The political landscape of Syria’s fragile transitional period shifted dramatically with the recent “Unity of the Stance of the Components of Northeastern Syria” Conference in Hasakah.
Organised by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the gathering was far more than another round of speeches, as it brought together an unprecedented coalition of Druze, Alawites, Kurds, Syriacs, Yazidis, Turkmen, and Circassians.
The symbolism was powerful, but the politics even more so. For many, the event marked a direct challenge to Interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s attempts to impose centralised authority over a country still reeling from war and political collapse.
Publicly, the conference was framed as a celebration of Syria’s diversity and a renewed pledge to pluralism. Yet, beneath the language of unity and human dignity ran a pointed critique of the violence, discrimination, and marginalisation that minority communities have suffered in recent months.
In March, attacks attributed to factions linked with the new Syrian army and the Interior Ministry targeted Shiite Alawites along the coast, followed by brutal assaults on Druze in Sweida, strikes against Christians and their churches, and reported violence against Kurdish towns across the north and east of the country.
Such incidents if isolated might be dismissed as grim by-products of instability. Seen together, however, critics argue, they reveal a troubling pattern and one that some minority leaders suspect is either a result of grave negligence or a deliberate policy of exclusion by Damascus.
Historically, Syria’s minorities have rarely spoken with one voice. Divisions in loyalty and fears of provoking greater repression have kept them apart. But now Druze, Alawites, and Kurds are beginning to articulate a shared political vision. Their demands of decentralisation, constitutional reform, and fair representation are being voiced in unison. If this cooperation holds, it could reshape the political transition, serving as either a decisive kingmaker or a formidable spoiler.
In Hasakah, the speeches were warm in tone but uncompromising in substance. The coalition’s vision of a secular, pluralistic, decentralised Syria is a rejection of both the authoritarian centralism of the Al-Assad era and what they see as Al-Sharaa’s unwillingness to meaningfully share power.
The proposals were explicit: a democratic constitution, entrenched decentralisation, and guaranteed minority representation. The message was just as clear – that Syria’s old model of power concentrated in Damascus is finished. The call to “reconsider” the constitutional declaration was, in effect, a challenge to the foundations of Al-Sharaa’s authority.
For Damascus, the danger lies in the fact that this is no longer simply a loose network of critics. The Hasakah gathering has the makings of an organised alternative power structure. By openly pointing to the self-administration model in northern and eastern Syria as a blueprint for the whole country, the coalition is tapping into a system that already exists since the SDF and the Autonomous Administration control large swathes of territory, run security forces, and oversee functioning governance.
Support for this model from influential Druze and Alawite leaders, far from the SDF’s traditional strongholds, is a signal that the idea of federal or confederal arrangements is moving into the national conversation.
During the conference, Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri, a prominent Druze leader from Syria’s Sweida Governorate, delivered a video address in which he stressed that the gathering was “not merely a political meeting, but a call to the national conscience and a response to the cry of a people exhausted by wars and marginalisation.”
Al-Hijri affirmed that the Druze community stands alongside “Kurdish, Arab, Syriac, Yazidi, Turkmen, Circassian, and other sectarian groups,” emphasising that Syria’s diversity is not a threat but “a treasure that strengthens the unity of society.”
The head of the Supreme Alawite Islamic Council in Syria Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal, also addressed the conference, underscoring the need to establish a “civil, secular, pluralistic, and decentralised” Syrian state that respects all communities and does not marginalise anyone on the basis of sect or religion.
For his part, Hussein Othman, co-chair of the Executive Council of the Autonomous Administration in Northeastern Syria, stressed “the need to intensify efforts at this sensitive stage to reject sectarianism and racism, confront attempts to sow discord and division, and work together to build a Syrian homeland inclusive of all, enshrining a culture of pluralism and diversity as a source of strength.”
Othman noted that the meeting comes at “a critical moment in the region’s history,” emphasising that this phase demands the highest levels of national and societal responsibility commensurate with the scale of the challenges and a commitment to charting a future worthy of the sacrifices of the region’s peoples.
