“What is going on in Syria is a sign of danger to any [Iraqi] who has even a little bit of a brain,” a leader of a powerful Iraqi militia recently declared.
“Whoever surrenders his weapons should be prepared for shaving off his moustache,” Sheikh Qais Al-Khazali told a congregation marking the anniversary of the martyrdom of the Shia saint Imam Hussein.
The leader of the Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) was referring to videos that appeared to show Syrian Islamist militants forcibly shaving off the moustaches of Druze men in Syria’s Sweida Province amid ongoing sectarian conflict earlier this month.
Al-Khazali’s sounding of the alarm about Syria’s political and sectarian chaos was the latest in a series of warnings by Iraqi leaders that their beleaguered country will be deeply affected by the conflict raging in their Western neighbour.
The overthrow of the Alawite regime of Bashar Al-Assad in December by rebel forces led by Sunni militant group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has had a significant impact on Iraq.
The upheaval put an end to over 50 years of Al-Assad family’s rule in Syria, which was seen by many as part of the “Shia Crescent,” an imagined geopolitical entity composed of Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon that was aligned with Iran.
The arc was broken after the collapse of the Al-Assad regime and the end of an era for Lebanon’s Shia Hizbullah Party as a result of the full-scale war Israel launched on Lebanon in the aftermath of Hamas’ attack on Israel on 7 October 2023.
The subsequent Israel-Hamas war was the primary catalyst for the cascading events that have reshaped the region during the last year and raised fears of further turmoil.
With uncertainty growing on its doorstep, Iraq is one country which faces an existential threat if the situation in Syria worsens unless the leaders of the Iraqi communities are capable of addressing the challenges.
Atrocities committed during the turmoil triggered by clashes between Sunni tribesmen and factions from the Druze minority in Sweida in Syria have been viewed with growing alarm by Iraqi Shias.
Seven months on from Al-Assad’s fall, the bloodshed in Sweida, which came three months after the distressing massacres in the Alawite coastal region of the country, have showed that Syria is descending into yet another wave of bloody sectarian violence.
Iraq fears that if sectarianism dominates in Syria, it will likely have significant security, political, and other implications for the deeply divided country that suffered from sectarian violence in the aftermath of the 2003 US-led invasion.
But more significantly, regime change in Syria and world and regional power competition in the country underscore issues that make Iraqis fear the trajectory could rekindle similar dynamics in Iraq and pose new challenges for the country.
Many Iraqi Shias have expressed a renewed sense of anxiety as radical Islamist militants, armed by neighbouring Turkey and supported by key regional Sunni powerhouses and formerly associated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) group, are stepping in as the new leaders of Syria.
The Iraqi Shias’ stress is amplified when they look at the foreign involvement in Syria and see a regional realignment that pushes for a new geopolitical reality in the Middle East and could create a potential domino effect of regime change in Iraq.
Turkey, which shares a 911-km frontier with Syria, was a main backer of the Sunni Islamist-led opposition groups that succeeded in toppling the Al-Assad regime. Emerging as a winner in Syria, it is subtly increasing the pressure to build up broader regional influence primarily in Iraq, a country hit by internal divisions and threatened by a collapsing regional order.
When viewed from an Iraqi Shia perspective, as Turkey continues to consolidate its influence in Syria, creating new regional dynamics, Ankara is likely to emerge as an active player pushing to expand its influence in Iraq.
The effect on Iraq has been particularly pronounced in Ankara’s diplomacy towards Baghdad, since Turkey sees its success in Syria as offering a wider strategic window to deepen engagement in its southern neighbour.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan decided on 20 July to terminate a longstanding Turkey-Iraq Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement that for five decades has been central to Turkey-Iraq energy cooperation.
The decision to close the pipeline, which runs through Iraqi Kurdistan, has drawn increased attention in Baghdad to Ankara’s strategy in Iraq amid political uncertainty and escalating tensions between the Shia-led government in the capital and the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government.
The termination of the agreement raises important questions about Ankara’s intentions to pursue a new strategic direction to increase its influence in Iraq.
Erdogan’s decision came against the backdrop of several developments that have been shaping Turkey’s multiple-track strategy in Iraq, including water, trade, and the future of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey.
The issue of water is an aggravating factor in Iraq’s relations with Turkey. The ongoing dispute between Iraq and Turkey over the flow into the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers stems from concerns over the construction and operation of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and its impacts on water security in Iraq.
Iraq, with a population of about 45 million people, relies on the two rivers for nearly all of its fresh water and is accusing Ankara of constructing unilateral infrastructure projects that have negative effects downstream in Iraq.
Turkey, meanwhile, continues to argue that the rivers are not international, but trans-boundary, which limits the scope for international mechanisms on equitable water sharing.
Ankara’s unilateral approach to the dispute is undoubtedly meant to keep its national control over the two rivers, while Iraq continues to suffer a drought that has strained the country’s water resources and affected millions.
Trade is another key instrument that Erdogan is using in his Iraq diplomacy as Turkey eyes Iraq’s lucrative oil revenues and looks to expanded trade exchanges and energy agreements with Iraq on favourable terms.
Turkey has already submitted a draft proposal to Iraq for a new energy agreement to include cooperation in oil, gas, petrochemicals, and electricity, as Ankara feels that current circumstances allow it to seek more advantages in dealing with the country.
In December, Turkish Minister of Trade Omer Bolat disclosed that his country is seeking to increase trade exchanges with Iraq from their current level of nearly $20 billion to $30 billion.
Turkey also sees the Development Road Initiative, a high-speed road and rail link running from Iraq’s port city of Basra on the Gulf to the Turkish border and later to Europe, as an opportunity to expand its influence in Iraq.
What should also prompt further reflection is the future of the PKK. Turkey has succeeded in snatching a declaration of peace and reconciliation from the Kurdish Party in a landmark step intended to end decades of conflict.
But much of the success of this will depend on Iraq, where the party is still operating amidst uncertainty about implementing the peace agreement and scepticism within its supporters, many of them Iraqi Kurds.
The United States is another partner in the network that seeks to rid Iraq of Iran’s influence and the “axis of resistance” it has forged in Iraq and resolve disputes with the US-backed semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region.
As Trump deepens ties with longstanding US allies in the region while nurturing more cordial relationships with the new regime in Damascus, his administration is applying pressure on the Iraqi government to achieve these and other goals.
The latest bid to push Baghdad to disband Iraq’s pro-Iranian militias and allow the resumption of Kurdish oil exports came last week when US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa Al-Sudani against any reluctance to solve the two issues.
Rubio “reiterated serious US concerns with the Popular Mobilisation Commission (PMC) bill currently pending in the Council of Representatives” in Iraq, emphasising that any such legislation would institutionalise Iranian influence and armed terrorist groups, undermining Iraq’s sovereignty, a State Department statement said.
One tough message heard in Baghdad and underlies this US policy came from Tom Barrack, US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria and Lebanon, who warned that Syria is developing very quickly.
“If Lebanon doesn’t move, it’s going to be Bilad Al-Sham again,” Barrack said in an interview, using the historical name for the Syria region.
In Baghdad, the biggest worry of many distrustful Shias is if foreign pressure is put on the government could that also mean Iraq would be becoming part of a modern Umayyad Caliphate on the model of the mediaeval one that once ruled the region from Damascus.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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