powerful Iranian people, who showed the world that the Israeli regime had to run to ‘Daddy’ to avoid being flattened by our missiles, do not take kindly to threats and insults,” he said.
Several factors contributed to the swift collapse of the diplomatic momentum. Chief among them is mutual mistrust hardened by decades of hostility. Tehran views US proposals as fundamentally unreliable, especially after Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) despite Iran’s verified compliance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
For Iran, that betrayal underscored the belief that Washington cannot be trusted to honour its commitments. “A person would have to be willfully blind to the last half-century of regional history to believe that the US and Israel are sincerely prepared to turn the page on their enmity towards the Islamic Republic,” a reformist Iranian politician with close ties to President Masoud Pezeshkian told Al-Ahram Weekly.
From Washington’s perspective, Iran is a duplicitous actor using diplomacy to buy time while advancing covert nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Tehran’s recent decision to bar IAEA inspectors only deepened US suspicions. Hardliners in the Trump administration interpret Iran’s refusal to forgo enrichment as undeniable evidence of bad faith.
Reflecting these internal divisions, Senator Lindsey Graham emphasised in the newspaper Israel Hayom that future talks must rest on three core demands: Iran must renounce nuclear weapons, end all enrichment, even for civilian use, and overhaul its regional policies, including support for proxy forces in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Graham also insisted that Iran recognise Israel’s right to exist.
Graham suggested that the recent strikes strengthened Israel’s position, arguing that the Gulf states were now better positioned to push for a broader peace. He even speculated that Lebanon and Syria could soon join the normalisation wave with Israel.
However, Iran and the US remain at odds on what regional stability should look like. Washington insists that Iran scale back its missile programme and withdraw support for regional proxies. Iran, conversely, sees these as pillars of national defence and strategic deterrence. These are not tactical disputes: they are diametrically opposed worldviews on power, legitimacy, and sovereignty in the region.
“We have received indirect messages from Washington, conveyed through regional intermediaries,” the Iranian politician said, “outlining a clear set of conditions: if Iran renounces its nuclear ambitions, halts enrichment, restricts its missile programme, and changes its regional posture, then sanctions might be lifted.”
But he criticised the imbalance in expectations. “These demands are met with deafening silence regarding Israel’s own obligations. There is no mention of a Palestinian state, no end to the genocide in Gaza, and no talk of Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese and Syrian lands or of Israel’s own nuclear arsenal.”
“It feels less like an invitation to peace,” he concluded, “and more like a demand for surrender, an arrangement devoid of mutual respect or any shared vision for collective security.”
Domestic politics on both sides further inhibit diplomacy. In Iran, the postwar climate has bolstered hardliners. Parliament swiftly passed legislation suspending all nuclear cooperation with the IAEA, reinforcing the belief that engagement with the West only leads to betrayal.
In the US, Trump’s foreign policy continues to be shaped less by strategic planning and more by his desire to project strength. His flirtation with outreach to Iran may have been a trial balloon quickly grounded by backlash from within his administration and base.
The path to improved relations is precarious. Iran is reportedly rebuilding its centrifuge infrastructure, with satellite imagery showing renewed activity at Fordow and Natanz. Still, scenarios for limited diplomacy persist. Iran could permit conditional IAEA access under revised terms, while the US might offer phased sanctions relief tied to verifiable enrichment limits. A stricter successor to the JCPOA remains possible though unlikely.
The European nations, particularly France, Germany, and the UK, are actively seeking a diplomatic compromise, worried that any failure to do so could reignite full-scale conflict among Iran, Israel, and the US within months.
In Israel, officials interpret the ceasefire not as a conclusion but as the start of a more dangerous chapter. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has portrayed what he sees as a “victory” over Iran as a launching point for expanding peace agreements with the Arab states.
As part of this regional initiative, US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barak is reportedly working to normalise relations between Israel and Syria, now under Interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa. Barak has voiced cautious optimism about a potential breakthrough.
However, Israeli officials led by Defence Minister Israel Katz and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar remain firm on maintaining sovereignty over the Golan Heights, buffer zones in Daraa and Quneitra, and the strategic Mount Hermon. These positions have triggered anger in Tehran, which views them as a ploy to extract sweeping political concessions after a military stalemate.
“How can such a disruption of the regional equilibrium be tolerated,” the Iranian politician asked. “The American-Israeli vision demands absolute Israeli dominance across the Middle East. It implies the permanent annexation of Syrian and Lebanese lands, the erasure of Palestinian statehood, the mass displacement of Palestinians, and the dismantling of Iran’s strategic deterrence. And in exchange, what does Israel offer? Nothing.”
As it stands, the ideological divide between the US and Iran – resistance versus containment, sovereignty versus hegemony – remains unbridgeable. Any grand bargain, however enticing in theory, is stymied by entrenched narratives, regional rivalries, domestic pressures, and a deep mistrust that diplomacy alone cannot dissolve.
The road ahead is littered with obstacles: crippling sanctions that fuel Iranian defiance, a maze of proxy wars, and fundamentally opposed visions of the future of the Middle East. The stakes are high. The urgency is undeniable. And yet, the elusive “grand bargain” that could redefine the region remains little more than a mirage glimmering on the diplomatic horizon and always just out of reach.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 3 July, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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