The underlying logic is that growing volumes of economic exchange, including the movement of goods, services, capital, and people, would gradually reduce the relative significance of conflict-related issues, such as territorial disputes.
The rationale is that as these economic interactions intensify, they create mutual and sustainable interests among conflicting parties, incentivizing them to freeze or postpone efforts to resolve disputes.
The anticipated economic gains from enhanced cooperation are presumed to outweigh any potential benefits derived from the continuation of conflict.
Crucially, these shifting interests and incentives are expected to affect not only governments—though their role remains vital—but also economic actors in the private sector, intellectual and academic elites, and, ultimately, the public.
This assumption has found support both theoretically and empirically.
On the theoretical level, numerous schools of thought have endorsed this view, foremost among them liberalism and various strands of economic integration theory. These approaches emerged as attempts to address how to prevent war and foster enduring peace.
Empirically, international relations have witnessed several regional experiences where existing disputes were neutralized or deprioritized to deepen economic integration.
A key example is the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967, which aimed to enhance economic cooperation among Southeast Asian nations.
ASEAN subsequently expanded its external partnerships through frameworks like ASEAN+3 (including China, Japan, and South Korea), ASEAN+6 (with the addition of Australia, India, and New Zealand), and other ASEAN-related formats.
The most significant experience, however, has been the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which brought together economies from various subregions.
APEC laid the foundation not only for talk of an “Asia-Pacific Community” as an emerging international bloc but also for a collective that transcended or neutralized numerous political, cultural, religious, and ideological divisions in favour of deepening trade and investment across and within regions.
This fostered shared economic gains on an unprecedented scale.
Undeniably, economic approaches have succeeded in addressing many regional disputes over the past decades.
The ASEAN and APEC experiences, in particular, demonstrate how economic integration can marginalize the salience of specific conflicts.
However, these successes have not led to a readiness among parties to engage in historic settlements.
Despite the progress in expanding economic exchanges, core disputes have resurfaced with vigour.
For example, the South China Sea dispute has reemerged as a central flashpoint.
The Taiwan issue has again imposed itself on regional dynamics with growing intensity.
Other unresolved conflicts persist, such as those over islands between China and Japan and between Japan and Russia.
In addition, historical sensitivities regarding Japanese militaristic nationalism continue to affect regional perceptions.
These developments suggest that while economic engagement may temporarily reduce the relative importance of disputes, it does not necessarily place them on a definitive path toward peaceful resolution.
This conclusion raises a fundamental question about the conditions under which economic approaches can successfully neutralize conflicts.
One critical condition involves the stance of the dominant power(s) in the international system.
When such powers actively promote economic cooperation and support the logic of integration, they help create a conducive environment for sidelining or defusing regional conflicts.
The reverse, however, is equally true.
When the leading powers retreat from the values of economic interdependence and globalization, they inadvertently reopen space for conflict resurgence.
This risk is further amplified when regional states lose trust in these powers as reliable security allies or when the dominant power shows signs of abandoning globalization.
For decades, the United States’ alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, coupled with its commitment to globalization and free trade, underpinned regional security.
But as confidence in Washington’s reliability wanes—and as it retreats from globalization and free trade—the reemergence of historical disputes has become increasingly likely.
Indeed, the US has, in some instances, transitioned from a stabilizing force to an active party in these conflicts.
A second condition pertains to the centrality of economic development as a national and regional goal.
The greater the consensus among states in a given region on prioritizing development, the more inclined they are to freeze or postpone existing disputes.
The assumption is that this willingness only endures as long as the development objective remains unfulfilled.
Once achieved, states may revisit unresolved disputes and reconfigure their strategic priorities—especially if the development process results in significant shifts in military or economic power.
At that point, some parties may seek to revive or resolve conflicts under newly favourable conditions.
This shift often occurs in tandem with changes in the orientation of the international system’s dominant powers, as noted earlier.
A third and no less critical condition relates to the nature of the conflict and the behaviour of its actors.
It is unrealistic to expect that one party to a dispute can persist in aggressive practices while expecting others in the region to overlook such behaviour—even if those others are not direct participants in the conflict.
Such behaviour undermines the foundations of any practical economic approach to conflict resolution.
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict offers a powerful illustration of this point.
It is difficult to imagine any meaningful regional economic framework gaining traction in the face of Israel’s aggressive policies against Palestinians and its ongoing efforts to deny them their legitimate right to establish an independent state.
Under such conditions, the prospects of replicating other regional economic successes—however temporarily—are slim.
This was captured in President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi’s remarks at the most recent Arab League summit, where he stated: “Even if Israel succeeds in signing normalization agreements with all Arab states, a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East will remain out of reach unless a Palestinian state is established, in accordance with international legitimacy.”
The experiences of ASEAN and APEC exemplify how economic integration can marginalize the significance of conflicts.
Yet, despite the impressive achievements made in expanding and deepening economic relations, this has not led to a willingness among the concerned parties to engage in historic or final settlements.
*Mohamed Fayez Farahat is Chairman of the Board of Al-Ahram Press Foundation and the former director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
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