The multitude of crises in Egypt’s immediate neighbourhood — including the war on Gaza, the appalling humanitarian situation of its population, the looming threat of liquidating the Palestinian cause, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the fragile civil peace in Libya and its total absence in Sudan, and the threats to the security of the Red Sea and the stability of the Horn of Africa — compel Egypt to pursue a prudent and proactive foreign policy.
As a regional power, Egypt’s role must focus on building peace, ending wars, resolving conflicts, and curbing arms races.
Egypt also requires the constant and careful calibration of the spaces for cooperation, coordination, and divergence with its Arab allies, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, and Qatar, as well as with influential regional actors like Turkey, despite disagreements on certain issues. Furthermore, Egypt must navigate its relations with states that undermine Middle Eastern security, whether through direct military aggression, as in the case of Israel, or proxy violence, as practiced systematically by Iran.
The accurate assessment of areas of convergence and divergence between Cairo and other regional capitals is a prerequisite for the effective articulation of multilateral diplomatic initiatives aimed at peace-building and conflict resolution.
Capitals such as Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Amman, and Ankara are aligned closely with Cairo on the necessity of ending the Gaza war, halting the genocide perpetrated by the Israeli government through killing and starvation, and restoring the two-state solution to the forefront of regional and international agendas.
While Cairo, alongside Doha, has led Arab efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza, ensure the delivery of humanitarian and medical assistance to more than two million Palestinians, and adopt a comprehensive reconstruction plan that confronts the crimes of forced displacement, Egyptian diplomacy also supported the joint Saudi-French initiative that culminated in a United Nations-sponsored conference advocating the two-state solution and reviving the principle of “land for peace” or “a Palestinian state in return for Arab normalisation with Israel.”
This combination of leadership, as demonstrated in Cairo’s efforts to end the Gaza war, and support, as reflected in its backing of the two-state conference, also characterises Egypt’s management of humanitarian and medical aid. Egypt spearheaded aid delivery through its land crossings with Gaza once international and regional pressure forced a shift in the Israeli government’s criminal practices — namely, the use of starvation as a weapon. Cairo welcomed Emirati and Jordanian airdrops (alongside other regional and international efforts) to prevent famine among the Palestinians.
In regions marked by complex geopolitical realities, intertwined power relations, and long histories of competition, tension, and conflict, as is the case in the Middle East, the interplay between leadership and support, between being on the frontlines and stepping back when necessary, constitutes the hallmark of a rational and active foreign policy. Such a policy acknowledges that the era of a single state’s dominance over the region has ended, if it ever truly existed, and that the balance of power among regional capitals precludes any one of them from unilaterally dictating the terms of war and peace.
It does not diminish Egypt’s stature to cooperate with Qatar in mediating an end to the Gaza war, nor does it undermine its role to support Saudi initiatives aimed at reviving the two-state solution. Egypt’s partnership with regional and international actors in delivering aid to the people of Gaza exemplifies a pragmatic approach grounded in the recognition that Israel’s current far-right government, at the height of its militaristic arrogance and genocidal tendencies, only reverses (some but not all) of its crimes when met with a combination of regional rejection and international pressure.
In the context of the Middle East, with its intricate political dynamics and delicate power structures, Cairo, as a leading regional capital, must not allow superficial commentary on the alleged decline of its role or the limited efficacy of its diplomacy to influence its collaborative efforts with other capitals. Cooperation and coordination, particularly when rooted in a division of labour that balances leadership in some arenas with support in others, form the essence of a rational and dynamic foreign policy, especially when there is convergence of vision and interest with regional partners.
At the same time, certain divergences persist between Egypt’s policies and those of some Arab allies and Turkey concerning Libya, Sudan, the GERD, and Red Sea and Horn of Africa security. Such divergences should not be equated automatically with competition, tension, or conflict. Rather, they are a reality of contemporary interstate relations in complex regions like the Middle East. These differences call for constructive and proactive engagement on Cairo’s part to safeguard national interests and mitigate the levels of tension and conflict in its surroundings.
For example, Egypt can leverage the recent positive shift in its bilateral relations with Ankara to help consolidate the existing truce between eastern and western Libya, avert renewed civil violence, and encourage both sides to reach a consensus, albeit a minimal one, that preserves national unity and ensures stability.
A similar constructive approach applies to other areas of divergence. Egypt’s clear positions — support for the Sudanese Armed Forces, the call for a binding international agreement on equitable Nile water-sharing, the view of Red Sea security as a collective arrangement not subject to unilateral control, and the rejection of non-littoral military and logistical presence along the Horn of Africa — can be advanced by drawing on Cairo’s special relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Such relations can help contain differences and maximise common ground that protects shared interests.
Egypt has a vital interest in restoring Sudan’s stability, an objective that neither Riyadh nor Abu Dhabi is likely to oppose. The GERD, which represents an existential threat to Egypt, may benefit from the UAE’s close ties with Ethiopia in pursuit of a peaceful and negotiated resolution. The security of the Red Sea, given the disastrous consequences of Houthi actions in Yemen on Suez Canal revenues and hence Egypt’s treasury, and the situation in the Horn of Africa, where Ethiopia seeks a strategic foothold, are issues that necessitate coordination between Riyadh, with its regional weight, and Cairo, with its naval capabilities and longstanding political and diplomatic presence in both the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
The most challenging issues in Egypt’s regional foreign policy, however, are those involving engagement with regional powers that routinely undermine security and stability, namely, Israel and Iran, pushing the entire region to the brink of disaster.
On the one hand, Egypt has successfully avoided open escalation with Israel since 7 October 2023, despite the crimes committed by its far-right government in Gaza and the West Bank and its repeated provocations along the Gaza-Sinai border. On the other hand, Cairo has translated its strategic commitment to peace into a prudent continuation of its diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv and its investment in mediation and negotiation efforts between Israelis and Palestinians. Ultimately, Egypt has upheld the Peace Treaty with Israel, safeguarded its national security by preventing the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, and maintained its role as an Arab power steadfastly supportive of Palestinian self-determination and committed to realising that right.
Yet, the ongoing war in Gaza, with its severe human and material toll, poses a serious threat to Egypt’s security and interests, in the same way as Israel’s expansive militarism across the region, its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, and its strategic gains from successive strikes against Iran and its proxies. The resultant arms race threatens to engulf the region following Israel’s demonstrated superiority in quantity, quality, technology, and intelligence capabilities.
In this context, Cairo has no alternative but to combine its peaceful bilateral engagement with Israel with the launch, or renewal, of diplomatic initiatives calling for an end to wars, the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free Middle East, a halt to arms races, and the development of collective security arrangements. These should commit all Middle Eastern states to non-aggression and peaceful conflict resolution. Egypt must present or re-present such proposals to all regional capitals, including Tel Aviv, and insist on the principles of non-intervention and peaceful settlement, even if such proposals are rejected or dismissed by Israel.
Egypt’s objective here is twofold: first, to establish a regional and international case against Israel’s far-right government; second, to inform Israeli public opinion that Egypt, alongside the Arab states and Turkey, seeks non-aggression, pursues peaceful resolutions, aspires to collective security arrangements, and endeavours to halt the madness of arms races that push the region toward catastrophe.
As for Iran, Egypt’s policy must combine efforts to dissuade a return to proxy violence with openness to negotiating the nuclear issue. At the same time, Cairo must coordinate with regional powers to contain the damage inflicted by the Houthi proxy on Red Sea security, shipping lanes, and the revenues of the Suez Canal, and thus on Egyptian interests, as well as mitigate the threats posed by the Houthis and other proxies to statehood and civil peace in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon.
The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 7 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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