It is now beyond doubt that the US-Israeli war on Iran, which lasted from 13 to 24 June, and the preceding developments in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria will lead to a significant reconfiguration of the Middle East and its power dynamics. It is also likely that these events will reshape the roles of the major international powers in the region, as well as regional perceptions of their influence and engagement.
These developments have reaffirmed the centrality of the United States as a dominant political and military actor in the Middle East. US President Donald Trump’s statements exude a sense of triumph, suggesting that Washington has emerged from the conflict with enhanced credibility, especially in its ability to support allies, challenge adversaries, and shape outcomes.
The United States provided both indirect military support and direct diplomatic cover for Israel and even took part in the 22 June strikes on Iran. It is expected that US military deployments in the region will continue in the coming months as a deterrent force, particularly while sensitive negotiations between Washington and Tehran remain unresolved. At the same time, the US is poised to extract economic and strategic benefits from them through investments and arms sales.
Politically, Washington will seek to consolidate its gains by either tightening sanctions on Iran or offering a face-saving diplomatic agreement. The latter could involve a carefully calibrated package of incentives, including the easing of economic sanctions that have severely burdened Iranian society.
In this endeavour, the US will rely on support from its European allies and regional partners. Concurrently, it will intensify its efforts to persuade the Arab states, chiefly Syria and Lebanon, to normalise relations with Israel. These initiatives serve broader US strategic interests, reinforcing its global standing and ensuring its leadership within the international order.
In contrast, Russia’s response has been limited to rhetorical condemnation, characterising the US-Israeli military campaign as an unjustified act of aggression. Moscow expressed a willingness to mediate but refrained from offering tangible military or diplomatic initiatives. This passive stance is likely due to Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, as well as the absence of a mutual defence clause in its January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with Iran.
It is expected that Russia will continue to avoid entanglement in military conflicts in the Middle East, prioritising the maintenance of its bases in Hmeimim and Tartus in Syria and coordinating with Israel to prevent unintended escalation. Russia briefly benefited from the spike in oil prices during the conflict and will likely persist in pursuing pragmatic economic engagement with all regional actors, regardless of their governance systems or foreign policy orientations. It will seek to avoid any confrontation that could jeopardise its tenuous balance with the United States.
Nonetheless, there is likely to be growing discontent within Iran regarding Russia’s restrained posture, an unease that may extend to intellectual circles across the Arab world. To salvage its regional credibility, Moscow may be compelled to deepen economic ties with Iran and boost investments in its strained economy.
China has adopted a similarly restrained approach. It condemned the Israeli-American strikes as violations of Iranian sovereignty and called for restraint, a ceasefire, and the resumption of dialogue. This stance is in line with Beijing’s broader strategic posture: non-interventionism, safeguarding energy flows from the Gulf, and preserving trade with all regional states.
While it urged all the parties to resolve disputes peacefully, many in Tehran may feel disappointed by China’s lack of robust support, especially given the depth of the Sino-Iranian relationship, formalised by a 25-year Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in March 2021. In response to this disappointment, Beijing may intensify economic cooperation with Iran, potentially participating in post-war reconstruction and infrastructure rehabilitation.
The European Union, for its part, played only a marginal role throughout the conflict. Former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to Washington Prince Turki Al-Faisal described the EU’s posture as one of “cowardice.” The bloc issued muted statements urging calm and warning against the risk of regional escalation, but it failed to propose any substantive initiative or to respond decisively to Israel’s violations of its partnership agreement with the EU. In effect, the EU aligned itself closely with the US approach.
In the months ahead, the European trio of France, Germany, and the UK may re-engage diplomatically with the Iranian nuclear issue. Yet, given the persistent absence of a unified EU vision for the Middle East, Europe’s role is likely to remain limited, with a primary focus on humanitarian aid rather than strategic influence.
This evolving landscape demonstrates that the United States remains the only power willing and able to exercise military force in the Middle East in defence of Israel. Even when European states participated in joint operations against the Houthis in Yemen, they did so under US command. Meanwhile, China, Russia, and the EU have confined themselves to issuing political statements and press releases, avoiding any action that could provoke a direct confrontation with Washington.
Trump now appears eager to capitalise on this historical moment. He is seeking a resolution with Iran and a 60-day ceasefire in Gaza, during which US- and Arab-brokered negotiations between Israel and Hamas would take place. This may be followed by efforts to resolve other regional conflicts in line with Washington’s broader vision for security and stability in the Middle East.
Of course, this analysis rests on the assumption that current regional and international dynamics will hold. But the critical question remains: could unforeseen events or shifts emerge that might upend these assumptions?
The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University. This article is published in collaboration with the Future Centre for Advanced Research and Studies.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 10 July, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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