Syria will hold its first parliamentary elections next week since the fall of the Al-Assad dynasty that ruled the country since the 1970s last December.
Officially, the vote is framed by the government of Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa as being a symbol of national recovery and democratic transition. In reality, however, it reflects a fractured landscape marked by volatility, exclusion, and unresolved disputes over the country’s political future.
Nearly half of Syrians will not participate, a reminder of both the Interim Government’s limited control and the deep divisions within Syrian society.
Internally, the government is struggling to secure its legitimacy among sectarian and ethnic groups that distrust or reject its projects. Externally, it faces relentless pressure from Israel, which has seized strategic ground on Mount Hermon and in Quneitra while launching repeated airstrikes deep into Syrian territory.
These operations, including recent strikes near Palmyra, Latakia, and Homs, appear to be designed to erode Syria’s military capacity and prevent the re-emergence of a centralised state.
The obstacles confronting the transition are profound. Less than a year after the Al-Assad regime’s collapse, fundamental questions remain unanswered. Can Syria hold together as a unified state? Can the Interim Government repel external encroachment and consolidate its authority? Can it forge a political consensus broad enough to command genuine popular support? And, crucially, can it impose order without triggering a relapse into sectarian and ethnic conflict?
In this uncertain context, scholars Patrick Haenni and Jérôme Drevon have turned their attention to the experience of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) in Idlib in northern Syria and to the transformation of its leader, Ahmed Al-Sharaa. Their new book, Transformed by the People: Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham’s Road to Power in Syria published in London by Hurst, offers a timely analysis of how a jihadi faction reinvented itself as a governing force in post-Al-Assad Syria.
Drawing on extensive fieldwork and interviews with HTS figures including Al-Sharaa, diplomats, and dissidents, Haenni and Drevon trace Al-Sharaa’s evolution from an Al-Qaeda-linked commander to a pragmatic centrist politician willing to negotiate even with former enemies, including Israel.
They argue that this shift was rooted in his years of governance in Idlib, where HTS moved away from uncompromising jihadism and sought to ground itself in nationalist politics.
Yet, the authors stress that HTS’ moderation is conditional and tactical, not necessarily ideological. Its tolerance of minority practices and outreach to international actors may reflect survival strategies rather than deep transformation. This leaves Syria’s fragile transition vulnerable to what they term “re-radicalisation from below” as hardline grassroots currents could still pull HTS and the country back towards extremism.
“We think it is evident that HTS is no longer a jihadist movement, although our book leaves this question as to what HTS has become. Being ‘jihadist’ ultimately means two things. First, it involves legitimising the fight against Muslim regimes that do not implement the jihadists’ understanding of Islamic law, one that includes full application of corporal punishments such as public executions. Second, it entails the legitimisation of violence against foreign countries, mainly Western states, that support these regimes. Both of these principles are rooted in a range of religious concepts central to jihadist ideology. HTS has genuinely moved away from this,” Haenni and Drevon said in an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly.
“In Idlib, HTS avoided implementing the jihadist version of Islamic law. Instead, it created a new religious authority to maintain political control and reduce dissent… In governance, HTS revived the classical schools of jurisprudence and even codified aspects of Islamic law, both to curb the influence of foreign jihadists and to control its own judiciary. Moreover, it fought bitter wars against both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, even executing members of the latter in public,” they said.
“Yet, what HTS is today remains uncertain. It is no longer jihadist, not truly Salafi (having stripped Salafism of its political demands), and it strongly opposes the Muslim Brotherhood both because they are a potential strong political contender and because opposing them is rewarding regionally. HTS has never clearly articulated its identity beyond being an Islamist movement, where Islam continues to inform its worldview but does not define a clear political project.”
The two scholars argue that HTS has undergone what they describe as a “Thermidorian shift” – a cooling period in which revolutionary fervour gives way to pragmatic governance. Thus, HTS has strategically softened its public image, reduced its overt jihadist rhetoric, and positioned itself as a credible governing authority.