The conference’s final communique pulled no punches, branding attacks on minorities as “crimes against humanity” that demand impartial investigation and prosecution “whoever the perpetrators may be.” It is a position that sets the coalition firmly on a collision course with Al-Sharaa, whose administration, critics note, has shown little appetite for pursuing such cases.
Damascus dismissed the conference as the product of foreign interference.
An Arab diplomat based in London told Al-Ahram Weekly that mistrust between Damascus and Syria’s minorities is at an “alarming pitch.” Minority communities, he said, feel increasingly targeted in the violence that has killed thousands since the Al-Assad regime’s fall last December and sidelined in shaping a transitional process that favours conservative, traditionalist visions over more inclusive ones. He revealed that recent Arab mediation attempts had collapsed.
“There is no doubt the gap between the two sides is widening. There is no credible mediator capable of bringing everyone to the table. Instead, outside actors with neither genuine concern nor honest intentions are intervening, seeking to strengthen one side at the expense of the other,” he said.
The war on Gaza has only deepened the problem, he added, drawing away both regional and US attention from Syria’s fragile transition and leaving the situation to fester.
For Al-Sharaa, the stakes could not be higher. The Hasakah coalition is gaining both local legitimacy and the possibility of international support, resources and political cover that could allow it to resist central authority outright. Calls for foreign intervention to protect minority communities are growing louder.
In Sweida, prominent Druze religious leader Sheikh Youssef Jarbou recently denounced the military campaign there as a cover for looting, arson, and the desecration of sacred sites, part of what he described as a pattern of sectarian targeting. He appealed to international guarantors and humanitarian groups to investigate “crimes against humanity” and urged unity among Druze leaders, thanking supporters abroad for their solidarity.
Sheikh Hamoud Al-Hanawi, another senior cleric, accused Damascus of “betraying national values and traditional alliances” and described the moment in stark terms: “this is no longer a bargaining chip in political games. It is the battle for our very existence and one we shall defend with our blood and will or be erased from the earth and history.”
Sheikh Al-Hijri, meanwhile, condemned the siege tactics in Sweida and made a rare public acknowledgement of Israel for what he described as efforts to minimise civilian casualties – an extraordinary statement in Syria’s current political climate.
The tensions are also not confined to the south. On Tuesday, the SDF accused Damascus and Turkish-backed factions of repeated ceasefire violations, warning that provocations were undermining the truce agreed on 1 April between Al-Sharaa’s administration and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi.
The group alleged artillery shelling, ground incursions, and attempted river crossings into SDF-held areas near Deir Hafer over several consecutive days.
The disputes with Druze leaders in the south and the SDF in the northeast underscore the scale of the challenges facing the Interim Government. Al-Sharaa’s administration has cast itself as the anchor of post-war stability, but its relationships with minorities and autonomous administrations remain strained by years of mistrust, unresolved grievances, and clashing political and security priorities.
The government faces a stark dilemma. Ignoring minority demands risks pushing them into open rebellion or into deeper alignment with the SDF. Attempting to suppress dissent could trigger a broader conflict, particularly if the SDF and allied tribal militias mount armed resistance. Conceding to decentralisation might preserve peace, but it would also mean ceding effective control over large parts of the country.
Regional actors are watching closely. Turkey, wary of Kurdish autonomy, may step up support for Damascus to counter the SDF’s influence. Iran, still backing Al-Assad loyalists, could exploit minority unrest to reassert itself, particularly among Alawites. Meanwhile, the US and Europe, key backers of the Interim Government, may face growing pressure to reconsider their support unless Al-Sharaa takes clear steps towards pluralistic governance.
The choices made now will determine whether Syria emerges from its transition as a unified state or fragments into semi-autonomous zones. If the grievances of its minorities remain unanswered, Damascus risks becoming the seat of a hollow government — recognised abroad but powerless at home.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 14 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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