That suggestion, widely condemned across the Arab world—particularly by Egypt and Jordan—was seen as an attempt to dismantle the Palestinian cause altogether.

Earlier this month, Trump unveiled a 20-point proposal he called Peace in Gaza. The plan calls for a ceasefire, the release of all Israeli captives, a phased Israeli withdrawal, and the disarmament of Hamas.

But several of its provisions have drawn sharp criticism, especially those concerning Gaza’s future governance, which Trump’s framework places under a new entity known as the Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA).

The Britain Palestine Project (BPP), an educational and advocacy organization relaunched from the former Balfour Project, acknowledges Britain’s historic and continuing responsibility in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It works to promote justice, equality, and peace for both peoples, urging the UK government to recognize the State of Palestine and uphold international law and support equal rights and national self-determination for both peoples. 

In this exclusive Ahram Online interview, BPP’s Brivati offers his perspective on Trump’s plan, possible paths to ending the Gaza war, and the broader prospects for a durable peace in the Middle East.

The following interview reflects Brivati's personal opinions and not the official policy of the BPP.

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Ahram Online (AO): In your opinion, does Trump’s plan to end the Israeli war on Gaza represent a genuine step toward peace, or merely a temporary truce?

Brian Brivati (BB): The plan, for all its neatness, avoids the only question that matters in the long run: will Palestinians govern themselves, or will others govern them in perpetuity? It is the only question that matters for Palestinians and for Israelis; without Palestinian agency and a viable state, Israel will never have security.

The text is explicit: this is not yet a Palestinian state. The Imperial Peace Board overseeing Gaza is appointed, not elected, and chaired by Trump. Its laws and budgets must be approved externally. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is kept at arm’s length pending deep reforms, with no timetable or clear benchmarks. Elections are promised in theory, but no dates are given

In the meantime, Gaza is treated as an isolated project—administered by foreigners, supervised by donors, patrolled by international soldiers, and developed by real estate speculators.

Of course, there are arguments in favour of such an arrangement.

Israel seeks security, foreign governments want order, and donors demand guarantees that their funds won’t vanish into corruption or fund rockets—ideally benefiting their own companies. After years of blood and gold and misery, who would not welcome a breathing space? Yet a breathing space may simply precede a new quagmire.

The moral trade-off is stark.

What value is peace if it denies political rights? What kind of justice rebuilds workplaces that Palestinians may labour in but not own? What order is it when laws are written in Washington and London, not Ramallah or Gaza City? And what does this peace do for the structural violence of military occupation and creeping annexation of the West Bank? 

The United Nations’ (UN) New York Declaration at least confronted most, if not all, of these issues.

It set a clear 15-month deadline for elections, reunification of Gaza and the West Bank, and recognition of a Palestinian state, perhaps too ambitious, but rooted in the idea that without sovereignty, all else is temporary. Trump’s plan sidesteps that entirely. It offers calm now, but defers freedom to an undefined later date.

AO: Former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s name is now explicitly tied to the White House plan for an International Interim Administration for Gaza. What’s your assessment, given his controversial record?

BB: Any interim arrangement in Gaza must be Palestinian-led, short, legal, and legitimized by a clear path to self-determination. The US-backed concept of a Gaza International Transitional Authority, reportedly with Blair in a senior role, begins with a legitimacy deficit because it is not Palestinian-led.

Blair’s role is irrelevant; what matters is Palestinian agency.

Without an enforceable timeline to end the occupation, restore sovereignty, and hold free elections, parachuting a figure associated with past failures risks repeating them. What is needed is a UN-anchored, Arab-supported civilian administration accountable to Palestinians and explicitly time-bound.

Look closely at Article 9 of Trump’s plan. It references the Saudi-French proposal, which centres Palestinian agency. Built into the framework is an alternative that could emerge through negotiations; the Arab world must push with all its strength for this path.

AO: Reports say Netanyahu, after meeting Kushner and Witkoff, inserted amendments affecting Israeli withdrawal. He later said Israel would remain in most of the strip and keep long-term security control. How do you interpret these assertions?

BB: They confirm what Palestinians have long warned: that facts on the ground could hollow out a process billed as ending the war.

Reliable reporting shows Israel pushing edits that slow or limit withdrawal and entrench buffer zones. Netanyahu’s own statements that the army would remain “in most of Gaza” is not an “interim” arrangement, but amounts to a continuation of control by other means, contrary to international law and to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) orders to prevent further grave harm to Palestinians.