This shift, imposed by the leadership but framed as reflecting the wishes of Syria’s “silent majority,” is intended to preserve the group’s relevance by addressing demands for order and stability over endless rebellion.
EMBRACE OF POLITICS: According to the two scholars, HTS stands out as one of the few jihadist movements to embrace politics not merely rhetorically but institutionally. It has embedded itself in governance structures, local administration, and service provision, presenting its moderation as authenticity rather than compromise.
By claiming to speak for the silent majority, HTS has marginalised more radical rivals such as the Islamic State group (IS) or Al-Qaeda loyalists, while simultaneously undermining the secular or Kurdish opposition. This positioning has helped neutralise internal dissent and appealed to external powers seeking stability in Syria.
Yet, the group’s pragmatic turn has not convinced all Syrians. Al-Sharaa and other transitional leaders face persistent scepticism, particularly from minorities and the urban middle class. For these constituencies, the claim to represent the nation rings hollow, especially as exclusionary practices deepen mistrust.
The parliamentary elections scheduled for 15 to 20 September in Syria illustrate these tensions. Three minority-dominated regions, Sweida, Hasakah, and Raqqa, are excluded from voting, officially on security grounds. The Syrian-Kurdish authorities have condemned the decision as undemocratic, warning that more than five million people are being deliberately disenfranchised.
The exclusion has intensified disputes between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus, particularly over the integration of Kurdish fighters and the governance of northern Syria. In Sweida, Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri has renewed calls for an independent Druze entity, citing the bloody clashes in July that left more than 2,000 people dead. This sectarian strife has eroded trust between the Druze community and the Interim Government, fuelling calls for self-determination.
Meanwhile, Syria’s Alawites, long at the centre of political power under Al-Assad, face new insecurity. Organising themselves into local councils, they advocate decentralised governance as a safeguard against persecution.
Their fears are not unfounded: the NGO the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has documented around 50 massacres of Alawites since the collapse of the former regime, resulting in approximately 1,400 deaths, though the true toll is likely to be higher due to the concealment of bodies.
Beyond minorities, discontent also runs deep within the urban middle class. Historically sceptical of extremism, this segment now views Damascus’ new rulers with disdain, citing raids on cafes, gender segregation in public offices, and the elevation of inexperienced or foreign-born officials unfamiliar with Syrian society. The resulting alienation risks further weakening the government’s credibility.
In sum, while HTS has redefined itself through pragmatic politics and appeals to a silent majority, Syria’s fragile social fabric remains under severe strain. The upcoming elections, far from unifying the country, may deepen mistrust among minorities and elites, leaving the promise of stability elusive.
Haenni and Drevon acknowledge that these developments undoubtedly pose a challenge to the government. “HTS’ performance after taking over Damascus has been ambiguous, both domestically and internationally. Internationally, the picture is relatively positive. The risk was the re-emergence of regional polarisation… The unexpectedly swift decision by Saudi Arabia to back Al-Sharaa altered the equation entirely, neutralising the danger of a foreign-led counter-revolution,” they said.
“HTS quickly cultivated ties with foreign states, strongly mobilising on a ‘zero problems with all states’ approach, both in the region and the West, and it has achieved a degree of legitimacy. Its leaders have met representatives from many countries, most unexpectedly when Al-Sharaa met US President Donald Trump in Saudi Arabia.”
“Several foreign governments have eased their sanctions on HTS, and it is likely that at least some UN Security Council restrictions will also be relaxed in the near future. For now, most external actors see no viable alternative to HTS rule and are therefore willing to engage with it. As a Western diplomat put it, ‘give him a chance and see.’ That said, concerns remain about its ability to stabilise the situation.”
Domestically, however, the situation is far more complex due to its lack of inclusivity, persistent unrest in Sweida, and unresolved questions over power-sharing with the Syrian Democratic Forces, argue Haenni and Drevon.
