The Somali Al-Shabaab group ranked as the world’s fourth deadliest terrorist organisation in 2024, according to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The number of deaths attributed to the group declined by 25 per cent from 512 in 2023 to 387 in 2024. The total number of attacks linked to the group dropped to 156 last year, the lowest since 2014.
This notable decline in activity over the past two years can be attributed to counterterrorism operations led by the Somali government and allied local clan militias known as ma’awisley. According to a report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) published in April 2023, Somali forces regained control of more than 215 locations from Al-Shabaab during the first phase of the counterterror offensive. Most of these locations are situated in the Federal States of Hirshabelle and Galmudug.
However, the momentum of the Somali security forces did not last. By early 2025, Al-Shabaab had re-escalated its operations. According to ACLED and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the group’s monthly attacks in Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle increased by roughly 50 per cent in 2025 compared to the previous year’s monthly average. The group also retook control of Adan Yabal, a town that had served as its central base in central Somalia for over a decade until it was seized by Somali forces in December 2022.
As part of its expansion strategy, Al-Shabaab opened a second front south of Mogadishu, where it captured several strategic villages in March 2025. As a result, Al-Shabaab realised an important logistical gain: reconnecting its operational zones in central and southern Somalia for the first time since 2022. It also began threatening the main roads linking Mogadishu with central Somalia.
Al-Shabaab conducted several high-profile operations in the first third of 2025. On 18 March, it claimed responsibility for an attempted attack on Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s convoy at the gates of the presidential palace in Mogadishu. On 19 April, it claimed responsibility for an attack against the Somali intelligence headquarters in Mogadishu, signalling its intention to strengthen its influence in the heart of the capital.
Over the years, Al-Shabaab has developed a resilience that has enabled it to survive repeated military setbacks. It has steadily built its human resources: while the African Union (AU) estimated its members at 2,000 in 2008, UN estimates in 2024 placed its core strength at 7,000 to 12,000 fighters. The group has also diversified its sources of revenue, which range from illicit trade in charcoal, sugar, and other goods to extorting civilians. Recent UN reports estimate Al-Shabaab’s annual revenue at between $100 million and $200 million.
Currently, the group is working to upgrade its military capabilities, including by incorporating drones into associated electronic warfare (EW) devices in its arsenal. It has recently been recruiting individuals with the necessary engineering expertise to adapt drones to its operational purposes. UN reports also indicate that the group is experimenting with 3D printing to develop explosives and drone components.
Al-Shabaab is also expanding its pragmatic alliances with various violent non-state actors, most notably the Ansarullah (Houthi) Movement in Yemen. Cooperation has increased in small arms and light weapons smuggling. US intelligence reports speak of drone transfers from the Houthis to Al-Shabaab, a development with potentially far-reaching implications for regional security.
As the foregoing suggests, Al-Shabaab’s activities cannot be viewed in isolation. Since it emerged in 2002, the group has benefited from the Somali government’s inability to assert control over vast swathes of national territory, especially rural areas. It has also taken advantage of the ongoing chronic security, political, and economic crises in the country stemming from weak state institutions, poor organisation, low distributive reach, as well as persistent tribal and clan conflicts – the clan remains the basic unit for interactions between the state and society. The heightened tensions and instability generated by the combination of these factors create fertile soil for terrorism.
In tandem with the faltering momentum of the government’s counterterrorism drive, the AU’s new mission in Somalia is facing significant challenges. The African Union Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which replaced the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) at the outset of this year, is shackled by severe funding shortages, which undermine its ability to build its operational presence.
An estimated $96 million financing shortfall has hampered its logistics and supply capacities and thus its operational performance and sustainability. Disputes among troop-contributing countries have further weakened the mission, especially following Burundi’s withdrawal following disagreements over troop allocations.
From a broader regional perspective, recent developments, such as the rise to power of Hayaat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) in Damascus in December 2024 and the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, have provided armed non-state actors with models of what can be achieved through patience, resilience, and pragmatic manoeuvring, especially within broader contexts that permit such outcomes.
Some analysts believe that Al-Shabaab may try to emulate the HTS or Taliban models. For now, it is unlikely to mount a coordinated assault against the capital with the aim of seizing power. Instead, it will probably capitalise on its recent gains in central and southern Somalia to build up military and economic pressure on the central government to both destabilise it and undermine its legitimacy.
Al-Shabaab’s ability to rebound and recapture territory underscores the need to reinforce and sustain the Somali government’s counterterrorism capacities. This must be accompanied by greater regional cooperation in intelligence-sharing and joint action. These efforts must further be complemented by non-military actions, especially in the realm of long-term sustainable development plans to alleviate poverty and address other urgent needs of the Somali people, thereby depriving the group of recruitment sources.
*The writer is an international terrorism researcher at the Egyptian Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS).
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