Any deal that normalizes permanent corridors, zones, or open‑ended “security control” will sabotage stability and perpetuate the cycle of violence.

Yet Trump, who doesn’t want to foot the bill, remains open to influence from Saudi Arabia and the Abraham Accords states. Those details could still shift. Netanyahu risks overplaying his hand because Trump is capable of biting that hand off, as he did when he urged Israel to halt bombardment once Hamas offered a hostage release. He is beholden to no one, including Israel.

AO: Do you believe Hamas could ever agree to disarm as stipulated in the Trump plan?

BB: Armed actors disarm when there is a credible political horizon and reliable guarantees. Recent Hamas statements indicate partial acceptance of parts of the US plan, such as hostage releases and the transfer of authority to a technocratic Palestinian body. The sticking points remain withdrawal, guarantees, and disarmament.

A workable path would be phased DDR—disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration—under international monitoring, modelled on Northern Ireland.

That could lay the basis for (1) ending the siege and occupation, (2) structured prisoner exchanges, (3) protections and amnesties for rank-and-file fighters, (4) inclusive Palestinian political renewal under the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and (5) verifiable security arrangements that don’t amount to indefinite Israeli control. Coercion alone won’t work; rights-based incentives might.

AO: What do you make of the recent wave of recognitions of a Palestinian state, including by the United Kingdom? Did public pressure and mass demonstrations play a role?

BB: The UK’s recognition on 21 September 2025 was historic and overdue. It aligns Britain with most of the world and with close partners, including France, Canada, and Australia, which also acted on the same day.

But recognition must be a starting point, not a substitute for action. It should come with concrete measures that defend Palestinian rights and the viability of two states.

And yes, public pressure mattered. Months of mass mobilizations, cross-party parliamentary calls, and civil society advocacy clearly shifted the political calculus.

AO: You’ve attended protests in London. What did demonstrators face?

BB: The protests have been diverse, overwhelmingly peaceful, and sustained. In recent days, police arrested nearly 500 people at a silent vigil in Trafalgar Square—most on suspicion of “supporting a proscribed organization” under counter-terrorism law. The government has since announced new powers to restrict repeat protests, citing their cumulative impact.

Whatever one’s view, it’s troubling when peaceful assembly meets mass arrests and expanding restrictions. The proper response to public conscience is engagement, not criminalization. Though in many ways these demonstrations are now irrelevant. Trump’s peace plan train has left the station. The question now is how to influence the plan—mitigating the bad and reinforcing the good—with Palestinian agency as the central principle.

AO: Does Europe have real leverage over the course of the war? What concrete steps could it take to help end it?

BB: Europe’s leverage is significant—the EU is a top trade partner and key supplier of defence and dual-use goods. To use that leverage responsibly, Europe should:

1. Condition engagement: Advance the proposal to suspend parts of the European Union (EU)-Israel Association Agreement and sanction extremist ministers and violent settlers.
2. Impose an arms embargo: Apply the EU Common Position when there is clear risk of serious international humanitarian law violations—some member states already have.
3. Support international law enforcement: Back the International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ) processes and insist on compliance with provisional measures.
4. Open and monitor crossings: Resource and, when feasible, redeploy the EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) to facilitate civilian movement and aid under the PA.
5. Ban settlement trade and finance: Target the settlement enterprise with sanctions, aligning EU practice with its legal obligations.

These are realistic and available tools that can make a measurable difference.

• Immediate ceasefire, release of all hostages, and phased prisoner exchanges.
• Complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, removal of ad-hoc “corridors” and buffer zones, and lifting of the blockade under international verification.
• A Palestinian-led interim administration with a short mandate and a time-bound roadmap to elections across Gaza and the West Bank, supported by institutional reform and unified security governance.
• DDR for all armed factions, tied to political guarantees and rights protections, supervised by a UN-mandated, Arab-backed mechanism, not an indefinite foreign protectorate.
• Accountability through the ICC and ICJ, with victim-centred reparations.
• Reconstruction at scale, with open crossings, property-rights protection, and equitable economic access that restores dignity rather than managing poverty.
• A time-bound path to full Palestinian statehood on the 1967 lines, with equal rights and reciprocal security guarantees for both peoples—because rights and security stand or fall together.

That is the only route that is both just and strategically sustainable.