“On the positive side, the government’s authority has not been seriously contested. Despite the presence of dozens of large armed groups before 2025, there has been no struggle over the leadership of Syria. HTS has also managed to launch a transitional process, introducing a temporary constitution and initiating the formation of a new parliament. But the new administration has been criticised for concentrating power in the hands of a few, with limited transparency, accountability, or genuine power-sharing,” they said.
The dilemma lies not in the desire of Syria’s interim rulers to put Syria on the right path, but in their ability to do so. The experience of governing a small city like Idlib cannot be compared to governing a country the size of Syria, they added.
“The new authorities face a structural dilemma: too weak and insufficiently disciplined to restore order on their own, they are compelled to rely on proxies, popular mobilisation, and tribal surges (fazaa). Many of these fighters, however, are driven less by strategic calculation than by currents of Sunni supremacism and impulses of revenge, partly the legacy of 14 years of regime-engineered massacres.”
“This exposes one of the central challenges confronting the current leadership: after struggling to contain, and eventually silence, their radical fringes, they now face a fresh wave of violence that is neither ideological nor jihadi, but profoundly sectarian and rooted in the very core of their social base. This ‘extreme centre,’ emanating not from the margins but from the majority constituencies of the regime, has in turn produced a new ‘minority question,’” the two scholars said.
“Communities that feel threatened are holding their weapons close, oscillating between the mirage of independence, as in the case of the Druze, or hardening their bargaining positions by demanding international guarantees, as with the Kurds. The Alawites, meanwhile, risk becoming the combustible material for further attempts at regional destabilisation.”
ROLE OF MINORITIES: Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities are increasingly asserting their role in shaping the country’s post-Al-Assad future.
A coalition of Kurds, Druze, Alawites, Christians, and others recently held a major conference in Hasakah to debate the nature of a new political system, with another gathering planned in Raqqa. These moves highlight a growing determination among the minorities to secure guarantees of autonomy and protection.
External actors have also weighed in. US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack has argued that “Syria may need to consider alternatives to a strictly centralised state. I’m not talking about a federation in the literal sense, but something close to it, one that allows everyone to preserve their dignity, culture, and language, free from any threat from Islamism.”
However, the authorities in Damascus categorically reject decentralisation, raising the likelihood of escalating tensions with the Kurds, Druze, and potentially the Alawites.
Haenni and Drevon note that “the Hasakah meeting represents the first concerted attempt to politicise this ‘minority question’ in post-revolutionary Syria. In substance, however, it introduces little that is new: the Syrian Democratic Forces have long advocated decentralisation as a means of safeguarding their autonomy within the emerging Syrian state.”
“They negotiate with Damascus within a US-led international framework, yet they remain unwilling to make any strategic concessions without a clear understanding of the endgame and the structural features of the new state. Their efforts to construct political building blocks in parallel to the authorities reflect a continuation of longstanding policy, albeit with a notable shift: these efforts are evolving from the establishment of democratic-oriented structures towards formations that increasingly resemble blocks organised along minority lines.”
These developments stand among the most intricate challenges confronting post-Al-Assad Syria. While there is hope for the establishment of democratic, representative institutions, the reality on the ground increasingly resembles closed ethnic and sectarian enclaves.
A concurrent demographic shift is reshaping historically diverse regions, as marginalised and vulnerable communities are displaced to create pockets of ethnic and sectarian homogeneity. In Damascus’ Al-Sumaria neighbourhood, Alawites have been recently expelled, for example. In Hasakah and Raqqa, Arabs face mounting pressure under Kurdish administration, while in Sweida, Arab tribes compel Druze residents to leave, even as Druze communities reciprocate. Similar patterns of displacement are unfolding against Alawites along the coast.
These movements are not uniformly orchestrated by the authorities in Damascus. As Haenni and Drevon note, much of the violence and expulsion stems from a phenomenon of “radicalisation from below.”
Yet whether top-down or grassroots in origin, the effect is profound: these shifts exacerbate fragmentation, entrench divisions, and pose a dire threat to Syria’s long-term stability.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 11 September, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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